[oe] [meta-oe][morty][PATCH] hostapd: fix WPA2 key replay security bug
akuster808
akuster808 at gmail.com
Tue Nov 7 15:44:34 UTC 2017
On 11/07/2017 01:27 AM, Hermida, Isaac wrote:
> Hi Armin,
>
> Do you plan to merge this into morty? Or is there a similar patch (maybe
> I skip it in the list)?
> I would like to know if it is going to be merged shortly (or rejected).
I am not aware of a similar patch. I am working on morty updates as we
speak.
thanks for the ping.
-Armin
>
> Thanks,
>
>
> On 11/02/2017 01:58 PM, Isaac Hermida wrote:
>> Note, hostapd and wpa_supplicant use the same sources. This commit uses the same
>> patch than OpenEmbedded-core commit 1d92cb1a20135cfffff9f94a6633ec0840518738 in
>> morty branch.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Isaac Hermida <isaac.hermida at digi.com>
>> ---
>> .../hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 939 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> .../recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb | 1 +
>> 2 files changed, 940 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>>
>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..32fad29cf63d
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>> @@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
>> +The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
>> +result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
>> +
>> +Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
>> +
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13077
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13078
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13079
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13080
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13081
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13082
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13086
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13087
>> +CVE: CVE-2017-13088
>> +
>> +Thanks to Wind River for the backport from upstream master to wpa_supplicant
>> +2.5.
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
>> +
>> +From 9a4a0f78bb2ad516d4a295fb5d042f8a61bd3f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 10:13:17 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
>> +
>> +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
>> +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
>> +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
>> +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
>> +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
>> +frames on RX side.
>> +
>> +This issue was introduced by the commit
>> +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
>> +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
>> +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
>> +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
>> +failed.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 9 +++++++++
>> + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
>> + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
>> + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
>> + 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>> +index 2760a3f..b38a64d 100644
>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>> +@@ -1740,6 +1740,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
>> + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>> + break;
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>> ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
>> ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
>> ++ return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>> +@@ -3208,6 +3211,12 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>> + return sm->wpa;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>> ++{
>> ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++ return sm->tk_already_set;
>> ++}
>> +
>> + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>> +index fd04f16..3e53461 100644
>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>> +@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
>> + u8 *data, size_t data_len);
>> + enum wpa_event {
>> + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
>> +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
>> ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
>> + };
>> + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>> + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
>> +@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>> + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>> + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>> + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>> ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>> + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
>> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>> +index eeaffbf..f8f5dbe 100644
>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>> +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
>> ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
>> ++ * PN in the driver */
>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
>> ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
>> ++ return;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
>> + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
>> + * after association has been completed. This function will be called
>> +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>> +
>> + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
>> + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
>> ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
>> + }
>> +
>> +
>> +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>> +
>> + sm->pairwise = pairwise;
>> + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
>> ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
>> + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
>> +
>> + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>> +index 57b098f..234d84c 100644
>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>> +@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
>> + struct wpa_ptk PTK;
>> + Boolean PTK_valid;
>> + Boolean pairwise_set;
>> ++ Boolean tk_already_set;
>> + int keycount;
>> + Boolean Pair;
>> + struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> +From d0d1adad8792ae948743031543db8839f83db829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 13:18:59 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
>> +
>> +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
>> +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
>> +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
>> +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
>> +sequence counter associated to the group key.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
>> + 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>> +index c08f651..21e13da 100644
>> +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
>> ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>> +@@ -215,6 +215,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
>> + size_t tk_len;
>> + };
>> +
>> ++struct wpa_gtk {
>> ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
>> ++ size_t gtk_len;
>> ++};
>> ++
>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> ++struct wpa_igtk {
>> ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
>> ++ size_t igtk_len;
>> ++};
>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> +
>> + /* WPA IE version 1
>> + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +index a9f255e..eab7151 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +@@ -697,6 +697,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
>> + u8 gtk_buf[32];
>> +
>> ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>> ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>> ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>> +@@ -731,6 +740,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + }
>> + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
>> +
>> ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>> ++
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> +@@ -801,6 +813,47 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
>> ++{
>> ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>> ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>> ++
>> ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>> ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
>> ++ keyidx);
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
>> ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
>> ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
>> ++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
>> ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>> ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
>> ++ return -1;
>> ++ }
>> ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>> ++ broadcast_ether_addr,
>> ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
>> ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
>> ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>> ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
>> ++ return -1;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>> ++
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++}
>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> ++
>> +
>> + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
>> +@@ -812,30 +865,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + if (ie->igtk) {
>> + size_t len;
>> + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>> +- u16 keyidx;
>> ++
>> + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>> + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
>> + return -1;
>> ++
>> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
>> +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>> +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
>> +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
>> +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
>> +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
>> +- igtk->igtk, len);
>> +- if (keyidx > 4095) {
>> +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>> +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
>> +- return -1;
>> +- }
>> +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>> +- broadcast_ether_addr,
>> +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
>> +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
>> +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>> +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
>> +- return -1;
>> +- }
>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>> ++ return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +@@ -2251,7 +2288,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>> + */
>> + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>> + {
>> +- int clear_ptk = 1;
>> ++ int clear_keys = 1;
>> +
>> + if (sm == NULL)
>> + return;
>> +@@ -2277,11 +2314,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>> + /* Prepare for the next transition */
>> + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
>> +
>> +- clear_ptk = 0;
>> ++ clear_keys = 0;
>> + }
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>> +
>> +- if (clear_ptk) {
>> ++ if (clear_keys) {
>> + /*
>> + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
>> + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
>> +@@ -2291,6 +2328,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>> + sm->tptk_set = 0;
>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> + }
>> +
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
>> +@@ -2807,6 +2848,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>> + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
>> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>> + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
>> + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
>> +@@ -2879,29 +2924,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
>> +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
>> +- u16 keyidx;
>> +-
>> +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>> +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>> +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
>> +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
>> +-
>> +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
>> +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
>> +-
>> +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
>> +- igd.igtk, keylen);
>> +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>> +- broadcast_ether_addr,
>> +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
>> +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
>> +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
>> +- "WNM mode");
>> +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>> +- return -1;
>> +- }
>> +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>> ++
>> ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>> ++ return -1;
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> + } else {
>> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> +index 965a9c1..27b6123 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> +@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>> + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
>> + int rx_replay_counter_set;
>> + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
>> ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> +
>> + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
>> +
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> +From 76c0d1a21f0ebf00119e50bc57776d393ee4a30d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:31:46 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
>> + Mode cases
>> +
>> +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
>> +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
>> +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
>> +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
>> +detect a possible key reconfiguration.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
>> + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +index eab7151..e7b5ca8 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +@@ -692,14 +692,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
>> +
>> + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
>> +- const u8 *key_rsc)
>> ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
>> + {
>> + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
>> + u8 gtk_buf[32];
>> +
>> + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>> +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>> +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
>> ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
>> ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
>> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>> + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
>> +@@ -740,8 +743,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + }
>> + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
>> +
>> +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>> +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>> ++ if (wnm_sleep) {
>> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
>> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
>> ++ } else {
>> ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>> ++ }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +@@ -800,7 +809,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
>> + gtk_len, gtk_len,
>> + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
>> +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) {
>> ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) {
>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> + "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>> +@@ -815,14 +824,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> +
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
>> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
>> ++ int wnm_sleep)
>> + {
>> + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>> + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>> +
>> + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>> +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>> +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
>> ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
>> ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
>> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
>> + keyidx);
>> +@@ -847,8 +860,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>> +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>> ++ if (wnm_sleep) {
>> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
>> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
>> ++ } else {
>> ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>> ++ }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +@@ -871,7 +890,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + return -1;
>> +
>> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> +@@ -1520,7 +1539,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto failed;
>> +
>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) ||
>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) ||
>> + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info))
>> + goto failed;
>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>> +@@ -2329,8 +2348,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>> + sm->tptk_set = 0;
>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>> + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> + }
>> +
>> +@@ -2849,8 +2870,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>> + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>> + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
>> +@@ -2915,7 +2938,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>> +
>> + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
>> + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
>> + "WNM mode");
>> +@@ -2927,7 +2950,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>> + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>> +
>> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
>> + return -1;
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> + } else {
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> +index 27b6123..51753ee 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> +@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>> + int rx_replay_counter_set;
>> + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
>> + struct wpa_gtk gtk;
>> ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>> + struct wpa_igtk igtk;
>> ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>> +
>> + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> +From dc0d33ee697d016f14d0b6f3330720de2dfa9ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:55:19 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
>> +
>> +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
>> +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
>> +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++
>> + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>> +index 21e13da..a04e759 100644
>> +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
>> ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>> +@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
>> + size_t kck_len;
>> + size_t kek_len;
>> + size_t tk_len;
>> ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
>> + };
>> +
>> + struct wpa_gtk {
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +index e7b5ca8..cb69b67 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +@@ -605,6 +605,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> + const u8 *key_rsc;
>> + u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
>> +
>> ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> ++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>> + "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver");
>> +
>> +@@ -643,6 +649,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>> +
>> + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
>> + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
>> ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
>> +
>> + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
>> + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> +From 9831007c38f18cd70a077fccc22c836100867138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 19:45:13 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
>> +
>> +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
>> +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
>> +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
>> +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
>> +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
>> +
>> +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
>> +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>> + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>> +index b38a64d..c603b1b 100644
>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>> +@@ -1895,6 +1895,20 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
>> + sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>> ++{
>> ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
>> ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
>> ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
>> ++ return -1;
>> ++ }
>> ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
>> ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>> ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++}
>> ++
>> +
>> + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
>> + {
>> +@@ -2417,9 +2431,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
>> + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
>> + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
>> + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
>> +- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
>> +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
>> +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
>> ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
>> ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
>> ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
>> ++ else
>> ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
>> ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
>> + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
>> + break;
>> + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> +From 7ec70b3c5a5e32f7687999ef21c608524dcf35b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:09:26 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
>> +
>> +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
>> +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
>> +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
>> +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
>> +that behavior does not get modified.
>> +
>> +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
>> +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
>> +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
>> +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
>> +and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
>> +
>> +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
>> +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> + 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>> +index 722c20a..0878c62 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>> +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
>> + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
>> + } tpk;
>> + int tpk_set;
>> ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
>> + int tpk_success;
>> + int tpk_in_progress;
>> +
>> +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
>> + u8 rsc[6];
>> + enum wpa_alg alg;
>> +
>> ++ if (peer->tk_set) {
>> ++ /*
>> ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
>> ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
>> ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
>> ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
>> ++ * not allow that to happen.
>> ++ */
>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
>> ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
>> ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
>> ++ return -1;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
>> +
>> + switch (peer->cipher) {
>> +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
>> ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
>> + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
>> + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
>> + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
>> + "driver");
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> ++ peer->tk_set = 1;
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> +@@ -690,7 +708,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
>> + peer->cipher = 0;
>> + peer->qos_info = 0;
>> + peer->wmm_capable = 0;
>> +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
>> ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
>> + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
>> + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
>> + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>> +@@ -1153,6 +1171,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
>> + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
>> + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
>> + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>> + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>> +@@ -1744,6 +1763,17 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
>> + peer->supp_oper_classes_len);
>> + }
>> +
>> ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
>> ++{
>> ++ int i;
>> ++
>> ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
>> ++ if (nonce[i])
>> ++ return 1;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++}
>> +
>> + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
>> + const u8 *buf, size_t len)
>> +@@ -1998,7 +2028,8 @@ skip_rsn:
>> + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
>> + peer->cipher = cipher;
>> +
>> +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
>> ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
>> ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
>> + /*
>> + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
>> + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
>> +@@ -2014,6 +2045,7 @@ skip_rsn:
>> + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
>> + goto error;
>> + }
>> ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
>> + }
>> +
>> + #if 0
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> +From 642f5eadf775b41bf3ddd8ffe77c33e785bda48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> +From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:36:56 +0800
>> +Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
>> +
>> +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
>> +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
>> +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
>> +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
>> +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
>> +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
>> +Reassociation Response frame.
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>> +
>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>> +
>> +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai at windriver.com>
>> +---
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
>> + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +index cb69b67..05e5168 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>> +@@ -2391,6 +2391,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>> + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
>> + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
>> + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>> +
>> + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
>> + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>> +index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>> +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
>> + u16 capab;
>> +
>> + sm->ft_completed = 0;
>> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
>> +
>> + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
>> + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
>> +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
>> ++ return 0;
>> ++ }
>> ++
>> + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
>> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
>> + return -1;
>> +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
>> + return -1;
>> + }
>> +
>> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
>> ++
>> + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
>> + return -1;
>> +
>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> +index 51753ee..85cc862 100644
>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>> +@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>> + size_t r0kh_id_len;
>> + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
>> + int ft_completed;
>> ++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
>> + int over_the_ds_in_progress;
>> + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
>> + int set_ptk_after_assoc;
>> +--
>> +1.9.1
>> +
>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
>> index ab01235ec913..81b2fb685311 100644
>> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
>> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
>> file://init \
>> file://hostapd.service \
>> file://0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch \
>> + file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
>> "
>>
>> S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}"
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