[OE-core] [daisy][PATCH v2] wpa_supplicant: fix WPA2 key replay security bug
Hermida, Isaac
Isaac.Hermida at digi.com
Thu Nov 9 16:52:46 UTC 2017
Ping, is there any plan to include this patch in a short term?
Regards.
On 11/03/2017 01:46 PM, Isaac Hermida wrote:
> WPA2 is vulnerable to replay attacks which result in unauthenticated users
> having access to the network.
>
> * CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the Four-way handshake
>
> * CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the Four-way handshake
>
> * CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Four-way
> handshake
>
> * CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the Group Key handshake
>
> * CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Group Key
> handshake
>
> * CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted Fast BSS Transition Reassociation
> Request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it
>
> * CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS)
> PeerKey (TPK) key in the TDLS handshake
>
> * CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a
> Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame
>
> * CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when
> processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame
>
> This is the backport to wpa_supplicant 2.1.
>
> Signed-off-by: Isaac Hermida <isaac.hermida-i7dp0qKlBMg at public.gmane.org>
> ---
> .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc | 1 +
> .../wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 944 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 945 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
> index 2229b8f5e960..de3f926515e6 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
> file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
> file://99_wpa_supplicant \
> file://fix-libnl3-host-contamination.patch \
> + file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
> "
> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "e96b8db5a8171cd17a5b2012d6ad7cc7"
> SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "91632e7e3b49a340ce408e2f978a93546a697383abf2e5a60f146faae9e1b277"
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..0bc6a8b9a5e9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,944 @@
> +The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
> +result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13077
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13078
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13079
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13080
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13081
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13082
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13086
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13087
> +CVE: CVE-2017-13088
> +
> +From 7e11b9d657d869ec0736021fd873484c806fa903 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef-4rd9VHyGk8h2kGVRwRwAbw at public.gmane.org>
> +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
> +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
> +
> +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
> +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
> +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
> +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
> +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
> +frames on RX side.
> +
> +This issue was introduced by the commit
> +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
> +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
> +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
> +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
> +failed.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef-4rd9VHyGk8h2kGVRwRwAbw at public.gmane.org>
> +---
> + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
> + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
> + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
> + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
> + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> +index 707a63f0cf63..950d14ea1ca6 100644
> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> +@@ -1555,6 +1555,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event)
> + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> + break;
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
> ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
> ++ return 0;
> + }
> +
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
> +@@ -2986,6 +2989,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> + }
> +
> +
> ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> ++{
> ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
> ++ return 0;
> ++ return sm->tk_already_set;
> ++}
> ++
> ++
> + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
> + {
> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
> +index bc3dec45a032..d6fbbdd4aaa5 100644
> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
> +@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
> + u8 *data, size_t data_len);
> + typedef enum {
> + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
> +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
> ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
> + } wpa_event;
> + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event);
> +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
> +index c22c4ccae3e6..6b7892a79116 100644
> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
> +@@ -762,6 +762,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> + return;
> + }
> +
> ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
> ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
> ++ * PN in the driver */
> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
> ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
> ++ return;
> ++ }
> ++
> + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
> + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
> + * after association has been completed. This function will be called
> +@@ -774,6 +782,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> +
> + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
> + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
> ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
> + }
> +
> +
> +@@ -887,6 +896,7 @@ static u16 wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
> + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTKName", ptk_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
> +
> + sm->pairwise = pairwise;
> ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
> + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
> +
> + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
> +index fcd5878e7494..e7e092a33850 100644
> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
> +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
> + struct wpa_ptk PTK;
> + Boolean PTK_valid;
> + Boolean pairwise_set;
> ++ Boolean tk_already_set;
> + int keycount;
> + Boolean Pair;
> + struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
> +
> +From 1cfe215c2ed3ce487dc3e61a64a9704174afd04e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef-4rd9VHyGk8h2kGVRwRwAbw at public.gmane.org>
> +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
> +Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
> +
> +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
> +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
> +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
> +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
> +sequence counter associated to the group key.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef-4rd9VHyGk8h2kGVRwRwAbw at public.gmane.org>
> +---
> + src/common/wpa_common.h | 12 ++++++
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
> + 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> +index dcc035c7d874..78217175acdc 100644
> +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
> ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> +@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ RSN_SELECTOR(0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 13)
> +
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> + #define WPA_IGTK_LEN 16
> ++#define WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN 32
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> +
> +
> +@@ -207,6 +208,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
> + } u;
> + } STRUCT_PACKED;
> +
> ++struct wpa_gtk {
> ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
> ++ size_t gtk_len;
> ++};
> ++
> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> ++struct wpa_igtk {
> ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
> ++ size_t igtk_len;
> ++};
> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> +
> + /* WPA IE version 1
> + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +index 4474c3b11737..26fdb7913270 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +@@ -630,6 +630,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
> + u8 gtk_buf[32];
> +
> ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
> ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
> ++ return 0;
> ++ }
> ++
> + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
> +@@ -661,6 +670,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
> ++
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> +@@ -730,6 +742,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + }
> +
> +
> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
> ++{
> ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
> ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
> ++
> ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
> ++ keyidx);
> ++ return 0;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
> ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
> ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
> ++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
> ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
> ++ return -1;
> ++ }
> ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
> ++ broadcast_ether_addr,
> ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
> ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
> ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
> ++ return -1;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
> ++
> ++ return 0;
> ++}
> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> ++
> ++
> + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
> + {
> +@@ -739,28 +793,13 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> +
> + if (ie->igtk) {
> + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
> +- u16 keyidx;
> ++
> + if (ie->igtk_len != sizeof(*igtk))
> + return -1;
> ++
> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
> +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
> +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
> +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
> +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
> +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
> +- igtk->igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN);
> +- if (keyidx > 4095) {
> +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
> +- return -1;
> +- }
> +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, WPA_ALG_IGTK, broadcast_ether_addr,
> +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
> +- igtk->igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) {
> +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> + return -1;
> +- }
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +@@ -2077,7 +2116,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> + */
> + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> + {
> +- int clear_ptk = 1;
> ++ int clear_keys = 1;
> +
> + if (sm == NULL)
> + return;
> +@@ -2103,11 +2142,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> + /* Prepare for the next transition */
> + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
> +
> +- clear_ptk = 0;
> ++ clear_keys = 0;
> + }
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> +
> +- if (clear_ptk) {
> ++ if (clear_keys) {
> + /*
> + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
> + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
> +@@ -2115,6 +2154,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Clear old PTK");
> + sm->ptk_set = 0;
> + sm->tptk_set = 0;
> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> + }
> +
> + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
> +@@ -2654,6 +2697,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> + }
> +
> +
> +@@ -2726,21 +2773,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
> + }
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
> +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
> +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
> +-
> +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
> +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, WPA_IGTK_LEN);
> +-
> +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
> +- igd.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN);
> +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, WPA_ALG_IGTK, broadcast_ether_addr,
> +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
> +- igd.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) {
> +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
> +- "WNM mode");
> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
> ++
> ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> + return -1;
> +- }
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> + } else {
> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> +index 75cfb479e032..73287c1612cb 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
> + int rx_replay_counter_set;
> + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
> ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> +
> + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
> +
> +
> +From 7ce8d2cd05f370bc94d821e9cef401d8de9e75ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
> +Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
> + Mode cases
> +
> +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
> +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
> +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
> +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
> +detect a possible key reconfiguration.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +---
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
> + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +index 26fdb7913270..4aa1ccb87684 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +@@ -625,14 +625,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
> +
> + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
> +- const u8 *key_rsc)
> ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
> + {
> + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
> + u8 gtk_buf[32];
> +
> + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
> ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
> ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
> + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
> +@@ -670,8 +673,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
> ++ if (wnm_sleep) {
> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
> ++ } else {
> ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
> ++ }
> +
> + return 0;
> + }
> +@@ -730,7 +739,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
> + gtk_len, gtk_len,
> + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
> +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) {
> ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) {
> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> + "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
> + return -1;
> +@@ -744,14 +753,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> +
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
> ++ int wnm_sleep)
> + {
> + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
> + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
> +
> + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
> +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
> ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
> ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
> + keyidx);
> +@@ -776,8 +789,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
> +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
> ++ if (wnm_sleep) {
> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
> ++ } else {
> ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
> ++ }
> +
> + return 0;
> + }
> +@@ -798,7 +817,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + return -1;
> +
> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> +@@ -1415,7 +1434,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + if (ret)
> + goto failed;
> +
> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) ||
> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) ||
> + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info))
> + goto failed;
> +
> +@@ -2155,8 +2174,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> + sm->ptk_set = 0;
> + sm->tptk_set = 0;
> + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> + }
> +
> +@@ -2698,8 +2719,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
> + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> + }
> +
> +@@ -2766,7 +2789,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
> +
> + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
> + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
> + "WNM mode");
> + return -1;
> +@@ -2776,7 +2799,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
> + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
> +
> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
> + return -1;
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> + } else {
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> +index 73287c1612cb..004915aba236 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> +@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> + int rx_replay_counter_set;
> + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
> + struct wpa_gtk gtk;
> ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> + struct wpa_igtk igtk;
> ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> +
> + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
> +
> +From 19cde15c1685266e41e3f08c5f58e4dc3d8b1246 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef-4rd9VHyGk8h2kGVRwRwAbw at public.gmane.org>
> +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
> +Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
> +
> +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
> +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
> +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
> +
> +This fixes the earlier fix in commit
> +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
> +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
> +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
> +message 3/4.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef-4rd9VHyGk8h2kGVRwRwAbw at public.gmane.org>
> +---
> + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++
> + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> +index 78217175acdc..f0e4e9bcce3d 100644
> +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
> ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> +@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
> + u8 rx_mic_key[8];
> + } auth;
> + } u;
> ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
> + } STRUCT_PACKED;
> +
> + struct wpa_gtk {
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +index 4aa1ccb87684..fe27cecf14be 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +@@ -541,6 +541,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + const u8 *key_rsc;
> + u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
> +
> ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> ++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
> ++ return 0;
> ++ }
> ++
> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> + "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver");
> +
> +@@ -577,6 +583,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
> + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
> + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
> + eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_sm_rekey_ptk,
> +
> +From 91837b1b958081a3df7fb1ecea49934961e8e442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
> +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
> +
> +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
> +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
> +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
> +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
> +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
> +
> +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
> +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +---
> + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
> + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> +index 950d14ea1ca6..229b50290a70 100644
> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> +@@ -1699,6 +1699,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
> + }
> +
> +
> ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> ++{
> ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
> ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
> ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
> ++ return -1;
> ++ }
> ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
> ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
> ++ return 0;
> ++}
> ++
> ++
> + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
> + {
> + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
> +@@ -2205,9 +2220,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
> + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
> + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
> + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
> +- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
> +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
> +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
> ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
> ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
> ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
> ++ else
> ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
> ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
> + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
> + break;
> + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
> +
> +From 5741bf62d3b5e9060f88a52d7d2836f423fd6cc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
> +Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
> +
> +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
> +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
> +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
> +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
> +that behavior does not get modified.
> +
> +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
> +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
> +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
> +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
> +and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
> +
> +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
> +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +---
> + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
> +index 8a978f7475ec..2802f8aeb406 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
> +@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
> + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
> + } tpk;
> + int tpk_set;
> ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
> + int tpk_success;
> + int tpk_in_progress;
> +
> +@@ -182,6 +183,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
> + u8 rsc[6];
> + enum wpa_alg alg;
> +
> ++ if (peer->tk_set) {
> ++ /*
> ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
> ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
> ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
> ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
> ++ * not allow that to happen.
> ++ */
> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
> ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
> ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
> ++ return -1;
> ++ }
> ++
> + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
> +
> + switch (peer->cipher) {
> +@@ -199,12 +214,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
> ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
> + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
> + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
> + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
> + "driver");
> + return -1;
> + }
> ++ peer->tk_set = 1;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> +@@ -645,7 +663,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_free(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
> + peer->supp_oper_classes = NULL;
> + peer->rsnie_i_len = peer->rsnie_p_len = 0;
> + peer->cipher = 0;
> +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
> ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
> + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
> + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> + os_memset(peer->rnonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> +@@ -1068,6 +1086,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
> + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
> + return -1;
> + }
> ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
> + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
> + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> +@@ -1518,6 +1537,19 @@ static int copy_peer_supp_oper_classes(const struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde,
> + }
> +
> +
> ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
> ++{
> ++ int i;
> ++
> ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
> ++ if (nonce[i])
> ++ return 1;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ return 0;
> ++}
> ++
> ++
> + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
> + const u8 *buf, size_t len)
> + {
> +@@ -1758,7 +1790,8 @@ skip_rsn:
> + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
> + peer->cipher = cipher;
> +
> +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
> ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
> ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
> + /*
> + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
> + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
> +@@ -1775,6 +1808,7 @@ skip_rsn:
> + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
> + goto error;
> + }
> ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
> + }
> +
> + #if 0
> +
> +From b6bdcc39aaf1a51c90c46a884e08acb3ffe33c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
> +Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
> + request
> +
> +Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
> +Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
> +response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
> +association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
> +successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
> +protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +---
> + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 2 ++
> + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> +
> +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
> +index 65b2783839ee..294d73d4f6a2 100644
> +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
> ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
> +@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
> + return;
> + }
> +
> ++ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
> ++
> + if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
> + wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
> +
> +From a812fb8140288ed89399720ae1f6e09795655402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
> +Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
> +
> +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
> +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
> +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
> +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
> +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
> +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
> +Reassociation Response frame.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> +---
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
> + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +index fe27cecf14be..ff9f26f94016 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> +@@ -2215,6 +2215,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
> + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
> + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> + }
> +
> +
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
> +index c8d8cfc8b6c4..172f5fcfc1a6 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
> +@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
> + u16 capab;
> +
> + sm->ft_completed = 0;
> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
> +
> + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
> + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
> +@@ -684,6 +685,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
> ++ return 0;
> ++ }
> ++
> + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
> + return -1;
> +@@ -782,6 +788,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
> ++
> + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> +index 004915aba236..63c7f90ed34b 100644
> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> +@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> + size_t r0kh_id_len;
> + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
> + int ft_completed;
> ++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
> + int over_the_ds_in_progress;
> + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
> + int set_ptk_after_assoc;
>
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