[OE-core] [PATCH] meta:recipes-extended: stat fix security gaps

Khem Raj raj.khem at gmail.com
Tue May 17 01:02:27 UTC 2016


> On May 16, 2016, at 5:21 PM, Plauchu Edwin <edwin.plauchu.camacho at linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
> Ok Bill
> 
> I rewrote the patch without using macros http://lists.openembedded.org/pipermail/openembedded-core/2016-May/121581.html
> 

you did not address the other comment about using printf properly.

> On 16/05/16 17:21, Randle, William C wrote:
>> On Mon, 2016-05-16 at 16:37 -0500, Plauchu Edwin wrote:
>>> On 16/05/16 16:28, Khem Raj wrote:
>>>>> On May 16, 2016, at 1:19 PM, edwin.plauchu.camacho at linux.intel.com wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> From: Edwin Plauchu <edwin.plauchu.camacho at intel.com>
>>>>> 
>>>>> This patch avoids stat fails to compile with compiler flags which elevate
>>>>> common string formatting issues into an error (-Wformat -Wformat-security
>>>>> -Werror=format-security).
>>>>> 
>>>>> [YOCTO #9550]
>>>>> 
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Edwin Plauchu <edwin.plauchu.camacho at intel.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> meta/conf/distro/include/security_flags.inc        |  1 -
>>>>> .../stat/stat-3.3/fix-security-format.patch        | 77
>>>>> ++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>> meta/recipes-extended/stat/stat_3.3.bb             |  1 +
>>>>> 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/stat/stat-3.3/fix-security-
>>>>> format.patch
>>>>> 
>>>>> diff --git a/meta/conf/distro/include/security_flags.inc
>>>>> b/meta/conf/distro/include/security_flags.inc
>>>>> index 7a91cec..5ae6dd8 100644
>>>>> --- a/meta/conf/distro/include/security_flags.inc
>>>>> +++ b/meta/conf/distro/include/security_flags.inc
>>>>> @@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-gettext = ""
>>>>> SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-kexec-tools = ""
>>>>> SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-makedevs = ""
>>>>> SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-oh-puzzles = ""
>>>>> -SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-stat = ""
>>>>> SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-unzip = ""
>>>>> SECURITY_STRINGFORMAT_pn-zip = ""
>>>>> 
>>>>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/stat/stat-3.3/fix-security-format.patch
>>>>> b/meta/recipes-extended/stat/stat-3.3/fix-security-format.patch
>>>>> new file mode 100644
>>>>> index 0000000..7d9f8df
>>>>> --- /dev/null
>>>>> +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/stat/stat-3.3/fix-security-format.patch
>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
>>>>> +meta: recipes-extended: Fixing security formatting issues on stat
>>>>> +
>>>>> +Fix security formatting issues related to printf without NULL argument
>>>>> +
>>>>> +stat.c: In function 'print_human_access':
>>>>> +stat.c:292:13: error: format not a string literal and no format arguments
>>>>> [-Werror=format-security]
>>>>> +     printf (access);
>>>>> +             ^
>>>>> +stat.c: In function 'print_human_time':
>>>>> +stat.c:299:57: error: format not a string literal and no format arguments
>>>>> [-Werror=format-security]
>>>>> +   if (strftime(str, 40, "%c", localtime(t)) > 0) printf(str);
>>>>> +                                                         ^
>>>>> +stat.c: In function 'print_it':
>>>>> +stat.c:613:6: error: format not a string literal and no format arguments
>>>>> [-Werror=format-security]
>>>>> +      printf(b);
>>>>> +      ^
>>>>> +stat.c:642:6: error: format not a string literal and no format arguments
>>>>> [-Werror=format-security]
>>>>> +      printf(b);
>>>>> +      ^
>>>>> +
>>>>> +[YOCTO #9550]
>>>>> +[https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9550]
>>>>> +
>>>>> +Upstream-Status: Pending
>>>>> +
>>>>> +Signed-off-by: Edwin Plauchu <edwin.plauchu.camacho at intel.com>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +diff --git a/stat.c b/stat.c
>>>>> +index 1ed07a9..351ab54 100644
>>>>> +--- a/stat.c
>>>>> ++++ b/stat.c
>>>>> +@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
>>>>> +
>>>>> + #include "fs.h"
>>>>> +
>>>>> ++#define __PRINT(STR) printf (STR,NULL)
>>>>> ++
>>>> Can we use proper formatting string here something like
>>>> printf(“%s”, access );
>>>> 
>>>> or use fputs() Call instead
>>> With fputs we need to specify stdout stream and
>>> the printf "%s" option needs a little bit more processing in formatting.
>>> 
>>> The actual change covers the security considerations with minimal add of
>>> NULL if you
>>> know why the another ways will be better please tell me.
>>> 
>>> Thanks in advance
>>> Edwin Plauchu
>>>> 
>>>>> + void print_human_type(unsigned short mode)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> +   switch (mode & S_IFMT)
>>>>> +@@ -289,15 +291,15 @@ void print_human_access(struct stat *statbuf)
>>>>> +     default:
>>>>> +       access[0] = '?';
>>>>> +     }
>>>>> +-    printf (access);
>>>>> ++    __PRINT(access);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + void print_human_time(time_t *t)
>>>>> + {
>>>>> +   char str[40];
>>>>> +
>>>>> +-  if (strftime(str, 40, "%c", localtime(t)) > 0) printf(str);
>>>>> +-  else printf("Cannot calculate human readable time, sorry");
>>>>> ++  if (strftime(str, 40, "%c", localtime(t)) > 0) __PRINT(str);
>>>>> ++  else __PRINT("Cannot calculate human readable time, sorry");
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* print statfs info */
>>>>> +@@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ void print_it(char *masterformat, char *filename,
>>>>> + 	{
>>>>> + 	    strcpy (pformat, "%");
>>>>> + 	    *m++ = '\0';
>>>>> +-	    printf(b);
>>>>> ++	    __PRINT(b);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + 	    /* copy all format specifiers to our format string */
>>>>> + 	    while (isdigit(*m) || strchr("#0-+. I", *m))
>>>>> +@@ -639,7 +641,7 @@ void print_it(char *masterformat, char *filename,
>>>>> + 	}
>>>>> + 	else
>>>>> + 	{
>>>>> +-	    printf(b);
>>>>> ++	    __PRINT(b);
>>>>> + 	    b = NULL;
>>>>> + 	}
>>>>> +     }
>> 
>> Is there a particular reason you used a macro for this package when all the
>> others you submitted so far use printf(arg, NULL) directly? I think it would be
>> good to be consistent.
>> 
>>     -Bill
>> 
> 
> --
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