[OE-core] [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
Martin Jansa
martin.jansa at gmail.com
Thu Dec 22 15:21:30 UTC 2016
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git at git.openembedded.org wrote:
> rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro
> in repository openembedded-core.
This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch.
OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE
- file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
- file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \
- file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
- file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \
Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago:
OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb
similarity index 94%
rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb
rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb
> commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8
> Author: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
> AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700
>
> openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
>
> Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
> CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH
>
> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
> (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9)
> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808 at gmail.com>
> ---
> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++
> .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..df36d5f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
> +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
> +
> +A common idiom in the codebase is:
> +
> +if (p + len > limit)
> +{
> + return; /* Too long */
> +}
> +
> +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
> +limit == p + SIZE
> +
> +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
> +message).
> +
> +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
> +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
> +undefined behaviour.
> +
> +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
> +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
> +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
> +
> +Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
> +
> +CVE-2016-2177
> +
> +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +CVE: CVE-2016-2177
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
> +
> +
> +---
> + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
> + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
> + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
> + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
> +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
> +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
> ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
> +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> +
> + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
> +
> +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
> ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> + goto f_err;
> +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> + /* get the session-id */
> + j = *(p++);
> +
> +- if (p + j > d + n) {
> ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> + goto f_err;
> +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> +
> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
> + /* cookie stuff */
> +- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
> ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> + goto f_err;
> + }
> + cookie_len = *(p++);
> +
> +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> + goto f_err;
> +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> + }
> + }
> +
> +- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> + goto f_err;
> +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> + }
> +
> + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
> +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
> + /* not enough data */
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
> +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> +
> + /* compression */
> + i = *(p++);
> +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
> + /* not enough data */
> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
> +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
> +index b182998..54ee783 100644
> +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
> ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
> +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
> + int r;
> + #endif
> +
> +- if (session_id + len > limit) {
> ++ if (limit - session_id < len) {
> + fatal = 1;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
> +index fb64607..cdac011 100644
> +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
> ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
> +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
> + };
> +
> +- if (data >= (limit - 2))
> ++ if (limit - data <= 2)
> + return;
> + data += 2;
> +
> +- if (data > (limit - 4))
> ++ if (limit - data < 4)
> + return;
> + n2s(data, type);
> + n2s(data, size);
> +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
> + return;
> +
> +- if (data + size > limit)
> ++ if (limit - data < size)
> + return;
> + data += size;
> +
> +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
> + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
> +
> +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
> + return;
> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
> + return;
> +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> + } else {
> + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
> +
> +- if (data + len != limit)
> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
> + return;
> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
> + return;
> +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
> + if (data == limit)
> + goto ri_check;
> +
> +- if (data > (limit - 2))
> ++ if (limit - data < 2)
> + goto err;
> +
> + n2s(data, len);
> +
> +- if (data + len != limit)
> ++ if (limit - data != len)
> + goto err;
> +
> +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
> + n2s(data, type);
> + n2s(data, size);
> +
> +- if (data + size > (limit))
> ++ if (limit - data < size)
> + goto err;
> + # if 0
> + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
> +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
> + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
> + return 1;
> +
> +- if (data >= limit - 2)
> ++ if (limit - data <= 2)
> + return 1;
> + n2s(data, len);
> +
> +- if (data > limit - len)
> ++ if (limit - data < len)
> + return 1;
> +
> +- while (data <= limit - 4) {
> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
> + n2s(data, type);
> + n2s(data, size);
> +
> +- if (data + size > limit)
> ++ if (limit - data < size)
> + return 1;
> + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
> + return 0;
> +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
> + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
> + # endif
> +
> +- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
> ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
> + goto ri_check;
> +
> + n2s(data, length);
> +- if (data + length != d + n) {
> ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
> + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
> ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
> + n2s(data, type);
> + n2s(data, size);
> +
> +- if (data + size > (d + n))
> ++ if ((d + n) - data < size)
> + goto ri_check;
> +
> + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
> +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
> + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
> + i = *(p++);
> +- p += i;
> +- if (p >= limit)
> ++
> ++ if (limit - p <= i)
> + return -1;
> ++
> ++ p += i;
> + }
> + /* Skip past cipher list */
> + n2s(p, i);
> +- p += i;
> +- if (p >= limit)
> ++ if (limit - p <= i)
> + return -1;
> ++ p += i;
> ++
> + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
> + i = *(p++);
> +- p += i;
> +- if (p > limit)
> ++ if (limit - p < i)
> + return -1;
> ++ p += i;
> ++
> + /* Now at start of extensions */
> +- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
> ++ if (limit - p <= 2)
> + return 0;
> + n2s(p, i);
> +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
> ++ while (limit - p >= 4) {
> + unsigned short type, size;
> + n2s(p, type);
> + n2s(p, size);
> +- if (p + size > limit)
> ++ if (limit - p < size)
> + return 0;
> + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
> + int r;
> +--
> +2.3.5
> +
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
> index ea40275..4135a31 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
> file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \
> file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \
> file://parallel.patch \
> + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
> "
>
> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
>
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> --
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--
Martin 'JaMa' Jansa jabber: Martin.Jansa at gmail.com
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