[oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 40/57: busybox: 1.27.2 -> 1.28.0
git at git.openembedded.org
git at git.openembedded.org
Thu Feb 15 13:31:39 UTC 2018
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rpurdie pushed a commit to branch master-next
in repository openembedded-core.
commit 0a29a5b0cdc853e2972da63f771933fca2238ab3
Author: Huang Qiyu <huangqy.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
AuthorDate: Fri Feb 9 13:11:34 2018 +0800
busybox: 1.27.2 -> 1.28.0
1.Upgrade busybox from 1.27.2 to 1.28.0.
2.Delete CVE-2011-5325.patch, busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch, since it is integrated upstream.
3.Modify busybox-udhcpc-no_deconfig.patch, since the data has been changed.
Signed-off-by: Huang Qiyu <huangqy.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
---
.../busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch | 481 ---------------------
.../busybox/busybox/busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch | 43 --
.../busybox/busybox-udhcpc-no_deconfig.patch | 12 +-
.../{busybox_1.27.2.bb => busybox_1.28.0.bb} | 6 +-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 534 deletions(-)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch
deleted file mode 100755
index 0926107..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,481 +0,0 @@
-busybox-1.27.2: Fix CVE-2011-5325
-
-[No upstream tracking] -- https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=8411
-
-libarchive: do not extract unsafe symlinks
-
-Prevent unsafe links extracting unless env variable $EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1
-is not set. Untarring file with -C DESTDIR parameter could be extracted with
-unwanted symlinks. This doesn't feel right, and IIRC GNU tar doesn't do that.
-Include necessary changes from previous commits.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=bc9bbeb2b81001e8731cd2ae501c8fccc8d87cc7]
-CVE: CVE-2011-5325
-bug: 8411
-Signed-off-by: Radovan Scasny <radovan.scasny at siemens.com>
-Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek at siemens.com>
-
-diff --git a/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src b/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src
-index 942e755..e1a8a75 100644
---- a/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src
-+++ b/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src
-@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ COMMON_FILES:= \
- data_extract_all.o \
- data_extract_to_stdout.o \
- \
-+ unsafe_symlink_target.o \
-+\
- filter_accept_all.o \
- filter_accept_list.o \
- filter_accept_reject_list.o \
-diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
-index 1830ffb..b828b65 100644
---- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
-+++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
-@@ -128,10 +128,9 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
- res = link(hard_link, dst_name);
- if (res != 0 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)) {
- /* shared message */
-- bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink "
-- "%s to %s", "hard",
-- dst_name,
-- hard_link);
-+ bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-+ "hard", dst_name, hard_link
-+ );
- }
- /* Hardlinks have no separate mode/ownership, skip chown/chmod */
- goto ret;
-@@ -178,15 +177,17 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
- case S_IFLNK:
- /* Symlink */
- //TODO: what if file_header->link_target == NULL (say, corrupted tarball?)
-- res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name);
-- if (res != 0
-- && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
-- ) {
-- /* shared message */
-- bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink "
-- "%s to %s", "sym",
-- dst_name,
-- file_header->link_target);
-+ if (!unsafe_symlink_target(file_header->link_target)) {
-+ res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name);
-+ if (res != 0
-+ && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
-+ ) {
-+ /* shared message */
-+ bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-+ "sym",
-+ dst_name, file_header->link_target
-+ );
-+ }
- }
- break;
- case S_IFSOCK:
-diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ee46e28
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
-+/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
-+/*
-+ * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree.
-+ */
-+#include "libbb.h"
-+#include "bb_archive.h"
-+
-+int FAST_FUNC unsafe_symlink_target(const char *target)
-+{
-+ const char *dot;
-+
-+ if (target[0] == '/') {
-+ const char *var;
-+unsafe:
-+ var = getenv("EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS");
-+ if (var) {
-+ if (LONE_CHAR(var, '1'))
-+ return 0; /* pretend it's safe */
-+ return 1; /* "UNSAFE!" */
-+ }
-+ bb_error_msg("skipping unsafe symlink to '%s' in archive,"
-+ " set %s=1 to extract",
-+ target,
-+ "EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS"
-+ );
-+ /* Prevent further messages */
-+ setenv("EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS", "0", 0);
-+ return 1; /* "UNSAFE!" */
-+ }
-+
-+ dot = target;
-+ for (;;) {
-+ dot = strchr(dot, '.');
-+ if (!dot)
-+ return 0; /* safe target */
-+
-+ /* Is it a path component starting with ".."? */
-+ if ((dot[1] == '.')
-+ && (dot == target || dot[-1] == '/')
-+ /* Is it exactly ".."? */
-+ && (dot[2] == '/' || dot[2] == '\0')
-+ ) {
-+ goto unsafe;
-+ }
-+ /* NB: it can even be trailing ".", should only add 1 */
-+ dot += 1;
-+ }
-+}
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/archival/unzip.c b/archival/unzip.c
-index 9037262..270e261 100644
---- a/archival/unzip.c
-+++ b/archival/unzip.c
-@@ -335,6 +335,44 @@ static void unzip_create_leading_dirs(const char *fn)
- free(name);
- }
-
-+static void unzip_extract_symlink(zip_header_t *zip, const char *dst_fn)
-+{
-+ char *target;
-+
-+ if (zip->fmt.ucmpsize > 0xfff) /* no funny business please */
-+ bb_error_msg_and_die("bad archive");
-+
-+ if (zip->fmt.method == 0) {
-+ /* Method 0 - stored (not compressed) */
-+ target = xzalloc(zip->fmt.ucmpsize + 1);
-+ xread(zip_fd, target, zip->fmt.ucmpsize);
-+ } else {
-+#if 1
-+ bb_error_msg_and_die("compressed symlink is not supported");
-+#else
-+ transformer_state_t xstate;
-+ init_transformer_state(&xstate);
-+ xstate.mem_output_size_max = zip->fmt.ucmpsize;
-+ /* ...unpack... */
-+ if (!xstate.mem_output_buf)
-+ WTF();
-+ target = xstate.mem_output_buf;
-+ target = xrealloc(target, xstate.mem_output_size + 1);
-+ target[xstate.mem_output_size] = '\0';
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ if (!unsafe_symlink_target(target)) {
-+//TODO: libbb candidate
-+ if (symlink(target, dst_fn)) {
-+ /* shared message */
-+ bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-+ "sym", dst_fn, target
-+ );
-+ }
-+ }
-+ free(target);
-+}
-+
- static void unzip_extract(zip_header_t *zip, int dst_fd)
- {
- transformer_state_t xstate;
-@@ -813,7 +851,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
- }
- check_file:
- /* Extract file */
-- if (stat(dst_fn, &stat_buf) == -1) {
-+ if (lstat(dst_fn, &stat_buf) == -1) {
- /* File does not exist */
- if (errno != ENOENT) {
- bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't stat '%s'", dst_fn);
-@@ -834,6 +872,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
- goto do_open_and_extract;
- printf("replace %s? [y]es, [n]o, [A]ll, [N]one, [r]ename: ", dst_fn);
- my_fgets80(key_buf);
-+//TODO: redo lstat + ISREG check! user input could have taken a long time!
-
- switch (key_buf[0]) {
- case 'A':
-@@ -842,7 +881,8 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
- do_open_and_extract:
- unzip_create_leading_dirs(dst_fn);
- #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
-- dst_fd = xopen3(dst_fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, file_mode);
-+ if (!S_ISLNK(file_mode))
-+ dst_fd = xopen3(dst_fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, file_mode);
- #else
- dst_fd = xopen(dst_fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC);
- #endif
-@@ -852,10 +892,18 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
- ? " extracting: %s\n"
- : */ " inflating: %s\n", dst_fn);
- }
-- unzip_extract(&zip, dst_fd);
-- if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) {
-- /* closing STDOUT is potentially bad for future business */
-- close(dst_fd);
-+#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
-+ if (S_ISLNK(file_mode)) {
-+ if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) /* no -p */
-+ unzip_extract_symlink(&zip, dst_fn);
-+ } else
-+#endif
-+ {
-+ unzip_extract(&zip, dst_fd);
-+ if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) {
-+ /* closing STDOUT is potentially bad for future business */
-+ close(dst_fd);
-+ };
- }
- break;
-
-diff --git a/coreutils/link.c b/coreutils/link.c
-index ac3ef85..aab249d 100644
---- a/coreutils/link.c
-+++ b/coreutils/link.c
-@@ -32,9 +32,8 @@ int link_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
- argv += optind;
- if (link(argv[0], argv[1]) != 0) {
- /* shared message */
-- bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink "
-- "%s to %s", "hard",
-- argv[1], argv[0]
-+ bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-+ "hard", argv[1], argv[0]
- );
- }
- return EXIT_SUCCESS;
-diff --git a/include/bb_archive.h b/include/bb_archive.h
-index 2b9c5f0..1e4da3c 100644
---- a/include/bb_archive.h
-+++ b/include/bb_archive.h
-@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void seek_by_jump(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
- void seek_by_read(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
-
- const char *strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
-+int unsafe_symlink_target(const char *target) FAST_FUNC;
-
- void data_align(archive_handle_t *archive_handle, unsigned boundary) FAST_FUNC;
- const llist_t *find_list_entry(const llist_t *list, const char *filename) FAST_FUNC;
-diff --git a/libbb/copy_file.c b/libbb/copy_file.c
-index 23c0f83..be90066 100644
---- a/libbb/copy_file.c
-+++ b/libbb/copy_file.c
-@@ -371,7 +371,10 @@ int FAST_FUNC copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
- int r = symlink(lpath, dest);
- free(lpath);
- if (r < 0) {
-- bb_perror_msg("can't create symlink '%s'", dest);
-+ /* shared message */
-+ bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
-+ "sym", dest, lpath
-+ );
- return -1;
- }
- if (flags & FILEUTILS_PRESERVE_STATUS)
-diff --git a/testsuite/tar.tests b/testsuite/tar.tests
-index 9f7ce15..b7cd74c 100755
---- a/testsuite/tar.tests
-+++ b/testsuite/tar.tests
-@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ unset LC_COLLATE
- unset LC_ALL
- umask 022
-
--rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
--mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
--
- # testing "test name" "script" "expected result" "file input" "stdin"
-
- testing "Empty file is not a tarball" '\
-@@ -53,6 +50,7 @@ dd if=/dev/zero bs=512 count=20 2>/dev/null | tar xvf - 2>&1; echo $?
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- # "tar cf test.tar input input_dir/ input_hard1 input_hard2 input_hard1 input_dir/ input":
- # GNU tar 1.26 records as hardlinks:
- # input_hard2 -> input_hard1
-@@ -64,7 +62,6 @@ SKIP=
- # We also don't use "hrw-r--r--" notation for hardlinks in "tar tv" listing.
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES
- testing "tar hardlinks and repeated files" '\
--rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
- >input_hard1
- ln input_hard1 input_hard2
- mkdir input_dir
-@@ -95,10 +92,11 @@ drwxr-xr-x input_dir
- " \
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES
- testing "tar hardlinks mode" '\
--rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
- >input_hard1
- chmod 741 input_hard1
- ln input_hard1 input_hard2
-@@ -128,10 +126,11 @@ Ok: 0
- " \
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES
- testing "tar symlinks mode" '\
--rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
- >input_file
- chmod 741 input_file
- ln -s input_file input_soft
-@@ -159,10 +158,11 @@ lrwxrwxrwx input_file
- " \
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_TAR_LONG_OPTIONS
- testing "tar --overwrite" "\
--rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
- ln input input_hard
- tar cf test.tar input_hard
- echo WRONG >input
-@@ -174,12 +174,13 @@ Ok
- " \
- "Ok\n" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- test x"$SKIP_KNOWN_BUGS" = x"" && {
- # Needs to be run under non-root for meaningful test
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE
- testing "tar writing into read-only dir" '\
--rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
- mkdir input_dir
- >input_dir/input_file
- chmod 550 input_dir
-@@ -201,7 +202,9 @@ dr-xr-x--- input_dir
- "" ""
- SKIP=
- }
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- # Had a bug where on extract autodetect first "switched off" -z
- # and then failed to recognize .tgz extension
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_SEAMLESS_GZ GUNZIP
-@@ -217,7 +220,9 @@ Ok
- " \
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- # Do we detect XZ-compressed data (even w/o .tar.xz or txz extension)?
- # (the uuencoded hello_world.txz contains one empty file named "hello_world")
- optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_XZ
-@@ -236,7 +241,9 @@ AAAEWVo=
- ====
- "
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- # On extract, everything up to and including last ".." component is stripped
- optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE
- testing "tar strips /../ on extract" "\
-@@ -255,7 +262,9 @@ Ok
- " \
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- # attack.tar.bz2 has symlink pointing to a system file
- # followed by a regular file with the same name
- # containing "root::0:0::/root:/bin/sh":
-@@ -270,6 +279,7 @@ optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2
- testing "tar does not extract into symlinks" "\
- >>/tmp/passwd && uudecode -o input && tar xf input 2>&1 && rm passwd; cat /tmp/passwd; echo \$?
- " "\
-+tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp/passwd' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
- 0
- " \
- "" "\
-@@ -281,12 +291,15 @@ l4/V8LDoe90yiWJhOJvIypgEfxdyRThQkBVn/bI=
- ====
- "
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-+
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- # And same with -k
- optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2
- testing "tar -k does not extract into symlinks" "\
- >>/tmp/passwd && uudecode -o input && tar xf input -k 2>&1 && rm passwd; cat /tmp/passwd; echo \$?
- " "\
--tar: can't open 'passwd': File exists
-+tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp/passwd' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
- 0
- " \
- "" "\
-@@ -298,7 +311,9 @@ l4/V8LDoe90yiWJhOJvIypgEfxdyRThQkBVn/bI=
- ====
- "
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
- optional UNICODE_SUPPORT FEATURE_TAR_GNU_EXTENSIONS FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2 FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT
- testing "Pax-encoded UTF8 names and symlinks" '\
- tar xvf ../tar.utf8.tar.bz2 2>&1; echo $?
-@@ -309,17 +324,45 @@ rm -rf etc usr
- ' "\
- etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0
- etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
-+tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
- etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0
- usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
- 0
- etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
--etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem -> /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
- etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
- " \
- "" ""
- SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
--
--cd .. && rm -rf tar.tempdir || exit 1
-+mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
-+optional UUDECODE FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2 FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT
-+testing "Symlink attack: create symlink and then write through it" '\
-+exec 2>&1
-+uudecode -o input && tar xvf input; echo $?
-+ls /tmp/bb_test_evilfile
-+ls bb_test_evilfile
-+ls symlink/bb_test_evilfile
-+' "\
-+anything.txt
-+symlink
-+tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
-+symlink/bb_test_evilfile
-+0
-+ls: /tmp/bb_test_evilfile: No such file or directory
-+ls: bb_test_evilfile: No such file or directory
-+symlink/bb_test_evilfile
-+" \
-+"" "\
-+begin-base64 644 tar_symlink_attack.tar.bz2
-+QlpoOTFBWSZTWZgs7bQAALT/hMmQAFBAAf+AEMAGJPPv32AAAIAIMAC5thlR
-+omAjAmCMADQT1BqNE0AEwAAjAEwElTKeo9NTR6h6gaeoA0DQNLVdwZZ5iNTk
-+AQwCAV6S00QFJYhrlfFkVCEDEGtgNVqYrI0uK3ggnt30gqk4e1TTQm5QIAKa
-+SJqzRGSFLMmOloHSAcvLiFxxRiQtQZF+qPxbo173ZDISOAoNoPN4PQPhBhKS
-+n8fYaKlioCTzL2oXYczyUUIP4u5IpwoSEwWdtoA=
-+====
-+"
-+SKIP=
-+cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
-
- exit $FAILCOUNT
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fc19ee3..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From c3797d40a1c57352192c6106cc0f435e7d9c11e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 18:09:29 +0100
-Subject: lineedit: do not tab-complete any strings which have control
- characters
-
-function old new delta
-add_match 41 68 +27
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-16544
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi <zhixiong.chi at windriver.com>
----
- libbb/lineedit.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libbb/lineedit.c b/libbb/lineedit.c
-index c0e35bb..56e8140 100644
---- a/libbb/lineedit.c
-+++ b/libbb/lineedit.c
-@@ -645,6 +645,18 @@ static void free_tab_completion_data(void)
-
- static void add_match(char *matched)
- {
-+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)matched;
-+ while (*p) {
-+ /* ESC attack fix: drop any string with control chars */
-+ if (*p < ' '
-+ || (!ENABLE_UNICODE_SUPPORT && *p >= 0x7f)
-+ || (ENABLE_UNICODE_SUPPORT && *p == 0x7f)
-+ ) {
-+ free(matched);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ p++;
-+ }
- matches = xrealloc_vector(matches, 4, num_matches);
- matches[num_matches] = matched;
- num_matches++;
---
-cgit v0.12
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-udhcpc-no_deconfig.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-udhcpc-no_deconfig.patch
index 582a258..f5c04d5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-udhcpc-no_deconfig.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/busybox-udhcpc-no_deconfig.patch
@@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ Index: busybox-1.27.2/networking/udhcp/dhcpc.c
change_listen_mode(LISTEN_NONE);
state = RELEASED;
-@@ -1298,7 +1303,7 @@ int udhcpc_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
- /* O,x: list; -T,-t,-A take numeric param */
- IF_UDHCP_VERBOSE(opt_complementary = "vv";)
- IF_LONG_OPTS(applet_long_options = udhcpc_longopts;)
-- opt = getopt32(argv, "CV:H:h:F:i:np:qRr:s:T:+t:+SA:+O:*ox:*fB"
-+ opt = getopt32(argv, "CV:H:h:F:i:np:qRr:s:T:+t:+SA:+O:*ox:*fBD"
+@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ int udhcpc_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ /* Parse command line */
+ opt = getopt32long(argv, "^"
+ /* O,x: list; -T,-t,-A take numeric param */
+- "CV:H:h:F:i:np:qRr:s:T:+t:+SA:+O:*ox:*fB"
++ "CV:H:h:F:i:np:qRr:s:T:+t:+SA:+O:*ox:*fBD"
USE_FOR_MMU("b")
IF_FEATURE_UDHCPC_ARPING("a::")
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT("P:")
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.28.0.bb
similarity index 87%
rename from meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb
rename to meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.28.0.bb
index 6c1f488..93c50a5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.28.0.bb
@@ -42,10 +42,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \
file://rcK \
file://runlevel \
file://makefile-libbb-race.patch \
- file://CVE-2011-5325.patch \
- file://busybox-CVE-2017-16544.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "
-SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "476186f4bab81781dab2369bfd42734e"
-SRC_URI[tarball.sha256sum] = "9d4be516b61e6480f156b11eb42577a13529f75d3383850bb75c50c285de63df"
+SRC_URI[tarball.md5sum] = "b119b8decda796ab5cee5478dc9c642c"
+SRC_URI[tarball.sha256sum] = "604553b7dbd59ded9e3ad7c6af49ed2cff599adf3e54d9463e5e0027b362019c"
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