[OE-core] [PATCH] python3: Add upstream random.c fixes for recent glibc
Richard Purdie
richard.purdie at linuxfoundation.org
Sun Jan 22 11:27:33 UTC 2017
python3 fails to work with recent glibc versions on older hosts, giving
errors like:
Fatal Python error: getentropy() failed
Aborted
This breaks buildtools-tarball and hence eSDK. This patch backports the
changes to random.c from upstream that address the problem.
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie at linuxfoundation.org>
---
.../python/python3/uptream-random-fixes.patch | 719 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.2.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 720 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/uptream-random-fixes.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/uptream-random-fixes.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/uptream-random-fixes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1eeaba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/uptream-random-fixes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,719 @@
+This patch updates random.c to match upstream python's code at revision
+8125d9a8152b. This addresses various issues around problems with glibc 2.24
+and 2.25 such that python would fail to start with:
+
+[rpurdie at centos7 ~]$ /tmp/t2/sysroots/x86_64-pokysdk-linux/usr/bin/python3
+Fatal Python error: getentropy() failed
+Aborted
+
+(taken from our buildtools-tarball also breaks eSDK)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Victor Stinner <victor.stinner at gmail.com>
+# Date 1483957133 -3600
+# Node ID 8125d9a8152b79e712cb09c7094b9129b9bcea86
+# Parent 337461574c90281630751b6095c4e1baf380cf7d
+Issue #29157: Prefer getrandom() over getentropy()
+
+Copy and then adapt Python/random.c from default branch. Difference between 3.5
+and default branches:
+
+* Python 3.5 only uses getrandom() in non-blocking mode: flags=GRND_NONBLOCK
+* If getrandom() fails with EAGAIN: py_getrandom() immediately fails and
+ remembers that getrandom() doesn't work.
+* Python 3.5 has no _PyOS_URandomNonblock() function: _PyOS_URandom()
+ works in non-blocking mode on Python 3.5
+
+Index: Python-3.5.2/Python/random.c
+===================================================================
+--- Python-3.5.2.orig/Python/random.c
++++ Python-3.5.2/Python/random.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
+ #include "Python.h"
+ #ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+ # include <windows.h>
++/* All sample MSDN wincrypt programs include the header below. It is at least
++ * required with Min GW. */
++# include <wincrypt.h>
+ #else
+ # include <fcntl.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+@@ -36,10 +39,9 @@ win32_urandom_init(int raise)
+ return 0;
+
+ error:
+- if (raise)
++ if (raise) {
+ PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
+- else
+- Py_FatalError("Failed to initialize Windows random API (CryptoGen)");
++ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -52,8 +54,9 @@ win32_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_
+
+ if (hCryptProv == 0)
+ {
+- if (win32_urandom_init(raise) == -1)
++ if (win32_urandom_init(raise) == -1) {
+ return -1;
++ }
+ }
+
+ while (size > 0)
+@@ -62,11 +65,9 @@ win32_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_
+ if (!CryptGenRandom(hCryptProv, (DWORD)chunk, buffer))
+ {
+ /* CryptGenRandom() failed */
+- if (raise)
++ if (raise) {
+ PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
+- else
+- Py_FatalError("Failed to initialized the randomized hash "
+- "secret using CryptoGen)");
++ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buffer += chunk;
+@@ -75,55 +76,29 @@ win32_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-/* Issue #25003: Don't use getentropy() on Solaris (available since
+- * Solaris 11.3), it is blocking whereas os.urandom() should not block. */
+-#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && !defined(sun)
+-#define PY_GETENTROPY 1
+-
+-/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by getentropy().
+- Return 0 on success, or raise an exception and return -1 on error.
+-
+- If fatal is nonzero, call Py_FatalError() instead of raising an exception
+- on error. */
+-static int
+-py_getentropy(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int fatal)
+-{
+- while (size > 0) {
+- Py_ssize_t len = Py_MIN(size, 256);
+- int res;
+-
+- if (!fatal) {
+- Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+- res = getentropy(buffer, len);
+- Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+-
+- if (res < 0) {
+- PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- }
+- else {
+- res = getentropy(buffer, len);
+- if (res < 0)
+- Py_FatalError("getentropy() failed");
+- }
+-
+- buffer += len;
+- size -= len;
+- }
+- return 0;
+-}
+-
+-#else
++#else /* !MS_WINDOWS */
+
+ #if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM_SYSCALL)
+ #define PY_GETRANDOM 1
+
++/* Call getrandom() to get random bytes:
++
++ - Return 1 on success
++ - Return 0 if getrandom() is not available (failed with ENOSYS or EPERM),
++ or if getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) failed with EAGAIN (system urandom not
++ initialized yet).
++ - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error:
++ if getrandom() failed with EINTR, raise is non-zero and the Python signal
++ handler raised an exception, or if getrandom() failed with a different
++ error.
++
++ getrandom() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal. */
+ static int
+ py_getrandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
+ {
+- /* Is getrandom() supported by the running kernel?
+- * Need Linux kernel 3.17 or newer, or Solaris 11.3 or newer */
++ /* Is getrandom() supported by the running kernel? Set to 0 if getrandom()
++ failed with ENOSYS or EPERM. Need Linux kernel 3.17 or newer, or Solaris
++ 11.3 or newer */
+ static int getrandom_works = 1;
+
+ /* getrandom() on Linux will block if called before the kernel has
+@@ -132,84 +107,165 @@ py_getrandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t si
+ * see https://bugs.python.org/issue26839. To avoid this, use the
+ * GRND_NONBLOCK flag. */
+ const int flags = GRND_NONBLOCK;
+- int n;
++ char *dest;
++ long n;
+
+- if (!getrandom_works)
++ if (!getrandom_works) {
+ return 0;
++ }
+
++ dest = buffer;
+ while (0 < size) {
+ #ifdef sun
+ /* Issue #26735: On Solaris, getrandom() is limited to returning up
+- to 1024 bytes */
++ to 1024 bytes. Call it multiple times if more bytes are
++ requested. */
+ n = Py_MIN(size, 1024);
+ #else
+- n = size;
++ n = Py_MIN(size, LONG_MAX);
+ #endif
+
+ errno = 0;
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
+ if (raise) {
+ Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+- n = getrandom(buffer, n, flags);
++ n = getrandom(dest, n, flags);
+ Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+ }
+ else {
+- n = getrandom(buffer, n, flags);
++ n = getrandom(dest, n, flags);
+ }
+ #else
+ /* On Linux, use the syscall() function because the GNU libc doesn't
+- * expose the Linux getrandom() syscall yet. See:
+- * https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17252 */
++ expose the Linux getrandom() syscall yet. See:
++ https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17252 */
+ if (raise) {
+ Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+- n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, buffer, n, flags);
++ n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, dest, n, flags);
+ Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+ }
+ else {
+- n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, buffer, n, flags);
++ n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, dest, n, flags);
+ }
+ #endif
+
+ if (n < 0) {
+- if (errno == ENOSYS) {
++ /* ENOSYS: the syscall is not supported by the kernel.
++ EPERM: the syscall is blocked by a security policy (ex: SECCOMP)
++ or something else. */
++ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM) {
+ getrandom_works = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
++
+ if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+- /* If we failed with EAGAIN, the entropy pool was
+- * uninitialized. In this case, we return failure to fall
+- * back to reading from /dev/urandom.
+- *
+- * Note: In this case the data read will not be random so
+- * should not be used for cryptographic purposes. Retaining
+- * the existing semantics for practical purposes. */
++ /* getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) fails with EAGAIN if the system
++ urandom is not initialiazed yet. In this case, fall back on
++ reading from /dev/urandom.
++
++ Note: In this case the data read will not be random so
++ should not be used for cryptographic purposes. Retaining
++ the existing semantics for practical purposes. */
+ getrandom_works = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+- if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
+- if (!raise)
+- Py_FatalError("getrandom() interrupted by a signal");
+- return -1;
++ if (raise) {
++ if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
++ return -1;
++ }
+ }
+- /* retry getrandom() */
++
++ /* retry getrandom() if it was interrupted by a signal */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+- if (raise)
++ if (raise) {
+ PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
+- else
+- Py_FatalError("getrandom() failed");
++ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- buffer += n;
++ dest += n;
+ size -= n;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+-#endif
++
++#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY)
++#define PY_GETENTROPY 1
++
++/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by getentropy():
++
++ - Return 1 on success
++ - Return 0 if getentropy() syscall is not available (failed with ENOSYS or
++ EPERM).
++ - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error:
++ if getentropy() failed with EINTR, raise is non-zero and the Python signal
++ handler raised an exception, or if getentropy() failed with a different
++ error.
++
++ getentropy() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal. */
++static int
++py_getentropy(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
++{
++ /* Is getentropy() supported by the running kernel? Set to 0 if
++ getentropy() failed with ENOSYS or EPERM. */
++ static int getentropy_works = 1;
++
++ if (!getentropy_works) {
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ while (size > 0) {
++ /* getentropy() is limited to returning up to 256 bytes. Call it
++ multiple times if more bytes are requested. */
++ Py_ssize_t len = Py_MIN(size, 256);
++ int res;
++
++ if (raise) {
++ Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
++ res = getentropy(buffer, len);
++ Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
++ }
++ else {
++ res = getentropy(buffer, len);
++ }
++
++ if (res < 0) {
++ /* ENOSYS: the syscall is not supported by the running kernel.
++ EPERM: the syscall is blocked by a security policy (ex: SECCOMP)
++ or something else. */
++ if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM) {
++ getentropy_works = 0;
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (errno == EINTR) {
++ if (raise) {
++ if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++ }
++
++ /* retry getentropy() if it was interrupted by a signal */
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ if (raise) {
++ PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
++ }
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ buffer += len;
++ size -= len;
++ }
++ return 1;
++}
++#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && !defined(sun) */
++
+
+ static struct {
+ int fd;
+@@ -217,127 +273,123 @@ static struct {
+ ino_t st_ino;
+ } urandom_cache = { -1 };
+
++/* Read random bytes from the /dev/urandom device:
+
+-/* Read size bytes from /dev/urandom into buffer.
+- Call Py_FatalError() on error. */
+-static void
+-dev_urandom_noraise(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
+-{
+- int fd;
+- Py_ssize_t n;
++ - Return 0 on success
++ - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error
+
+- assert (0 < size);
++ Possible causes of errors:
+
+-#ifdef PY_GETRANDOM
+- if (py_getrandom(buffer, size, 0) == 1)
+- return;
+- /* getrandom() is not supported by the running kernel, fall back
+- * on reading /dev/urandom */
+-#endif
++ - open() failed with ENOENT, ENXIO, ENODEV, EACCES: the /dev/urandom device
++ was not found. For example, it was removed manually or not exposed in a
++ chroot or container.
++ - open() failed with a different error
++ - fstat() failed
++ - read() failed or returned 0
+
+- fd = _Py_open_noraise("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+- if (fd < 0)
+- Py_FatalError("Failed to open /dev/urandom");
++ read() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal.
+
+- while (0 < size)
+- {
+- do {
+- n = read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
+- } while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+- if (n <= 0)
+- {
+- /* stop on error or if read(size) returned 0 */
+- Py_FatalError("Failed to read bytes from /dev/urandom");
+- break;
+- }
+- buffer += n;
+- size -= (Py_ssize_t)n;
+- }
+- close(fd);
+-}
++ The file descriptor of the device is kept open between calls to avoid using
++ many file descriptors when run in parallel from multiple threads:
++ see the issue #18756.
++
++ st_dev and st_ino fields of the file descriptor (from fstat()) are cached to
++ check if the file descriptor was replaced by a different file (which is
++ likely a bug in the application): see the issue #21207.
+
+-/* Read size bytes from /dev/urandom into buffer.
+- Return 0 on success, raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
++ If the file descriptor was closed or replaced, open a new file descriptor
++ but don't close the old file descriptor: it probably points to something
++ important for some third-party code. */
+ static int
+-dev_urandom_python(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
++dev_urandom(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
+ {
+ int fd;
+ Py_ssize_t n;
+- struct _Py_stat_struct st;
+-#ifdef PY_GETRANDOM
+- int res;
+-#endif
+
+- if (size <= 0)
+- return 0;
++ if (raise) {
++ struct _Py_stat_struct st;
+
+-#ifdef PY_GETRANDOM
+- res = py_getrandom(buffer, size, 1);
+- if (res < 0)
+- return -1;
+- if (res == 1)
+- return 0;
+- /* getrandom() is not supported by the running kernel, fall back
+- * on reading /dev/urandom */
+-#endif
+-
+- if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
+- /* Does the fd point to the same thing as before? (issue #21207) */
+- if (_Py_fstat_noraise(urandom_cache.fd, &st)
+- || st.st_dev != urandom_cache.st_dev
+- || st.st_ino != urandom_cache.st_ino) {
+- /* Something changed: forget the cached fd (but don't close it,
+- since it probably points to something important for some
+- third-party code). */
+- urandom_cache.fd = -1;
+- }
+- }
+- if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0)
+- fd = urandom_cache.fd;
+- else {
+- fd = _Py_open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+- if (fd < 0) {
+- if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENXIO ||
+- errno == ENODEV || errno == EACCES)
+- PyErr_SetString(PyExc_NotImplementedError,
+- "/dev/urandom (or equivalent) not found");
+- /* otherwise, keep the OSError exception raised by _Py_open() */
+- return -1;
+- }
+ if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
+- /* urandom_fd was initialized by another thread while we were
+- not holding the GIL, keep it. */
+- close(fd);
+- fd = urandom_cache.fd;
++ /* Does the fd point to the same thing as before? (issue #21207) */
++ if (_Py_fstat_noraise(urandom_cache.fd, &st)
++ || st.st_dev != urandom_cache.st_dev
++ || st.st_ino != urandom_cache.st_ino) {
++ /* Something changed: forget the cached fd (but don't close it,
++ since it probably points to something important for some
++ third-party code). */
++ urandom_cache.fd = -1;
++ }
+ }
++ if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0)
++ fd = urandom_cache.fd;
+ else {
+- if (_Py_fstat(fd, &st)) {
+- close(fd);
++ fd = _Py_open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
++ if (fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENXIO ||
++ errno == ENODEV || errno == EACCES) {
++ PyErr_SetString(PyExc_NotImplementedError,
++ "/dev/urandom (or equivalent) not found");
++ }
++ /* otherwise, keep the OSError exception raised by _Py_open() */
+ return -1;
+ }
++ if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
++ /* urandom_fd was initialized by another thread while we were
++ not holding the GIL, keep it. */
++ close(fd);
++ fd = urandom_cache.fd;
++ }
+ else {
+- urandom_cache.fd = fd;
+- urandom_cache.st_dev = st.st_dev;
+- urandom_cache.st_ino = st.st_ino;
++ if (_Py_fstat(fd, &st)) {
++ close(fd);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ else {
++ urandom_cache.fd = fd;
++ urandom_cache.st_dev = st.st_dev;
++ urandom_cache.st_ino = st.st_ino;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+- }
+
+- do {
+- n = _Py_read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
+- if (n == -1)
+- return -1;
+- if (n == 0) {
+- PyErr_Format(PyExc_RuntimeError,
+- "Failed to read %zi bytes from /dev/urandom",
+- size);
++ do {
++ n = _Py_read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
++ if (n == -1)
++ return -1;
++ if (n == 0) {
++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_RuntimeError,
++ "Failed to read %zi bytes from /dev/urandom",
++ size);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ buffer += n;
++ size -= n;
++ } while (0 < size);
++ }
++ else {
++ fd = _Py_open_noraise("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
++ if (fd < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- buffer += n;
+- size -= n;
+- } while (0 < size);
++ while (0 < size)
++ {
++ do {
++ n = read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
++ } while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
++ if (n <= 0) {
++ /* stop on error or if read(size) returned 0 */
++ close(fd);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ buffer += n;
++ size -= n;
++ }
++ close(fd);
++ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -349,8 +401,8 @@ dev_urandom_close(void)
+ urandom_cache.fd = -1;
+ }
+ }
++#endif /* !MS_WINDOWS */
+
+-#endif
+
+ /* Fill buffer with pseudo-random bytes generated by a linear congruent
+ generator (LCG):
+@@ -373,29 +425,98 @@ lcg_urandom(unsigned int x0, unsigned ch
+ }
+ }
+
+-/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
+- number generator (RNG). It is suitable for most cryptographic purposes
+- except long living private keys for asymmetric encryption.
++/* Read random bytes:
+
+- Return 0 on success, raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
+-int
+-_PyOS_URandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
++ - Return 0 on success
++ - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error
++
++ Used sources of entropy ordered by preference, preferred source first:
++
++ - CryptGenRandom() on Windows
++ - getrandom() function (ex: Linux and Solaris): call py_getrandom()
++ - getentropy() function (ex: OpenBSD): call py_getentropy()
++ - /dev/urandom device
++
++ Read from the /dev/urandom device if getrandom() or getentropy() function
++ is not available or does not work.
++
++ Prefer getrandom() over getentropy() because getrandom() supports blocking
++ and non-blocking mode and Python requires non-blocking RNG at startup to
++ initialize its hash secret: see the PEP 524.
++
++ Prefer getrandom() and getentropy() over reading directly /dev/urandom
++ because these functions don't need file descriptors and so avoid ENFILE or
++ EMFILE errors (too many open files): see the issue #18756.
++
++ Only use RNG running in the kernel. They are more secure because it is
++ harder to get the internal state of a RNG running in the kernel land than a
++ RNG running in the user land. The kernel has a direct access to the hardware
++ and has access to hardware RNG, they are used as entropy sources.
++
++ Note: the OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() function does not automatically reseed
++ its RNG on fork(), two child processes (with the same pid) generate the same
++ random numbers: see issue #18747. Kernel RNGs don't have this issue,
++ they have access to good quality entropy sources.
++
++ If raise is zero:
++
++ - Don't raise an exception on error
++ - Don't call the Python signal handler (don't call PyErr_CheckSignals()) if
++ a function fails with EINTR: retry directly the interrupted function
++ - Don't release the GIL to call functions.
++*/
++static int
++pyurandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
+ {
++#if defined(PY_GETRANDOM) || defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
++ int res;
++#endif
++
+ if (size < 0) {
+- PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
+- "negative argument not allowed");
++ if (raise) {
++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
++ "negative argument not allowed");
++ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+- if (size == 0)
++
++ if (size == 0) {
+ return 0;
++ }
+
+ #ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+- return win32_urandom((unsigned char *)buffer, size, 1);
+-#elif defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
+- return py_getentropy(buffer, size, 0);
++ return win32_urandom((unsigned char *)buffer, size, raise);
++#else
++
++#if defined(PY_GETRANDOM) || defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
++#ifdef PY_GETRANDOM
++ res = py_getrandom(buffer, size, raise);
+ #else
+- return dev_urandom_python((char*)buffer, size);
++ res = py_getentropy(buffer, size, raise);
+ #endif
++ if (res < 0) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (res == 1) {
++ return 0;
++ }
++ /* getrandom() or getentropy() function is not available: failed with
++ ENOSYS, EPERM or EAGAIN. Fall back on reading from /dev/urandom. */
++#endif
++
++ return dev_urandom(buffer, size, raise);
++#endif
++}
++
++/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
++ number generator (RNG). It is suitable for most cryptographic purposes
++ except long living private keys for asymmetric encryption.
++
++ Return 0 on success. Raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
++int
++_PyOS_URandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
++{
++ return pyurandom(buffer, size, 1);
+ }
+
+ void
+@@ -436,13 +557,14 @@ _PyRandom_Init(void)
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+-#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+- (void)win32_urandom(secret, secret_size, 0);
+-#elif defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
+- (void)py_getentropy(secret, secret_size, 1);
+-#else
+- dev_urandom_noraise(secret, secret_size);
+-#endif
++ int res;
++
++ /* _PyRandom_Init() is called very early in the Python initialization
++ and so exceptions cannot be used (use raise=0). */
++ res = pyurandom(secret, secret_size, 0);
++ if (res < 0) {
++ Py_FatalError("failed to get random numbers to initialize Python");
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -454,8 +576,6 @@ _PyRandom_Fini(void)
+ CryptReleaseContext(hCryptProv, 0);
+ hCryptProv = 0;
+ }
+-#elif defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
+- /* nothing to clean */
+ #else
+ dev_urandom_close();
+ #endif
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.2.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.2.bb
index bde9c95..2ff7c9e 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.2.bb
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
file://setup.py-find-libraries-in-staging-dirs.patch \
file://configure.ac-fix-LIBPL.patch \
file://python3-fix-CVE-2016-1000110.patch \
+ file://upstream-random-fixes.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8906efbacfcdc7c3c9198aeefafd159e"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0010f56100b9b74259ebcd5d4b295a32324b58b517403a10d1a2aa7cb22bca40"
--
2.7.4
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