[OE-core] [PATCH][morty] bluez5: fix out-of-bounds access in SDP server (CVE-2017-1000250)

[Bruce Ashfield]

.. and if anyone notices, there's a kernel part to this CVE as well.

I've applied to fix to all the active linux-yocto kernels, and the change
will be part
of my consolidated pull request that comes out later today.

Cheers,

Bruce

On Thu, Sep 14, 2017 at 8:27 AM, Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com> wrote:

> All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable to
> an
> information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to
> obtain
> sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This
> vulnerability
> lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
> ---
>  meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc        |  1 +
>  .../bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch           | 34
> ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-
> 1000250.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
> index ecefb7b593e..3421c382063 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
>      file://run-ptest \
>      ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', '',
> 'file://0001-Allow-using-obexd-without-systemd-in-the-user-sessio.patch',
> d)} \
>      file://0001-tests-add-a-target-for-building-tests-without-runnin.patch
> \
> +    file://cve-2017-1000250.patch \
>  "
>  S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}"
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000000..9fac961bcf6
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
> +All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable
> to an
> +information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to
> obtain
> +sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This
> vulnerability
> +lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests.
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2017-1000250
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
> +
> +From 9e009647b14e810e06626dde7f1bb9ea3c375d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz at intel.com>
> +Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 10:01:40 +0300
> +Subject: sdp: Fix Out-of-bounds heap read in service_search_attr_req
> function
> +
> +Check if there is enough data to continue otherwise return an error.
> +---
> + src/sdpd-request.c | 2 +-
> + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/sdpd-request.c b/src/sdpd-request.c
> +index 1eefdce..318d044 100644
> +--- a/src/sdpd-request.c
> ++++ b/src/sdpd-request.c
> +@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ static int service_search_attr_req(sdp_req_t *req,
> sdp_buf_t *buf)
> +       } else {
> +               /* continuation State exists -> get from cache */
> +               sdp_buf_t *pCache = sdp_get_cached_rsp(cstate);
> +-              if (pCache) {
> ++              if (pCache && cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent <
> pCache->data_size) {
> +                       uint16_t sent = MIN(max, pCache->data_size -
> cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent);
> +                       pResponse = pCache->data;
> +                       memcpy(buf->data, pResponse + cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent,
> sent);
> +--
> +cgit v1.1
> --
> 2.11.0
>
> --
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>



-- 
"Thou shalt not follow the NULL pointer, for chaos and madness await thee
at its end"
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