[OE-core] [zeus 25/28] go: fix CVE-2019-16276
Martin Jansa
martin.jansa at gmail.com
Thu Oct 31 11:57:29 UTC 2019
I'm sorry I was looking at wrong build before.
It doesn't happen in zeus and master. Only with warrior where this was
backported as well in:
"[OE-core] [warrior 18/19] go: fix CVE-2019-16276"
Probably because warrior is using older minor version of 1.12 go:
-GO_MINOR = ".1"
+GO_MINOR = ".9"
On Thu, Oct 31, 2019 at 12:49 PM Martin Jansa <martin.jansa at gmail.com>
wrote:
> This seems to cause:
>
> ERROR: go-native-1.12.1-r0 do_patch: Fuzz detected:
>
> Applying patch
> 0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch
> patching file src/net/http/serve_test.go
> patching file src/net/http/transport_test.go
> Hunk #1 succeeded at 5059 with fuzz 2 (offset -74 lines).
> patching file src/net/textproto/reader.go
> patching file src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
>
> The context lines in the patches can be updated with devtool:
>
> devtool modify go-native
> devtool finish --force-patch-refresh go-native <layer_path>
>
> Don't forget to review changes done by devtool!
>
> ERROR: go-native-1.12.1-r0 do_patch: QA Issue: Patch log indicates that
> patches do not apply cleanly. [patch-fuzz]
>
> and the same for go-cross and go-runtime.
>
> The version currently in master is the same, so I guess both are showing
> this QA issue.
>
> Regards,
>
> On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 8:54 AM Armin Kuster <akuster808 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen at windriver.com>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen at windriver.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie at linuxfoundation.org>
>> (cherry picked from commit e31f87e289dfd3bbca961e927447a9c7ba816d3f)
>> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808 at gmail.com>
>> ---
>> meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc | 1 +
>> ...nch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch | 163
>> +++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 164 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644
>> meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch
>>
>> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc
>> b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc
>> index 39157ff..ed14b17 100644
>> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc
>> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12.inc
>> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
>> file://0006-cmd-dist-separate-host-and-target-builds.patch \
>> file://0007-cmd-go-make-GOROOT-precious-by-default.patch \
>> file://0008-use-GOBUILDMODE-to-set-buildmode.patch \
>> +
>> file://0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch \
>> "
>> SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = "
>> file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"
>>
>> diff --git
>> a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch
>> b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..7b39dbd
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++
>> b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.12/0001-release-branch.go1.12-security-net-textproto-don-t-n.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
>> +From 265b691ac440bfb711d8de323346f7d72e620efe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo at golang.org>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 12:37:36 -0400
>> +Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.12-security] net/textproto: don't
>> + normalize headers with spaces before the colon
>> +
>> +RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like
>> +
>> +X-Answer : 42
>> +
>> +being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for
>> compatibility
>> +purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012.
>> +
>> +On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the
>> same
>> +to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the
>> +behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the
>> server.
>> +
>> +For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be
>> +possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the
>> +header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a
>> +single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the
>> request
>> +boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to
>> tack an
>> +arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including
>> +authentication headers unknown to the attacker.
>> +
>> +This was recently presented at multiple security conferences:
>> +
>> https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn
>> +
>> +net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters.
>> +Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them
>> +unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http
>> enforce
>> +RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the
>> client
>> +side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding
>> the
>> +issue sounds worse than letting the application decide.
>> +
>> +Fixes CVE-2019-16276
>> +
>> +Change-Id: I6d272de827e0870da85d93df770d6a0e161bbcf1
>> +Reviewed-on:
>> https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/549719
>> +Reviewed-by
>> <https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/549719+Reviewed-by>:
>> Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz at google.com>
>> +(cherry picked from commit 1280b868e82bf173ea3e988be3092d160ee66082)
>> +Reviewed-on:
>> https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/558776
>> +Reviewed-by
>> <https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/558776+Reviewed-by>:
>> Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur at google.com>
>> +
>> +CVE: CVE-2019-16276
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport [
>> https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6e6f4aaf70c8b1cc81e65a26332aa9409de03ad8
>> ]
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/net/http/serve_test.go | 4 ++++
>> + src/net/http/transport_test.go | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> + src/net/textproto/reader.go | 10 ++--------
>> + src/net/textproto/reader_test.go | 13 ++++++-------
>> + 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/net/http/serve_test.go b/src/net/http/serve_test.go
>> +index 6eb0088a96..89bfdfbb82 100644
>> +--- a/src/net/http/serve_test.go
>> ++++ b/src/net/http/serve_test.go
>> +@@ -4748,6 +4748,10 @@ func TestServerValidatesHeaders(t *testing.T) {
>> + {"foo\xffbar: foo\r\n", 400}, //
>> binary in header
>> + {"foo\x00bar: foo\r\n", 400}, //
>> binary in header
>> + {"Foo: " + strings.Repeat("x", 1<<21) + "\r\n", 431}, //
>> header too large
>> ++ // Spaces between the header key and colon are not
>> allowed.
>> ++ // See RFC 7230, Section 3.2.4.
>> ++ {"Foo : bar\r\n", 400},
>> ++ {"Foo\t: bar\r\n", 400},
>> +
>> + {"foo: foo foo\r\n", 200}, // LWS space is okay
>> + {"foo: foo\tfoo\r\n", 200}, // LWS tab is okay
>> +diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
>> b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
>> +index 5c329543e2..5e5438a708 100644
>> +--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
>> ++++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
>> +@@ -5133,3 +5133,30 @@ func TestTransportIgnores408(t *testing.T) {
>> + }
>> + t.Fatalf("timeout after %v waiting for Transport connections to
>> die off", time.Since(t0))
>> + }
>> ++
>> ++func TestInvalidHeaderResponse(t *testing.T) {
>> ++ setParallel(t)
>> ++ defer afterTest(t)
>> ++ cst := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(w
>> ResponseWriter, r *Request) {
>> ++ conn, buf, _ := w.(Hijacker).Hijack()
>> ++ buf.Write([]byte("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n" +
>> ++ "Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 19:09:27 GMT\r\n" +
>> ++ "Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n" +
>> ++ "Content-Length: 0\r\n" +
>> ++ "Foo : bar\r\n\r\n"))
>> ++ buf.Flush()
>> ++ conn.Close()
>> ++ }))
>> ++ defer cst.close()
>> ++ res, err := cst.c.Get(cst.ts.URL)
>> ++ if err != nil {
>> ++ t.Fatal(err)
>> ++ }
>> ++ defer res.Body.Close()
>> ++ if v := res.Header.Get("Foo"); v != "" {
>> ++ t.Errorf(`unexpected "Foo" header: %q`, v)
>> ++ }
>> ++ if v := res.Header.Get("Foo "); v != "bar" {
>> ++ t.Errorf(`bad "Foo " header value: %q, want %q`, v, "bar")
>> ++ }
>> ++}
>> +diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader.go b/src/net/textproto/reader.go
>> +index 2c4f25d5ae..1a5e364cf7 100644
>> +--- a/src/net/textproto/reader.go
>> ++++ b/src/net/textproto/reader.go
>> +@@ -493,18 +493,12 @@ func (r *Reader) ReadMIMEHeader() (MIMEHeader,
>> error) {
>> + return m, err
>> + }
>> +
>> +- // Key ends at first colon; should not have trailing
>> spaces
>> +- // but they appear in the wild, violating specs, so we
>> remove
>> +- // them if present.
>> ++ // Key ends at first colon.
>> + i := bytes.IndexByte(kv, ':')
>> + if i < 0 {
>> + return m, ProtocolError("malformed MIME header
>> line: " + string(kv))
>> + }
>> +- endKey := i
>> +- for endKey > 0 && kv[endKey-1] == ' ' {
>> +- endKey--
>> +- }
>> +- key := canonicalMIMEHeaderKey(kv[:endKey])
>> ++ key := canonicalMIMEHeaderKey(kv[:i])
>> +
>> + // As per RFC 7230 field-name is a token, tokens consist
>> of one or more chars.
>> + // We could return a ProtocolError here, but better to be
>> liberal in what we
>> +diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
>> b/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
>> +index f85fbdc36d..b92fdcd3c7 100644
>> +--- a/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
>> ++++ b/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go
>> +@@ -188,11 +188,10 @@ func TestLargeReadMIMEHeader(t *testing.T) {
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> +-// Test that we read slightly-bogus MIME headers seen in the wild,
>> +-// with spaces before colons, and spaces in keys.
>> ++// TestReadMIMEHeaderNonCompliant checks that we don't normalize headers
>> ++// with spaces before colons, and accept spaces in keys.
>> + func TestReadMIMEHeaderNonCompliant(t *testing.T) {
>> +- // Invalid HTTP response header as sent by an Axis security
>> +- // camera: (this is handled by IE, Firefox, Chrome, curl, etc.)
>> ++ // These invalid headers will be rejected by net/http according
>> to RFC 7230.
>> + r := reader("Foo: bar\r\n" +
>> + "Content-Language: en\r\n" +
>> + "SID : 0\r\n" +
>> +@@ -202,9 +201,9 @@ func TestReadMIMEHeaderNonCompliant(t *testing.T) {
>> + want := MIMEHeader{
>> + "Foo": {"bar"},
>> + "Content-Language": {"en"},
>> +- "Sid": {"0"},
>> +- "Audio Mode": {"None"},
>> +- "Privilege": {"127"},
>> ++ "SID ": {"0"},
>> ++ "Audio Mode ": {"None"},
>> ++ "Privilege ": {"127"},
>> + }
>> + if !reflect.DeepEqual(m, want) || err != nil {
>> + t.Fatalf("ReadMIMEHeader =\n%v, %v; want:\n%v", m, err,
>> want)
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
>> --
>> _______________________________________________
>> Openembedded-core mailing list
>> Openembedded-core at lists.openembedded.org
>> http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
>>
>
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