[OE-core] [PATCH] libpam: add a new 'nullok_secure' option support to pam_unix
Ming Liu
ming.liu at windriver.com
Thu Jul 18 01:31:20 UTC 2013
On 07/18/2013 12:03 AM, Saul Wold wrote:
> On 07/16/2013 08:15 PM, Ming Liu wrote:
>> Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
>> accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
>> from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
>>
>> The original pam_unix.so was configured with nullok_secure in
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam.d/common-auth, but no such code
>> exists actually.
>>
>> The patch set comes from:
>> http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/054_pam_security_abstract_securetty_handling
>>
>> http://patch-tracker.debian.org/patch/series/view/pam/1.1.3-7.1/055_pam_unix_nullok_secure
>>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu at windriver.com>
>> ---
>> .../pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch | 196
>> +++++++++++++++++
>> .../pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch | 220
>> ++++++++++++++++++++
>
> Both these patches need proper Upstream-Status: and Signed-off-by:
> tags please
OK, got it. I will add those in V1.
the best,
thank you
>
> Thanks
> Sau!
>
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb | 4 +-
>> 3 files changed, 419 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>> create mode 100644
>> meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>>
>> diff --git
>> a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>>
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..a537b33
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
>> +Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the
>> "nullok_secure" option
>> + introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch.
>> +
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
>> b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am
>> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am 2013-07-05
>> 11:08:23.224483237 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am 2013-07-05
>> 11:15:21.304486456 +0800
>> +@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif
>> + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la
>> + pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam
>> +
>> ++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES = \
>> ++ pam_securetty.c \
>> ++ tty_secure.c
>> ++
>> + if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
>> + noinst_DATA = README
>> + README: pam_securetty.8.xml
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
>> b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
>> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c 2013-07-05
>> 11:07:50.064483568 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c 2013-07-05
>> 11:12:23.994483344 +0800
>> +@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
>> + /* pam_securetty module */
>> +
>> +-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
>> +-#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/"
>> + #define CMDLINE_FILE "/proc/cmdline"
>> + #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE "/sys/class/tty/console/active"
>> +
>> +@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@
>> + #include <security/pam_modutil.h>
>> + #include <security/pam_ext.h>
>> +
>> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> ++ const char *uttyname);
>> ++
>> + #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG 0x0001
>> + #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG 0x0002
>> +
>> +@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
>> + const char *username;
>> + const char *uttyname;
>> + const void *void_uttyname;
>> +- char ttyfileline[256];
>> +- char ptname[256];
>> +- struct stat ttyfileinfo;
>> + struct passwd *user_pwd;
>> +- FILE *ttyfile;
>> +
>> + /* log a trail for debugging */
>> + if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
>> +@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p
>> + return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
>> + }
>> +
>> +- /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
>> +- if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) {
>> +- uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
>> +- }
>> +-
>> +- if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
>> +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
>> SECURETTY_FILE);
>> +- return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty
>> handling,
>> +- this needs to succeed. But we still log the
>> +- error. */
>> +- }
>> +-
>> +- if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) ||
>> !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
>> +- /* If the file is world writable or is not a
>> +- normal file, return error */
>> +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
>> +- "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
>> +- SECURETTY_FILE);
>> +- return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> +- }
>> +-
>> +- ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
>> +- if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
>> +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
>> +- return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
>> +- }
>> +-
>> +- if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
>> +- snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
>> +- } else {
>> +- ptname[0] = '\0';
>> +- }
>> +-
>> +- retval = 1;
>> +-
>> +- while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) !=
>> NULL)
>> +- && retval) {
>> +- if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
>> +- ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
>> +-
>> +- retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname)
>> +- && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
>> +- }
>> +- fclose(ttyfile);
>> ++ retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname);
>> +
>> + if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) {
>> + FILE *cmdlinefile;
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
>> b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c
>> +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c 1970-01-01
>> 08:30:00.000000000 +0830
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c 2013-07-05
>> 11:14:21.534482900 +0800
>> +@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
>> ++/*
>> ++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty
>> ++ */
>> ++
>> ++
>> ++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
>> ++#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/"
>> ++
>> ++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman
>> ++ * <hartmans at debian.org>*/
>> ++/*
>> ++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith at redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
>> ++ * July 25, 1996.
>> ++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
>> ++ */
>> ++
>> ++#include <unistd.h>
>> ++#include <sys/types.h>
>> ++#include <sys/stat.h>
>> ++#include <security/pam_modules.h>
>> ++#include <stdarg.h>
>> ++#include <syslog.h>
>> ++#include <sys/syslog.h>
>> ++#include <stdio.h>
>> ++#include <string.h>
>> ++#include <stdlib.h>
>> ++#include <ctype.h>
>> ++#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
>> ++#include <security/pam_ext.h>
>> ++
>> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> ++ const char *uttyname);
>> ++
>> ++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char
>> *uttyname)
>> ++{
>> ++ int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> ++ char ttyfileline[256];
>> ++ char ptname[256];
>> ++ struct stat ttyfileinfo;
>> ++ FILE *ttyfile;
>> ++ /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
>> ++ if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
>> ++ uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
>> ++
>> ++ if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
>> ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m",
>> ++ SECURETTY_FILE);
>> ++ return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty
>> handling,
>> ++ this needs to succeed. But we still log the
>> ++ error. */
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) ||
>> !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
>> ++ /* If the file is world writable or is not a
>> ++ normal file, return error */
>> ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
>> ++ "%s is either world writable or not a normal file",
>> ++ SECURETTY_FILE);
>> ++ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
>> ++ if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
>> ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE);
>> ++ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) {
>> ++ snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname);
>> ++ } else {
>> ++ ptname[0] = '\0';
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ retval = 1;
>> ++
>> ++ while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL)
>> ++ && retval) {
>> ++ if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
>> ++ ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
>> ++ retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname)
>> ++ && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) );
>> ++ }
>> ++ fclose(ttyfile);
>> ++
>> ++ if(retval) {
>> ++ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ return retval;
>> ++}
>> diff --git
>> a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..09cffe3
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
>> +Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which
>> +accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected
>> +from a tty listed in /etc/securetty.
>> +
>> +Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans at debian.org>,
>> + Steve Langasek <vorlon at debian.org>
>> +
>> +Upstream status: not yet submitted
>> +===================================================================
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
>> b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164
>> +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000
>> +0800
>> +@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING
>> + pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
>> + endif
>> + pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
>> +- @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS)
>> ++ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) \
>> ++ ../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo
>> +
>> + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
>> +
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201
>> +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774
>> +0800
>> +@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&.
>> + .RS 4
>> + The default action of this module is to not permit the user access
>> to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
>> + \fBnullok\fR
>> +-argument overrides this default\&.
>> ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank
>> password to access the service\&.
>> ++.RE
>> ++.PP
>> ++\fBnullok_secure\fR
>> ++.RS 4
>> ++The default action of this module is to not permit the user access
>> to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
>> ++\fBnullok_secure\fR
>> ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank
>> password to access the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set
>> to one of the values found in /etc/securetty\&.
>> + .RE
>> + .PP
>> + \fBtry_first_pass\fR
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
>> b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 2013-07-05
>> 09:52:38.775108523 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 2013-07-05
>> 10:30:23.084483630 +0800
>> +@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@
>> + <para>
>> + The default action of this module is to not permit the
>> + user access to a service if their official password is
>> blank.
>> +- The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this
>> default.
>> ++ The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this
>> default
>> ++ and allows any user with a blank password to access the
>> ++ service.
>> ++ </para>
>> ++ </listitem>
>> ++ </varlistentry>
>> ++ <varlistentry>
>> ++ <term>
>> ++ <option>nullok_secure</option>
>> ++ </term>
>> ++ <listitem>
>> ++ <para>
>> ++ The default action of this module is to not permit the
>> ++ user access to a service if their official password is
>> blank.
>> ++ The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this
>> ++ default and allows any user with a blank password to
>> access
>> ++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to
>> one of
>> ++ the values found in /etc/securetty.
>> + </para>
>> + </listitem>
>> + </varlistentry>
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/README 2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/README 2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800
>> +@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok
>> +
>> + The default action of this module is to not permit the user
>> access to a
>> + service if their official password is blank. The nullok
>> argument overrides
>> +- this default.
>> ++ this default and allows any user with a blank password to
>> access the
>> ++ service.
>> ++
>> ++nullok_secure
>> ++
>> ++ The default action of this module is to not permit the user
>> access to a
>> ++ service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure
>> argument
>> ++ overrides this default and allows any user with a blank
>> password to access
>> ++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of
>> the values
>> ++ found in /etc/securetty.
>> +
>> + try_first_pass
>> +
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800
>> +@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl
>> + /* now parse the arguments to this module */
>> +
>> + for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
>> +- int j;
>> ++ int j, sl;
>> +
>> + D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
>> +
>> + for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
>> +- if (unix_args[j].token
>> +- && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token,
>> strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
>> +- break;
>> ++ if (unix_args[j].token) {
>> ++ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token);
>> ++ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') {
>> ++ /* exclude argument from comparison */
>> ++ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl))
>> ++ break;
>> ++ } else {
>> ++ /* compare full strings */
>> ++ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token))
>> ++ break;
>> ++ }
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> +@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
>> + child = fork();
>> + if (child == 0) {
>> + int i=0;
>> ++ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
>> + struct rlimit rlim;
>> + static char *envp[] = { NULL };
>> + char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
>> +@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h
>> + /* exec binary helper */
>> + args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
>> + args[1] = x_strdup(user);
>> +- if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */
>> ++
>> ++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
>> ++ const void *uttyname;
>> ++ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
>> ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL
>> ++ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname)
>> != PAM_SUCCESS)
>> ++ {
>> ++ nullok = 0;
>> ++ }
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ if (nullok) {
>> + args[2]=strdup("nullok");
>> + } else {
>> + args[2]=strdup("nonull");
>> +@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u
>> + if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
>> + return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */
>> +
>> ++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) {
>> ++ int retval2;
>> ++ const void *uttyname;
>> ++ retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname);
>> ++ if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL)
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++
>> ++ if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) !=
>> PAM_SUCCESS)
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> + /* UNIX passwords area */
>> +
>> + retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
>> +@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t *
>> + }
>> + }
>> + } else {
>> +- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
>> ++ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt,
>> ++ _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name));
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
>> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
>> +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h 2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800
>> ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h 2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800
>> +@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct {
>> + password hash algorithms */
>> + #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS 26 /* new password hashes will
>> use blowfish */
>> + #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN 27 /* min length for password */
>> ++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 28 /* NULL passwords allowed
>> only on secure ttys */
>> + /* -------------- */
>> +-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 28 /* number of ctrl arguments
>> defined */
>> ++#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 29 /* number of ctrl arguments
>> defined */
>> +
>> + #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl)
>> (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl))
>> +
>> +@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
>> + /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */ {"not_set_pass",
>> _ALL_ON_, 0100},
>> + /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200},
>> + /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400},
>> +-/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000},
>> ++/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000), 0x200},
>> + /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000},
>> + /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_,
>> 04000},
>> + /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000},
>> +@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C
>> + /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000),
>> 040000000},
>> + /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000},
>> + /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */ {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000),
>> 0200000000},
>> +-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000},
>> ++/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000},
>> ++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(0x200),
>> 0x10000000},
>> + };
>> +
>> + #define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
>> +@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl
>> + ,const char *data_name
>> + ,const void **pass);
>> +
>> ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> ++ const char *uttyname);
>> ++
>> + extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
>> + unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft);
>> + #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> index 62ad7b1..3d8999d 100644
>> --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb
>> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ SRC_URI =
>> "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
>> file://reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch \
>> file://add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch \
>> file://libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch \
>> + file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \
>> + file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \
>> "
>> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7b73e58b7ce79ffa321d408de06db2c4"
>> SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
>> "bab887d6280f47fc3963df3b95735a27a16f0f663636163ddf3acab5f1149fc2"
>> @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-db-uniquename=_pam \
>>
>> CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC "
>>
>> -PR = "r2"
>> +PR = "r3"
>>
>> S = "${WORKDIR}/Linux-PAM-${PV}"
>>
>>
>
>
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