[OE-core] [PATCH 4/4] nss: Upgrade to 3.17
Saul Wold
sgw at linux.intel.com
Fri Sep 5 20:06:28 UTC 2014
CVE patches removed since they have been implemented upstream
Rename patch dir (files) to generic PN name
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw at linux.intel.com>
---
.../nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch | 81 --
.../nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch | 92 ---
.../nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch | 18 -
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch | 916 ---------------------
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch | 48 --
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch | 68 --
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch | 41 -
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc | 9 +-
.../nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch | 0
.../nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch | 0
.../nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch | 0
meta/recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/nss.pc.in | 0
.../recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/signlibs.sh | 0
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.15.1.bb | 9 -
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.17.bb | 8 +
15 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1281 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch
rename meta/recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch (100%)
rename meta/recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch (100%)
rename meta/recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch (100%)
rename meta/recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/nss.pc.in (100%)
rename meta/recipes-support/nss/{files => nss}/signlibs.sh (100%)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.15.1.bb
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.17.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1a159c3..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu at windriver.com>
-
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-@@ -10509,7 +10509,7 @@ ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *pla
- /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
- t = plaintext->len;
- t -= paddingLength+overhead;
-- /* If len >= padding_length+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
-+ /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
- good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
- /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
- t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
-@@ -10742,7 +10742,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
- }
- }
-
-- good = (unsigned)-1;
-+ good = ~0U;
- minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
- if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
- /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
-@@ -10756,14 +10756,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
- /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
- * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
- if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
-- SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, record too small.",
-- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-- /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
-- ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
-- SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
-- /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
-- PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
-- return SECFailure;
-+ goto decrypt_loser;
- }
-
- if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
-@@ -10831,11 +10824,18 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
- return SECFailure;
- }
-
-+ if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
-+ ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
-+ goto decrypt_loser;
-+ }
-+
- /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
- rv = crSpec->decode(
- crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
- plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
-- good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
-+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-+ goto decrypt_loser;
-+ }
-
- PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
-
-@@ -10843,7 +10843,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
-
- /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
- if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
-- const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->iv_size;
-+ const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
- const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
-
- if (crSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
-@@ -10899,10 +10899,11 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
- }
-
- if (good == 0) {
-+decrypt_loser:
- /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
- ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
-
-- SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: mac check failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-
- if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
- SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 21da0c0..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: backport
-yanjun.zhu <yanjun.zhu at windriver.com>
---- a/nss/lib/util/secport.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/util/secport.c
-@@ -69,13 +69,22 @@ PORTCharConversionFunc ucs4Utf8ConvertFu
- PORTCharConversionFunc ucs2Utf8ConvertFunc;
- PORTCharConversionWSwapFunc ucs2AsciiConvertFunc;
-
-+/* NSPR memory allocation functions (PR_Malloc, PR_Calloc, and PR_Realloc)
-+ * use the PRUint32 type for the size parameter. Before we pass a size_t or
-+ * unsigned long size to these functions, we need to ensure it is <= half of
-+ * the maximum PRUint32 value to avoid truncation and catch a negative size.
-+ */
-+#define MAX_SIZE (PR_UINT32_MAX >> 1)
-+
- void *
- PORT_Alloc(size_t bytes)
- {
-- void *rv;
-+ void *rv = NULL;
-
-- /* Always allocate a non-zero amount of bytes */
-- rv = (void *)PR_Malloc(bytes ? bytes : 1);
-+ if (bytes <= MAX_SIZE) {
-+ /* Always allocate a non-zero amount of bytes */
-+ rv = PR_Malloc(bytes ? bytes : 1);
-+ }
- if (!rv) {
- ++port_allocFailures;
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-@@ -86,9 +95,11 @@ PORT_Alloc(size_t bytes)
- void *
- PORT_Realloc(void *oldptr, size_t bytes)
- {
-- void *rv;
-+ void *rv = NULL;
-
-- rv = (void *)PR_Realloc(oldptr, bytes);
-+ if (bytes <= MAX_SIZE) {
-+ rv = PR_Realloc(oldptr, bytes);
-+ }
- if (!rv) {
- ++port_allocFailures;
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-@@ -99,10 +110,12 @@ PORT_Realloc(void *oldptr, size_t bytes)
- void *
- PORT_ZAlloc(size_t bytes)
- {
-- void *rv;
-+ void *rv = NULL;
-
-- /* Always allocate a non-zero amount of bytes */
-- rv = (void *)PR_Calloc(1, bytes ? bytes : 1);
-+ if (bytes <= MAX_SIZE) {
-+ /* Always allocate a non-zero amount of bytes */
-+ rv = PR_Calloc(1, bytes ? bytes : 1);
-+ }
- if (!rv) {
- ++port_allocFailures;
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-@@ -209,6 +222,10 @@ PORT_NewArena(unsigned long chunksize)
- {
- PORTArenaPool *pool;
-
-+ if (chunksize > MAX_SIZE) {
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
- pool = PORT_ZNew(PORTArenaPool);
- if (!pool) {
- return NULL;
-@@ -224,8 +241,6 @@ PORT_NewArena(unsigned long chunksize)
- return(&pool->arena);
- }
-
--#define MAX_SIZE 0x7fffffffUL
--
- void *
- PORT_ArenaAlloc(PLArenaPool *arena, size_t size)
- {
-@@ -330,6 +345,11 @@ PORT_ArenaGrow(PLArenaPool *arena, void
- PORTArenaPool *pool = (PORTArenaPool *)arena;
- PORT_Assert(newsize >= oldsize);
-
-+ if (newsize > MAX_SIZE) {
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+
- if (ARENAPOOL_MAGIC == pool->magic ) {
- PZ_Lock(pool->lock);
- /* Do we do a THREADMARK check here? */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7203d02..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-signed-off-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi at gmail.com>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-reference:https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/e79a09364b5e
-
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-@@ -781,6 +781,11 @@ static SECStatus
- Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen,
- const unsigned char *input, int inputLen)
- {
-+ if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) {
-+ *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
- *outputLen = inputLen;
- if (input != output)
- PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen);
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index db3d6f9..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,916 +0,0 @@
-nss: CVE-2013-1740
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-the patch comes from:
-http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1740
-https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=919877
-https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=713933
-
-changeset: 10946:f28426e944ae
-user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc at google.com>
-date: Tue Nov 26 16:44:39 2013 -0800
-summary: Bug 713933: Handle the return value of both ssl3_HandleRecord calls
-
-changeset: 10945:774c7dec7565
-user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc at google.com>
-date: Mon Nov 25 19:16:23 2013 -0800
-summary: Bug 713933: Declare the |falseStart| local variable in the smallest
-
-changeset: 10848:141fae8fb2e8
-user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc at google.com>
-date: Mon Sep 23 11:25:41 2013 -0700
-summary: Bug 681839: Allow SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension to be called before the handshake is finished, r=brian at briansmith.org
-
-changeset: 10898:1b9c43d28713
-user: Brian Smith <brian at briansmith.org>
-date: Thu Oct 31 15:40:42 2013 -0700
-summary: Bug 713933: Make SSL False Start work with asynchronous certificate validation, r=wtc
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang at windriver.com>
----
- nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def | 7 ++
- nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h | 54 +++++++++++---
- nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c | 63 ++++++++++++----
- nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c | 10 +--
- nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h | 22 +++++-
- nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c | 10 +--
- nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c | 9 +--
- nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c | 12 ++-
- 10 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
-index fbf7fc5..e937bd4 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
-@@ -163,3 +163,10 @@ SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses;
- ;+ local:
- ;+*;
- ;+};
-+;+NSS_3.15.3 { # NSS 3.15.3 release
-+;+ global:
-+SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart;
-+SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback;
-+;+ local:
-+;+*;
-+;+};
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
-index 6db0e34..ddeaaef 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
-@@ -121,14 +121,17 @@ SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
- #define SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START 22 /* Enable SSL false start (off by */
- /* default, applies only to */
- /* clients). False start is a */
--/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before */
--/* verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up */
--/* sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and */
--/* only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the */
--/* cipher isn't broken this is safe. Because of this, False Start will only */
--/* occur on RSA or DH ciphersuites where the cipher's key length is >= 80 */
--/* bits. The advantage of False Start is that it saves a round trip for */
--/* client-speaks-first protocols when performing a full handshake. */
-+/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before
-+ * verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up
-+ * sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and
-+ * only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the
-+ * cipher isn't broken this is safe. The advantage of false start is that
-+ * it saves a round trip for client-speaks-first protocols when performing a
-+ * full handshake.
-+ *
-+ * In addition to enabling this option, the application must register a
-+ * callback using the SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback function.
-+ */
-
- /* For SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, by default we prevent chosen plaintext attacks
- * on SSL CBC mode cipher suites (see RFC 4346 Section F.3) by splitting
-@@ -653,14 +656,45 @@ SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks);
- SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char * envString);
-
- /*
--** Set the callback on a particular socket that gets called when we finish
--** performing a handshake.
-+** Set the callback that gets called when a TLS handshake is complete. The
-+** handshake callback is called after verifying the peer's Finished message and
-+** before processing incoming application data.
-+**
-+** For the initial handshake: If the handshake false started (see
-+** SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START), then application data may already have been sent
-+** before the handshake callback is called. If we did not false start then the
-+** callback will get called before any application data is sent.
- */
- typedef void (PR_CALLBACK *SSLHandshakeCallback)(PRFileDesc *fd,
- void *client_data);
- SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd,
- SSLHandshakeCallback cb, void *client_data);
-
-+/* Applications that wish to enable TLS false start must set this callback
-+** function. NSS will invoke the functon to determine if a particular
-+** connection should use false start or not. SECSuccess indicates that the
-+** callback completed successfully, and if so *canFalseStart indicates if false
-+** start can be used. If the callback does not return SECSuccess then the
-+** handshake will be canceled. NSS's recommended criteria can be evaluated by
-+** calling SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart.
-+**
-+** If no false start callback is registered then false start will never be
-+** done, even if the SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START option is enabled.
-+**/
-+typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLCanFalseStartCallback)(
-+ PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, PRBool *canFalseStart);
-+
-+SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(
-+ PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback callback, void *arg);
-+
-+/* This function sets *canFalseStart according to the recommended criteria for
-+** false start. These criteria may change from release to release and may depend
-+** on which handshake features have been negotiated and/or properties of the
-+** certifciates/keys used on the connection.
-+*/
-+SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd,
-+ PRBool *canFalseStart);
-+
- /*
- ** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new
- ** handshake. If flushCache is non-zero, the SSL3 cache entry will be
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-index 61d24d9..f39ba09 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
-@@ -2535,7 +2535,7 @@ ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss,
- SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type),
- nIn));
-- PRINT_BUF(3, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
-+ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
-
- PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
-
-@@ -6674,36 +6674,73 @@ done:
- return rv;
- }
-
-+static SECStatus
-+ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
-+{
-+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
-+ PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending );
-+ PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart );
-+
-+ if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+ } else {
-+ PRBool maybeFalseStart;
-+ SECStatus rv;
-+
-+ /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
-+ * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
-+ * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
-+ * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
-+ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
-+ maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10;
-+ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
-+
-+ if (!maybeFalseStart) {
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+ } else {
-+ rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
-+ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
-+ &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
-+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"));
-+ } else {
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
-+ PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
-+ }
-+ return rv;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
-+ return SECSuccess;
-+}
-+
- PRBool
--ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) {
-- PRBool rv;
-+ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
-+{
-+ PRBool result = PR_FALSE;
-
- PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
-
-- /* XXX: does not take into account whether we are waiting for
-- * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete or SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq. If/when
-- * that is done, this function could return different results each time it
-- * would be called.
-- */
-+ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
-+ case wait_new_session_ticket:
-+ result = PR_TRUE;
-+ break;
-+ case wait_change_cipher:
-+ result = !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn);
-+ break;
-+ case wait_finished:
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound");
-+ }
-
-- ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
-- rv = ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
-- !ss->sec.isServer &&
-- !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
-- ss->ssl3.cwSpec &&
--
-- /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
-- * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
-- * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
-- * Therefore we require an 80-bit cipher and a forward-secret key
-- * exchange. */
-- ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10 &&
-- (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss ||
-- ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa ||
-- ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
-- ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa);
-- ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
-- return rv;
-+ return result;
- }
-
- static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
-@@ -6785,6 +6822,9 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
- }
- if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending &&
- (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) {
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
-+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
- ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
- return SECWouldBlock;
- }
-@@ -6822,14 +6862,50 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
- goto loser; /* err code was set. */
- }
-
-- /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
-- * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
-+ /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
-+ * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
-+ * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
-+ * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
-+ * the functions that depend on this being set.
- */
-+ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-+
- if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
-+ /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
-+ * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
-+ */
- rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- goto loser; /* err code was set. */
- }
-+
-+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
-+ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
-+ /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
-+ * false starting before we try to flush the client second
-+ * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
-+ * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
-+ * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
-+ * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
-+ * done before its false start callback is called.
-+ */
-+ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
-+ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
-+ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
-+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-+ goto loser;
-+ }
-+ } else {
-+ /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
-+ * message are racing each other. If the certificate
-+ * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
-+ * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
-+ */
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
-+ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+ }
-+ }
- }
-
- rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
-@@ -6844,10 +6920,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
- else
- ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
-
-- /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here, if we can false start. */
-- if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL && ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-- (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
-- }
-+ PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss));
-
- return SECSuccess;
-
-@@ -9421,13 +9494,6 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
-
- ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
- rv = SECSuccess;
--
-- /* XXX: Async cert validation and False Start don't work together
-- * safely yet; if we leave False Start enabled, we may end up false
-- * starting (sending application data) before we
-- * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete has been called.
-- */
-- ss->opt.enableFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
- }
-
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-@@ -9551,6 +9617,12 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
- } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
- sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
- ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
-+
-+ if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
-+ SSL_TRC(3,("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
-+ " with peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+ }
-+
- rv = target(ss);
- /* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim
- * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent
-@@ -9560,7 +9632,29 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
- rv = SECSuccess;
- }
- } else {
-- rv = SECSuccess;
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
-+ " peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+
-+ PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
-+ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
-+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
-+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket ||
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished);
-+
-+ /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
-+ * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
-+ * haven't received any of the server's second round yet.
-+ */
-+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
-+ !ss->firstHsDone &&
-+ !ss->sec.isServer &&
-+ !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
-+ ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
-+ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
-+ } else {
-+ rv = SECSuccess;
-+ }
- }
-
- done:
-@@ -10023,9 +10117,6 @@ xmit_loser:
- return rv;
- }
-
-- ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
-- ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
--
- if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
- effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
- } else {
-@@ -10090,6 +10181,9 @@ xmit_loser:
- return rv;
- }
-
-+/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
-+ * to have type sslRestartTarget.
-+ */
- SECStatus
- ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
- {
-@@ -10099,19 +10193,16 @@ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
-
- /* The first handshake is now completed. */
- ss->handshake = NULL;
-- ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-
- if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) {
- (*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid);
- ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE;
- }
-
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
- ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
-
-- /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here, if we cannot false start. */
-- if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL && !ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-- (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
-- }
-+ ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
-
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-@@ -11045,7 +11136,6 @@ process_it:
-
- ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
- return rv;
--
- }
-
- /*
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
-index 6d62515..03e369d 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
-@@ -275,11 +275,17 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
- {
- SSL3Ciphertext cText;
- int rv;
-- PRBool canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
-+ PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE;
-
- SSL_TRC(30, ("ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake"));
-
-+ /* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake,
-+ * which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the
-+ * RecvBufLock.
-+ */
-+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
- PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
-+
- do {
- PRBool handleRecordNow = PR_FALSE;
-
-@@ -368,20 +374,48 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
- if (rv < 0) {
- return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv;
- }
-+ if (rv == (int) SECSuccess && ss->gs.buf.len > 0) {
-+ /* We have application data to return to the application. This
-+ * prioritizes returning application data to the application over
-+ * completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
-+ */
-+ PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
-+ PORT_Assert(cText.type == content_application_data);
-+ break;
-+ }
-
-- /* If we kicked off a false start in ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, break
-- * out of this loop early without finishing the handshake.
-- */
-- if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
-- ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-- canFalseStart = (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
-- ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket) &&
-- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss);
-- ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+ PORT_Assert(keepGoing);
-+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
-+ /* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to
-+ * handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone
-+ * instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead,
-+ * we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending
-+ * application data.
-+ */
-+ PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
-+ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
-+ keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
-+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
-+ /* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete
-+ * the handshake if we're false starting.
-+ *
-+ * If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead
-+ * of here, then this function would become be a no-op after
-+ * receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we
-+ * would never complete the handshake.
-+ */
-+ PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
-+
-+ if (ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
-+ keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
-+ } else {
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
-+ }
- }
-- } while (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
-- !canFalseStart &&
-- ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
-+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+ } while (keepGoing);
-+
-
- ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
- ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len;
-@@ -404,7 +438,10 @@ ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
- {
- int rv;
-
-+ /* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */
-+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
- PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
-+
- do {
- rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags);
- } while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
-index d2f57bf..cb956d4 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
-@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
- sslSocket *ss;
- const char *cipherName;
- PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE;
-- PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
-
- ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
- if (!ss) {
-@@ -78,14 +77,7 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
- *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF;
- }
-
-- if (ss->firstHsDone) {
-- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
-- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- }
--
-- if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
-+ if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) {
- if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
- cipherName = ssl_cipherName[ss->sec.cipherType];
- } else {
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h b/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
-index 90e9567..bf0d67f 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
-@@ -842,6 +842,8 @@ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def;
- /* Shared state between ssl3_HandleFinished and ssl3_FinishHandshake */
- PRBool cacheSID;
-
-+ PRBool canFalseStart; /* Can/did we False Start */
-+
- /* clientSigAndHash contains the contents of the signature_algorithms
- * extension (if any) from the client. This is only valid for TLS 1.2
- * or later. */
-@@ -1116,6 +1118,10 @@ struct sslSocketStr {
- unsigned long clientAuthRequested;
- unsigned long delayDisabled; /* Nagle delay disabled */
- unsigned long firstHsDone; /* first handshake is complete. */
-+ unsigned long enoughFirstHsDone; /* enough of the first handshake is
-+ * done for callbacks to be able to
-+ * retrieve channel security
-+ * parameters from the SSL socket. */
- unsigned long handshakeBegun;
- unsigned long lastWriteBlocked;
- unsigned long recvdCloseNotify; /* received SSL EOF. */
-@@ -1156,6 +1162,8 @@ const unsigned char * preferredCipher;
- void *badCertArg;
- SSLHandshakeCallback handshakeCallback;
- void *handshakeCallbackData;
-+ SSLCanFalseStartCallback canFalseStartCallback;
-+ void *canFalseStartCallbackData;
- void *pkcs11PinArg;
- SSLNextProtoCallback nextProtoCallback;
- void *nextProtoArg;
-@@ -1358,7 +1366,19 @@ extern void ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(sslSocket *ss);
-
- extern SECStatus ssl_EnableNagleDelay(sslSocket *ss, PRBool enabled);
-
--extern PRBool ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslSocket *ss);
-+extern void ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
-+
-+/* Returns PR_TRUE if we are still waiting for the server to respond to our
-+ * client second round. Once we've received any part of the server's second
-+ * round then we don't bother trying to false start since it is almost always
-+ * the case that the NewSessionTicket, ChangeCipherSoec, and Finished messages
-+ * were sent in the same packet and we want to process them all at the same
-+ * time. If we were to try to false start in the middle of the server's second
-+ * round, then we would increase the number of I/O operations
-+ * (SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Recv/PR_Send/etc.) needed to finish the handshake.
-+ */
-+extern PRBool ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
-+
- extern SECStatus
- ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec,
- PRBool isServer,
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
-index 9f2597e..d0c23b7 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
-@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
- sslSocket * ss;
- SSLChannelInfo inf;
- sslSessionID * sid;
-- PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
-
- if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-@@ -43,14 +42,7 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
- memset(&inf, 0, sizeof inf);
- inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof inf, len);
-
-- if (ss->firstHsDone) {
-- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
-- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- }
--
-- if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
-+ if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) {
- sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
- inf.protocolVersion = ss->version;
- inf.authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
-index dc14794..d972998 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
-@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
- {
- /* some decisions derived from SSL_GetChannelInfo */
- sslSocket * sslsocket = NULL;
-- PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
-
- if (!pYes) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-@@ -93,14 +92,8 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
-
- *pYes = PR_FALSE;
-
-- if (sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
-- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- } else if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized && ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslsocket)) {
-- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- }
--
- /* according to public API SSL_GetChannelInfo, this doesn't need a lock */
-- if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
-+ if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity) {
- if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized) { /* SSL3 and TLS */
- /* now we know this socket went through ssl3_InitState() and
- * ss->xtnData got initialized, which is the only member accessed by
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
-index 49bb42b..d0df442 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
-@@ -97,23 +97,13 @@ ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
- ss->securityHandshake = 0;
- }
- if (ss->handshake == 0) {
-- ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
-- ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
-- ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
--
-- SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed",
-- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-- /* call handshake callback for ssl v2 */
-- /* for v3 this is done in ssl3_HandleFinished() */
-- if ((ss->handshakeCallback != NULL) && /* has callback */
-- (!ss->firstHsDone) && /* only first time */
-- (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { /* not ssl3 */
-- ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
-+ /* for v3 this is done in ssl3_FinishHandshake */
-+ if (!ss->firstHsDone && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
-+ ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
-+ ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
-+ ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
-+ ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
- }
-- ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-- ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
-- ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
- break;
- }
- rv = (*ss->handshake)(ss);
-@@ -134,6 +124,24 @@ ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
- return rv;
- }
-
-+void
-+ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
-+{
-+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
-+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
-+
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+
-+ ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-+ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
-+ ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
-+ ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
-+
-+ if (ss->handshakeCallback) {
-+ (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
-+ }
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Handshake function that blocks. Used to force a
- * retry on a connection on the next read/write.
-@@ -206,6 +214,7 @@ SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer)
- ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
-
- ss->firstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
-+ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
- if ( asServer ) {
- ss->handshake = ssl2_BeginServerHandshake;
- ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsServer;
-@@ -221,6 +230,8 @@ SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer)
- ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
-
- ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
-
- /*
- ** Blow away old security state and get a fresh setup.
-@@ -331,6 +342,71 @@ SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeCallback cb,
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
-+/* Register an application callback to be called when false start may happen.
-+** Acquires and releases HandshakeLock.
-+*/
-+SECStatus
-+SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback cb,
-+ void *arg)
-+{
-+ sslSocket *ss;
-+
-+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
-+ if (!ss) {
-+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) {
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
-+
-+ ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
-+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+
-+ ss->canFalseStartCallback = cb;
-+ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = arg;
-+
-+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+ ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
-+
-+ return SECSuccess;
-+}
-+
-+SECStatus
-+SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool *canFalseStart)
-+{
-+ sslSocket *ss;
-+
-+ *canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
-+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
-+ if (!ss) {
-+ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) {
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
-+ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2);
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Require a forward-secret key exchange. */
-+ *canFalseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss ||
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa ||
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa;
-+
-+ return SECSuccess;
-+}
-+
- /* Try to make progress on an SSL handshake by attempting to read the
- ** next handshake from the peer, and sending any responses.
- ** For non-blocking sockets, returns PR_ERROR_WOULD_BLOCK if it cannot
-@@ -524,6 +600,9 @@ DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags)
- int amount;
- int available;
-
-+ /* ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord may call ssl_FinishHandshake, which needs the
-+ * 1stHandshakeLock. */
-+ ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
- ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
-
- available = ss->gs.writeOffset - ss->gs.readOffset;
-@@ -590,6 +669,7 @@ DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags)
-
- done:
- ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
-+ ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
- return rv;
- }
-
-@@ -1156,7 +1236,7 @@ ssl_SecureRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len)
- int
- ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
- {
-- int rv = 0;
-+ int rv = 0;
-
- SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending %d bytes",
- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
-@@ -1191,19 +1271,15 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
- ss->writerThread = PR_GetCurrentThread();
- /* If any of these is non-zero, the initial handshake is not done. */
- if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
-- PRBool canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
-+ PRBool falseStart = PR_FALSE;
- ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
-- if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
-+ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
-+ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
- ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-- if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
-- ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished ||
-- ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket) &&
-- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
-- canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
-- }
-+ falseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart;
- ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
- }
-- if (!canFalseStart &&
-+ if (!falseStart &&
- (ss->handshake || ss->nextHandshake || ss->securityHandshake)) {
- rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss);
- }
-@@ -1228,6 +1304,17 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
- goto done;
- }
-
-+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
-+ PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
-+#ifdef DEBUG
-+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
-+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
-+#endif
-+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending data due to false start",
-+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
-+ }
-+
- /* Send out the data using one of these functions:
- * ssl2_SendClear, ssl2_SendStream, ssl2_SendBlock,
- * ssl3_SendApplicationData
-diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
-index cd4a7a7..73e069b 100644
---- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
-@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ ssl_DupSocket(sslSocket *os)
- ss->badCertArg = os->badCertArg;
- ss->handshakeCallback = os->handshakeCallback;
- ss->handshakeCallbackData = os->handshakeCallbackData;
-+ ss->canFalseStartCallback = os->canFalseStartCallback;
-+ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = os->canFalseStartCallbackData;
- ss->pkcs11PinArg = os->pkcs11PinArg;
-
- /* Create security data */
-@@ -2341,10 +2343,14 @@ ssl_Poll(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt16 how_flags, PRInt16 *p_out_flags)
- } else if (new_flags & PR_POLL_WRITE) {
- /* The caller is trying to write, but the handshake is
- ** blocked waiting for data to read, and the first
-- ** handshake has been sent. so do NOT to poll on write.
-+ ** handshake has been sent. So do NOT to poll on write
-+ ** unless we did false start.
- */
-- new_flags ^= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
-- new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; /* do select on read. */
-+ if (!(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
-+ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart)) {
-+ new_flags ^= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
-+ }
-+ new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; /* do select on read. */
- }
- }
- } else if ((new_flags & PR_POLL_READ) && (SSL_DataPending(fd) > 0)) {
---
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f30475b..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-nss: CVE-2013-5606
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-the patch comes from:
-http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-5606
-https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=910438
-http://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/d29898e0981c
-
-The CERT_VerifyCert function in lib/certhigh/certvfy.c in
-Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) 3.15 before 3.15.3 provides
-an unexpected return value for an incompatible key-usage certificate
-when the CERTVerifyLog argument is valid, which might allow remote
-attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted certificate.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang at windriver.com>
----
- nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c | 7 +++++--
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c b/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c
-index f364ceb..f450205 100644
---- a/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c
-@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ CERT_VerifyCert(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT);
- LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log,cert,0,flags);
- } else if (trusted) {
-- goto winner;
-+ goto done;
- }
-
-
-@@ -1340,7 +1340,10 @@ CERT_VerifyCert(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
- }
- }
-
--winner:
-+done:
-+ if (log && log->head) {
-+ return SECFailure;
-+ }
- return(SECSuccess);
-
- loser:
---
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1be8a17..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-nss: CVE-2014-1492
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-the patch comes from:
-http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-1492
-https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=903885
-
-changeset: 11063:709d4e597979
-user: Kai Engert <kaie at kuix.de>
-date: Wed Mar 05 18:38:55 2014 +0100
-summary: Bug 903885, address requests to clarify comments from wtc
-
-changeset: 11046:2ffa40a3ff55
-tag: tip
-user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc at google.com>
-date: Tue Feb 25 18:17:08 2014 +0100
-summary: Bug 903885, fix IDNA wildcard handling v4, r=kaie
-
-changeset: 11045:15ea62260c21
-user: Christian Heimes <sites at cheimes.de>
-date: Mon Feb 24 17:50:25 2014 +0100
-summary: Bug 903885, fix IDNA wildcard handling, r=kaie
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang at windriver.com>
----
- nss/lib/certdb/certdb.c | 15 +++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/nss/lib/certdb/certdb.c b/nss/lib/certdb/certdb.c
-index b7d22bd..91877b7 100644
---- a/nss/lib/certdb/certdb.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/certdb/certdb.c
-@@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ cert_TestHostName(char * cn, const char * hn)
- return rv;
- }
- } else {
-- /* New approach conforms to RFC 2818. */
-+ /* New approach conforms to RFC 6125. */
- char *wildcard = PORT_Strchr(cn, '*');
- char *firstcndot = PORT_Strchr(cn, '.');
- char *secondcndot = firstcndot ? PORT_Strchr(firstcndot+1, '.') : NULL;
-@@ -1390,14 +1390,17 @@ cert_TestHostName(char * cn, const char * hn)
- /* For a cn pattern to be considered valid, the wildcard character...
- * - may occur only in a DNS name with at least 3 components, and
- * - may occur only as last character in the first component, and
-- * - may be preceded by additional characters
-+ * - may be preceded by additional characters, and
-+ * - must not be preceded by an IDNA ACE prefix (xn--)
- */
- if (wildcard && secondcndot && secondcndot[1] && firsthndot
-- && firstcndot - wildcard == 1
-- && secondcndot - firstcndot > 1
-- && PORT_Strrchr(cn, '*') == wildcard
-+ && firstcndot - wildcard == 1 /* wildcard is last char in first component */
-+ && secondcndot - firstcndot > 1 /* second component is non-empty */
-+ && PORT_Strrchr(cn, '*') == wildcard /* only one wildcard in cn */
- && !PORT_Strncasecmp(cn, hn, wildcard - cn)
-- && !PORT_Strcasecmp(firstcndot, firsthndot)) {
-+ && !PORT_Strcasecmp(firstcndot, firsthndot)
-+ /* If hn starts with xn--, then cn must start with wildcard */
-+ && (PORT_Strncasecmp(hn, "xn--", 4) || wildcard == cn)) {
- /* valid wildcard pattern match */
- return SECSuccess;
- }
---
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d6434df..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-nss: CVE-2014-1544
-
-the patch comes from:
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2014-1544
-https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/204f22c527f8
-
-author Robert Relyea <rrelyea at redhat.com>
-https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=963150
-Bug 963150: Add nssCertificate_AddRef and nssCertificate_Destroy calls
-to PK11_ImportCert to prevent nssTrustDomain_AddCertsToCache from
-freeing the CERTCertificate associated with the NSSCertificate. r=wtc.
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang at windriver.com>
----
- nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c b/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
-index 39168b9..3f3edb1 100644
---- a/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
-@@ -981,8 +981,15 @@ PK11_ImportCert(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CERTCertificate *cert,
- * CERTCertificate, and finish
- */
- nssPKIObject_AddInstance(&c->object, certobj);
-+ /* nssTrustDomain_AddCertsToCache may release a reference to 'c' and
-+ * replace 'c' by a different value. So we add a reference to 'c' to
-+ * prevent 'c' from being destroyed. */
-+ nssCertificate_AddRef(c);
- nssTrustDomain_AddCertsToCache(STAN_GetDefaultTrustDomain(), &c, 1);
-+ /* XXX should we pass the original value of 'c' to
-+ * STAN_ForceCERTCertificateUpdate? */
- (void)STAN_ForceCERTCertificateUpdate(c);
-+ nssCertificate_Destroy(c);
- SECITEM_FreeItem(keyID,PR_TRUE);
- return SECSuccess;
- loser:
---
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
index d706c43..cf6110d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
@@ -16,20 +16,13 @@ SRC_URI = "\
file://nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch \
file://nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch \
file://nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch \
- file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch \
- file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch \
- file://nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch \
- file://nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch \
- file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch \
- file://nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch \
- file://nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
file://nss.pc.in \
file://signlibs.sh \
"
inherit siteinfo
-PR = "r0"
+
DEPENDS = "sqlite3 nspr zlib nss-native"
DEPENDS_class-native = "sqlite3-native nspr-native zlib-native"
RDEPENDS_${PN} = "perl"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch
rename to meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss-fix-incorrect-shebang-of-perl.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch
rename to meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss-fix-support-cross-compiling.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch
rename to meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss-no-rpath-for-cross-compiling.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss.pc.in b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss.pc.in
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss.pc.in
rename to meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/nss.pc.in
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/signlibs.sh b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/signlibs.sh
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-support/nss/files/signlibs.sh
rename to meta/recipes-support/nss/nss/signlibs.sh
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.15.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.15.1.bb
deleted file mode 100644
index 7b06f00..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.15.1.bb
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-require nss.inc
-
-SRC_URI += "\
- http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_15_1_RTM/src/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
-"
-
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "fb68f4d210ac9397dd0d3c39c4f938eb"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f994106a33d1f3210f4151bbb3419a1c28fd1cb545caa7dc9afdebd6da626284"
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.17.bb b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.17.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..804783f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.17.bb
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+require nss.inc
+
+SRC_URI += "\
+ http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/NSS_3_17_RTM/src/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
+"
+
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "081dd99afa12af589c09e2d7cb5f5c6d"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3b1abcd8f89211dda2cc739bfa76552d080f7ea80482ef2727b006548a7f0c81"
--
1.8.3.1
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