[OE-core] [PATCH 1/1] wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-8041
Hongxu Jia
hongxu.jia at windriver.com
Fri Nov 13 12:18:09 UTC 2015
On 11/13/2015 08:11 PM, Jussi Kukkonen wrote:
> On 13 November 2015 at 13:08, Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia at windriver.com
> <mailto:hongxu.jia at windriver.com>> wrote:
>
> Backport patch from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/
> and rebase for wpa-supplicant 2.4
>
>
> There's a thread about upgrading master to 2.5 (which should fix this)
> already.
> The patch probably still makes sense for jethro though.
>
Yes, you are right, the 2.5 don't need this, it makes sense for jethro.
//Hongxu
> - Jussi
>
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia at windriver.com
> <mailto:hongxu.jia at windriver.com>>
> ---
> ...load-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch | 64
> ++++++++++++++++++++++
> .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
> <http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb> | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644
> meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
>
> diff --git
> a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..bc1d1e5
> --- /dev/null
> +++
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
> +From c13401c723a039971bcd91b3856d76c6041b15f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi <mailto:j at w1.fi>>
> +Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 05:54:18 -0500
> +Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF
> record parser
> +
> +It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
> +wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
> +length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
> +2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
> +payload length value and the record type filter reading up to
> about 20
> +bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the
> process.
> +This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32
> bytes of
> +heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow
> of the
> +same length which would most likely result in the process
> termination.
> +In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
> +would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result
> in an
> +infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
> +
> +Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of
> service
> +attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
> +sending them during NFC connection handover if the application
> providing
> +the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
> +received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC
> stack
> +that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
> +hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
> +here.
> +
> +Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
> +detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi <mailto:j at w1.fi>>
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport [from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/]
> +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia at windriver.com
> <mailto:hongxu.jia at windriver.com>>
> +---
> + src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
> + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
> +index d45dfc8..f7f729b 100644
> +--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
> ++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
> +@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data,
> u32 size,
> + if (size < 6)
> + return -1;
> + record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
> ++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
> ++ return -1;
> + pos += sizeof(u32);
> + }
> +
> +@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data,
> u32 size,
> + pos += record->payload_length;
> +
> + record->total_length = pos - data;
> +- if (record->total_length > size)
> ++ if (record->total_length > size ||
> ++ record->total_length < record->payload_length)
> + return -1;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +--
> +1.9.1
> +
> diff --git
> a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
> <http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
> <http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
> index a124cf2..6e4d028 100644
> ---
> a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
> <http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
> +++
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
> <http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI =
> "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz
> <http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-$%7BPV%7D.tar.gz> \
> file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
> \
> file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
> \
> file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \
> +
> file://0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
> \
> "
> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d"
> SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
> "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
> --
> 1.9.1
>
> --
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