[OE-core] [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
akuster808
akuster808 at gmail.com
Mon Jan 2 17:43:50 UTC 2017
On 12/22/2016 07:21 AM, Martin Jansa wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git at git.openembedded.org wrote:
>> rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro
>> in repository openembedded-core.
> This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch.
got them now.
>
> OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE
> - file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
> - file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
> + file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
> + file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
> file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
> file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
> file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
> file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
> file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
> file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \
> - file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
> - file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \
>
> Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago:
Yes there was a pull request but it did not contain that change. got
this too now.
Armin
>
> OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb
> similarity index 94%
> rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb
> rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb
>
>> commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8
>> Author: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
>> AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700
>>
>> openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
>>
>> Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
>> CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
>> (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9)
>> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808 at gmail.com>
>> ---
>> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 +
>> 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..df36d5f
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
>> +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
>> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
>> +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
>> +
>> +A common idiom in the codebase is:
>> +
>> +if (p + len > limit)
>> +{
>> + return; /* Too long */
>> +}
>> +
>> +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
>> +limit == p + SIZE
>> +
>> +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
>> +message).
>> +
>> +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
>> +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
>> +undefined behaviour.
>> +
>> +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
>> +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
>> +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
>> +
>> +Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
>> +
>> +CVE-2016-2177
>> +
>> +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +CVE: CVE-2016-2177
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
>> +
>> +
>> +---
>> + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
>> + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
>> + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
>> + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
>> +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
>> +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
>> ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
>> +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
>> +
>> + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
>> +
>> +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
>> ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
>> + goto f_err;
>> +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
>> + /* get the session-id */
>> + j = *(p++);
>> +
>> +- if (p + j > d + n) {
>> ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
>> + goto f_err;
>> +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
>> +
>> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
>> + /* cookie stuff */
>> +- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
>> ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
>> + goto f_err;
>> + }
>> + cookie_len = *(p++);
>> +
>> +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
>> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
>> + goto f_err;
>> +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> +- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
>> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
>> + goto f_err;
>> +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
>> +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
>> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
>> + /* not enough data */
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
>> +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
>> +
>> + /* compression */
>> + i = *(p++);
>> +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
>> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
>> + /* not enough data */
>> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
>> +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
>> +index b182998..54ee783 100644
>> +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
>> ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
>> +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
>> + int r;
>> + #endif
>> +
>> +- if (session_id + len > limit) {
>> ++ if (limit - session_id < len) {
>> + fatal = 1;
>> + goto err;
>> + }
>> +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
>> +index fb64607..cdac011 100644
>> +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
>> ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
>> +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
>> + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
>> + };
>> +
>> +- if (data >= (limit - 2))
>> ++ if (limit - data <= 2)
>> + return;
>> + data += 2;
>> +
>> +- if (data > (limit - 4))
>> ++ if (limit - data < 4)
>> + return;
>> + n2s(data, type);
>> + n2s(data, size);
>> +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
>> + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
>> + return;
>> +
>> +- if (data + size > limit)
>> ++ if (limit - data < size)
>> + return;
>> + data += size;
>> +
>> +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
>> + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
>> + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
>> +
>> +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
>> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
>> + return;
>> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
>> + return;
>> +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
>> + } else {
>> + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
>> +
>> +- if (data + len != limit)
>> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
>> + return;
>> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
>> + return;
>> +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
>> + if (data == limit)
>> + goto ri_check;
>> +
>> +- if (data > (limit - 2))
>> ++ if (limit - data < 2)
>> + goto err;
>> +
>> + n2s(data, len);
>> +
>> +- if (data + len != limit)
>> ++ if (limit - data != len)
>> + goto err;
>> +
>> +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
>> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
>> + n2s(data, type);
>> + n2s(data, size);
>> +
>> +- if (data + size > (limit))
>> ++ if (limit - data < size)
>> + goto err;
>> + # if 0
>> + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
>> +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
>> + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
>> + return 1;
>> +
>> +- if (data >= limit - 2)
>> ++ if (limit - data <= 2)
>> + return 1;
>> + n2s(data, len);
>> +
>> +- if (data > limit - len)
>> ++ if (limit - data < len)
>> + return 1;
>> +
>> +- while (data <= limit - 4) {
>> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
>> + n2s(data, type);
>> + n2s(data, size);
>> +
>> +- if (data + size > limit)
>> ++ if (limit - data < size)
>> + return 1;
>> + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
>> + return 0;
>> +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
>> + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
>> + # endif
>> +
>> +- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
>> ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
>> + goto ri_check;
>> +
>> + n2s(data, length);
>> +- if (data + length != d + n) {
>> ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
>> + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
>> ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
>> + n2s(data, type);
>> + n2s(data, size);
>> +
>> +- if (data + size > (d + n))
>> ++ if ((d + n) - data < size)
>> + goto ri_check;
>> +
>> + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
>> +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
>> + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
>> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
>> + i = *(p++);
>> +- p += i;
>> +- if (p >= limit)
>> ++
>> ++ if (limit - p <= i)
>> + return -1;
>> ++
>> ++ p += i;
>> + }
>> + /* Skip past cipher list */
>> + n2s(p, i);
>> +- p += i;
>> +- if (p >= limit)
>> ++ if (limit - p <= i)
>> + return -1;
>> ++ p += i;
>> ++
>> + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
>> + i = *(p++);
>> +- p += i;
>> +- if (p > limit)
>> ++ if (limit - p < i)
>> + return -1;
>> ++ p += i;
>> ++
>> + /* Now at start of extensions */
>> +- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
>> ++ if (limit - p <= 2)
>> + return 0;
>> + n2s(p, i);
>> +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
>> ++ while (limit - p >= 4) {
>> + unsigned short type, size;
>> + n2s(p, type);
>> + n2s(p, size);
>> +- if (p + size > limit)
>> ++ if (limit - p < size)
>> + return 0;
>> + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
>> + int r;
>> +--
>> +2.3.5
>> +
>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
>> index ea40275..4135a31 100644
>> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
>> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
>> file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \
>> file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \
>> file://parallel.patch \
>> + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
>> "
>>
>> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
>>
>> --
>> To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact
>> the administrator of this repository.
>> --
>> _______________________________________________
>> Openembedded-commits mailing list
>> Openembedded-commits at lists.openembedded.org
>> http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-commits
>
>
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