[OE-core] [PATCH] bitbake.conf/sstate.bbclass: Change PATH when installing sstate files to avoid issues

Richard Purdie richard.purdie at linuxfoundation.org
Wed Mar 21 21:12:49 UTC 2012


On Wed, 2012-03-21 at 17:54 +0000, McClintock Matthew-B29882 wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 5:44 AM, Richard Purdie
> <richard.purdie at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > This resolves issues related to pigz-native when installing from sstate that people
> > have been seeing. It also gives us a way to solve issues like the gzip-native race
> > during sstate package creation covered in Yocto #1774.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie at linuxfoundation.org>
> > ---
> > diff --git a/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass b/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass
> > index 0d16d11..1570654 100644
> > --- a/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass
> > +++ b/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass
> > @@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ def sstate_installpkg(ss, d):
> >         bb.mkdirhier(dir)
> >         oe.path.remove(dir)
> >
> > +    # We're adding binaries into the sysroots, we don't want to execute them
> > +    # whilst they're half installed or being installed so we need to
> > +    # remove the sysroots from PATH
> > +    savedpath = d.getVar("PATH")
> > +    d.setVar("PATH", "${ORIGPATH}")
> > +
> >     sstateinst = d.expand("${WORKDIR}/sstate-install-%s/" % ss['name'])
> >     sstatepkg = d.getVar('SSTATE_PKG', True) + '_' + ss['name'] + ".tgz"
> >
> > @@ -190,6 +196,8 @@ def sstate_installpkg(ss, d):
> >         # conflict with another writer
> >         os.remove(fixmefn)
> >
> > +    d.setVar("PATH", savedpath)
> > +
> 
> So we always use the host tar and gzip here? Isn't there a reason we
> build tar-native explicitly? Could be fine if it's not needed for
> sstate-cache...

I had to hit the archives but:

http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit.cgi/poky/commit/?id=577dd4b3e5d4861c31824d920fa170ba3a585f63

so yes, there is a good reason we might want to use our tar and I just
broken our old versions of tar workaround :(. We did check that tar code
for races and its relatively safe. The gzip situation is of course not
so safe and we have the open bugs to prove it :(.

So I should probably revert this patch although I'm reluctant since I
can think of other ways we can break the sysroots which this patch very
neatly solves.

The only other option would be to explicitly allow tar through some
linking/PATH magic :/.

Cheers,

Richard







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