[OE-core] [dora][PATCH 4/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0224
Paul Eggleton
paul.eggleton at linux.intel.com
Mon Jun 9 15:53:46 UTC 2014
>From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014]
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability (CVE-2014-0224)
An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak
keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. This can be exploited
by a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where the attacker can decrypt and
modify traffic from the attacked client and server.
The attack can only be performed between a vulnerable client *and*
server. OpenSSL clients are vulnerable in all versions of OpenSSL. Servers
are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users
of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton at linux.intel.com>
---
.../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ed1d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+
+Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
+time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
+secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
+
+Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
+and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
+
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton at linux.intel.com>
+
+
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200
+@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
+
+ /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200
+@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -916,6 +917,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start:
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
++ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
++ {
++ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
++
++ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
++
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ {
+- if (s->session == NULL)
++ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
++ {
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
++ }
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #endif
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index dc77330..fae0b93 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \
+ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
--
1.9.3
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