[oe-commits] [meta-openembedded] 15/17: proftpd: CVE-2016-3125
git at git.openembedded.org
git at git.openembedded.org
Thu Apr 28 08:48:59 UTC 2016
martin_jansa pushed a commit to branch master-next
in repository meta-openembedded.
commit 7a690a84e1a9ac1662cfd975226b4693ac7c26d2
Author: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache at windriver.com>
AuthorDate: Wed Apr 27 16:57:57 2016 +0300
proftpd: CVE-2016-3125
The mod_tls module in ProFTPD before 1.3.5b and 1.3.6 before
1.3.6rc2 does not properly handle the TLSDHParamFile directive,
which might cause a weaker than intended Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
to be used and consequently allow attackers to have unspecified
impact via unknown vectors.
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-3125
Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache at windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa at gmail.com>
---
.../proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 248 insertions(+)
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69c9be0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+From 7a8f683cedf9b0d1024a80362693c9f8b93a0f2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: TJ Saunders <tj at castaglia.org>
+Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 15:07:58 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Backport of fix for Bug#4230 to 1.3.5 branch.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-3125
+
+Author: TJ Saunders <tj at castaglia.org>
+Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache at windriver.com>
+---
+ contrib/mod_tls.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/mod_tls.c b/contrib/mod_tls.c
+index df92658..5883cc7 100644
+--- a/contrib/mod_tls.c
++++ b/contrib/mod_tls.c
+@@ -411,6 +411,13 @@ static int tls_required_on_ctrl = 0;
+ static int tls_required_on_data = 0;
+ static unsigned char *tls_authenticated = NULL;
+
++/* Define the minimum DH group length we allow (unless the AllowWeakDH
++ * TLSOption is used). Ideally this would be 2048, per https://weakdh.org,
++ * but for compatibility with older Java versions, which only support up to
++ * 1024, we'll use 1024. For now.
++ */
++#define TLS_DH_MIN_LEN 1024
++
+ /* mod_tls session flags */
+ #define TLS_SESS_ON_CTRL 0x0001
+ #define TLS_SESS_ON_DATA 0x0002
+@@ -438,6 +445,7 @@ static unsigned char *tls_authenticated = NULL;
+ #define TLS_OPT_USE_IMPLICIT_SSL 0x0200
+ #define TLS_OPT_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATIONS 0x0400
+ #define TLS_OPT_VERIFY_CERT_CN 0x0800
++#define TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH 0x1000
+
+ /* mod_tls SSCN modes */
+ #define TLS_SSCN_MODE_SERVER 0
+@@ -2417,24 +2425,139 @@ static int tls_ctrl_renegotiate_cb(CALLBACK_FRAME) {
+
+ static DH *tls_dh_cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) {
+ DH *dh = NULL;
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
++ int pkeylen = 0, use_pkeylen = FALSE;
++
++ /* OpenSSL will only ever call us (currently) with a keylen of 512 or 1024;
++ * see the SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH macro in ssl_locl.h. Sigh.
++ *
++ * Thus we adjust the DH parameter length according to the size of the
++ * RSA/DSA private key used for the current connection.
++ *
++ * NOTE: This MAY cause interoperability issues with some clients, notably
++ * Java 7 (and earlier) clients, since Java 7 and earlier supports
++ * Diffie-Hellman only up to 1024 bits. More sighs. To deal with these
++ * clients, then, you need to configure a certificate/key of 1024 bits.
++ */
++ pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
++ if (pkey != NULL) {
++ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
++ EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
++ pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
++
++ if (pkeylen < TLS_DH_MIN_LEN) {
++ if (!(tls_opts & TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH)) {
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
++ "certificate private key length %d less than %d bits, using %d "
++ "(see AllowWeakDH TLSOption)", pkeylen, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN,
++ TLS_DH_MIN_LEN);
++ pkeylen = TLS_DH_MIN_LEN;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (pkeylen != keylen) {
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 13,
++ "adjusted DH parameter length from %d to %d bits", keylen, pkeylen);
++ use_pkeylen = TRUE;
++ }
++ }
++ }
+
+ if (tls_tmp_dhs != NULL &&
+ tls_tmp_dhs->nelts > 0) {
+ register unsigned int i;
+- DH **dhs;
++ DH *best_dh = NULL, **dhs;
++ int best_dhlen = 0;
+
+ dhs = tls_tmp_dhs->elts;
++
++ /* Search the configured list of DH parameters twice: once for any sizes
++ * matching the actual requested size (usually 1024), and once for any
++ * matching the certificate private key size (pkeylen).
++ *
++ * This behavior allows site admins to configure a TLSDHParamFile that
++ * contains 1024-bit parameters, for e.g. Java 7 (and earlier) clients.
++ */
++
++ /* Note: the keylen argument is in BITS, but DH_size() returns the number
++ * of BYTES.
++ */
+ for (i = 0; i < tls_tmp_dhs->nelts; i++) {
+- /* Note: the keylength argument is in BITS, but DH_size() returns
+- * the number of BYTES.
++ int dhlen;
++
++ dhlen = DH_size(dhs[i]) * 8;
++ if (dhlen == keylen) {
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
++ "found matching DH parameter for key length %d", keylen);
++ return dhs[i];
++ }
++
++ /* Try to find the next "best" DH to use, where "best" means
++ * the smallest DH that is larger than the necessary keylen.
+ */
+- if (DH_size(dhs[i]) == (keylength / 8)) {
++ if (dhlen > keylen) {
++ if (best_dh != NULL) {
++ if (dhlen < best_dhlen) {
++ best_dh = dhs[i];
++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
++ }
++
++ } else {
++ best_dh = dhs[i];
++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ for (i = 0; i < tls_tmp_dhs->nelts; i++) {
++ int dhlen;
++
++ dhlen = DH_size(dhs[i]) * 8;
++ if (dhlen == pkeylen) {
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
++ "found matching DH parameter for certificate private key length %d",
++ pkeylen);
+ return dhs[i];
+ }
++
++ if (dhlen > pkeylen) {
++ if (best_dh != NULL) {
++ if (dhlen < best_dhlen) {
++ best_dh = dhs[i];
++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
++ }
++
++ } else {
++ best_dh = dhs[i];
++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (best_dh != NULL) {
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
++ "using best DH parameter for key length %d (length %d)", keylen,
++ best_dhlen);
++ return best_dh;
+ }
+ }
+
+- switch (keylength) {
++ /* Still no DH parameters found? Use the built-in ones. */
++
++ if (keylen < TLS_DH_MIN_LEN) {
++ if (!(tls_opts & TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH)) {
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
++ "requested key length %d less than %d bits, using %d "
++ "(see AllowWeakDH TLSOption)", keylen, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN);
++ keylen = TLS_DH_MIN_LEN;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (use_pkeylen) {
++ keylen = pkeylen;
++ }
++
++ switch (keylen) {
+ case 512:
+ dh = get_dh512();
+ break;
+@@ -2443,32 +2566,33 @@ static DH *tls_dh_cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) {
+ dh = get_dh768();
+ break;
+
+- case 1024:
+- dh = get_dh1024();
+- break;
++ case 1024:
++ dh = get_dh1024();
++ break;
+
+- case 1536:
+- dh = get_dh1536();
+- break;
++ case 1536:
++ dh = get_dh1536();
++ break;
+
+- case 2048:
+- dh = get_dh2048();
+- break;
++ case 2048:
++ dh = get_dh2048();
++ break;
+
+- default:
+- tls_log("unsupported DH key length %d requested, returning 1024 bits",
+- keylength);
+- dh = get_dh1024();
+- break;
++ default:
++ tls_log("unsupported DH key length %d requested, returning 1024 bits",
++ keylen);
++ dh = get_dh1024();
++ break;
+ }
+
++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11, "using builtin DH for %d bits", keylen);
++
+ /* Add this DH to the list, so that it can be freed properly later. */
+ if (tls_tmp_dhs == NULL) {
+ tls_tmp_dhs = make_array(session.pool, 1, sizeof(DH *));
+ }
+
+ *((DH **) push_array(tls_tmp_dhs)) = dh;
+-
+ return dh;
+ }
+
+@@ -8445,6 +8569,9 @@ MODRET set_tlsoptions(cmd_rec *cmd) {
+ strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "AllowClientRenegotiations") == 0) {
+ opts |= TLS_OPT_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATIONS;
+
++ } else if (strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "AllowWeakDH") == 0) {
++ opts |= TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH;
++
+ } else if (strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "EnableDiags") == 0) {
+ opts |= TLS_OPT_ENABLE_DIAGS;
+
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb
index 5bed85b..57d4984 100644
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.proftpd.org/distrib/source/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://contrib.patch \
file://build_fixup.patch \
file://proftpd.service \
+ file://CVE-2016-3125.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b9d3092411478415b31d435f8e26d173"
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