[oe] [meta-oe][PATCH] hostapd: fix the bug for PATCHTOOL = "patch"
akuster808
akuster808 at gmail.com
Fri Jun 15 13:56:52 UTC 2018
On 06/14/2018 06:20 PM, Khem Raj wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 1:36 PM akuster808 <akuster808 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06/13/2018 08:47 PM, Zheng, Ruoqin wrote:
>>> Hi
>>>
>>> Will this patch be merged in sumo branch?
>> Once its in Master, I will pick it up.
>>
> It should be in master already
> http://git.openembedded.org/meta-openembedded/commit/?id=543bb9c05a7d579ff8acbd46ee7c4502fa86a93f
so it is.. thanks.
- armin
>
>> - armin
>>> Zheng Ruoqin
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Zheng, Ruoqin/郑 若钦
>>> Sent: Sunday, May 27, 2018 6:42 PM
>>> To: openembedded-devel at lists.openembedded.org
>>> Cc: Zheng, Ruoqin/郑 若钦 <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> Subject: [oe][meta-oe][PATCH] hostapd: fix the bug for PATCHTOOL = "patch"
>>>
>>> When switch PATCHTOOL to patch, the key-replay-cve-multiple.patch can't
>>> be apply with "--dry-run" as follows:
>>>
>>> checking file src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> checking file src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> checking file src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> checking file src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> checking file src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> checking file src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> Hunk #1 FAILED at 709.
>>> Hunk #2 FAILED at 757.
>>> Hunk #3 succeeded at 840 (offset -12 lines).
>>> Hunk #4 FAILED at 868.
>>> Hunk #5 FAILED at 900.
>>> Hunk #6 FAILED at 924.
>>> Hunk #7 succeeded at 1536 (offset -38 lines).
>>> Hunk #8 FAILED at 2386.
>>> Hunk #9 FAILED at 2920.
>>> Hunk #10 succeeded at 2940 (offset -46 lines).
>>> Hunk #11 FAILED at 2998.
>>> 8 out of 11 hunks FAILED
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> Hunk #1 FAILED at 32.
>>> 1 out of 1 hunk FAILED
>>> checking file src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> Hunk #1 succeeded at 215 with fuzz 1.
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> checking file src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> Hunk #1 succeeded at 1898 (offset -3 lines).
>>> Hunk #2 succeeded at 2470 (offset -3 lines).
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> Hunk #1 succeeded at 2378 (offset -62 lines).
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>>> checking file src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> Hunk #1 succeeded at 123 (offset -5 lines).
>>>
>>> So split the key-replay-cve-multiple.patch to 7 patches.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> ---
>>> ...-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch | 177 ++++
>>> ...nstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch | 253 ++++++
>>> ...ection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch | 187 ++++
>>> ...04-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch | 82 ++
>>> ...Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch | 67 ++
>>> .../0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch | 135 +++
>>> ...llow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch | 85 ++
>>> .../hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 984 ---------------------
>>> .../recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb | 8 +-
>>> 9 files changed, 993 insertions(+), 985 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
>>> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
>>> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>>>
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..5535a3c
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
>>> +From 044ae35c5694c39a4aca2a33502cc3897e88f79e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
>>> +
>>> +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
>>> +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
>>> +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
>>> +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
>>> +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
>>> +frames on RX side.
>>> +
>>> +This issue was introduced by the commit
>>> +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
>>> +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
>>> +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
>>> +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
>>> +failed.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
>>> + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
>>> + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
>>> + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
>>> + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
>>> + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> +index 4e04169..333035f 100644
>>> +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> +@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
>>> + {
>>> + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
>>> + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
>>> ++ int set = 1;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
>>> +@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
>>> + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
>>> + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
>>> + * does not support full AP client state.
>>> ++ *
>>> ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
>>> ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
>>> ++ * the same key.
>>> + */
>>> +- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
>>> ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
>>> ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
>>> ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
>>> + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
>>> ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
>>> ++ set = 0;
>>> ++ }
>>> +
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
>>> + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
>>> +@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
>>> + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
>>> + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
>>> + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
>>> +- sta->added_unassoc)) {
>>> ++ set)) {
>>> + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
>>> + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
>>> + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
>>> +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
>>> ++ set ? "set" : "add");
>>> +
>>> + if (sta->added_unassoc) {
>>> + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
>>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> +index 3587086..707971d 100644
>>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> +@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
>>> + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> + break;
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
>>> ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>>> +@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +
>>> ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> ++{
>>> ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++ return sm->tk_already_set;
>>> ++}
>>> ++
>>> ++
>>> + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>>> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
>>> + {
>>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> +index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
>>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
>>> + u8 *data, size_t data_len);
>>> + enum wpa_event {
>>> + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
>>> +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
>>> ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
>>> + };
>>> + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
>>> +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>>> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
>>> + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
>>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> +index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
>>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
>>> ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
>>> ++ * PN in the driver */
>>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
>>> ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
>>> ++ return;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
>>> + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
>>> + * after association has been completed. This function will be called
>>> +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> +
>>> + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
>>> + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
>>> ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +
>>> +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>>> +
>>> + sm->pairwise = pairwise;
>>> + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
>>> ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
>>> + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
>>> +
>>> + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
>>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> +index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
>>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
>>> + struct wpa_ptk PTK;
>>> + Boolean PTK_valid;
>>> + Boolean pairwise_set;
>>> ++ Boolean tk_already_set;
>>> + int keycount;
>>> + Boolean Pair;
>>> + struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..4e57bca
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
>>> +From c623cc973de525f7411dffe438e957ba86ef4733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
>>> +
>>> +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
>>> +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
>>> +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
>>> +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
>>> +sequence counter associated to the group key.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
>>> + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> +index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
>>> +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> +@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
>>> + size_t tk_len;
>>> + };
>>> +
>>> ++struct wpa_gtk {
>>> ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
>>> ++ size_t gtk_len;
>>> ++};
>>> ++
>>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> ++struct wpa_igtk {
>>> ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
>>> ++ size_t igtk_len;
>>> ++};
>>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> +
>>> + /* WPA IE version 1
>>> + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
>>> + u8 gtk_buf[32];
>>> +
>>> ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>>> ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
>>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>>> ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
>>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>>> +@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + }
>>> + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
>>> +
>>> ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>>> ++
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +
>>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
>>> ++{
>>> ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>>> ++
>>> ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>>> ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
>>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
>>> ++ keyidx);
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
>>> ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
>>> ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
>>> ++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
>>> ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
>>> ++ return -1;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>>> ++ broadcast_ether_addr,
>>> ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
>>> ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
>>> ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
>>> ++ return -1;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>>> ++
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++}
>>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> ++
>>> ++
>>> + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
>>> + {
>>> +@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + if (ie->igtk) {
>>> + size_t len;
>>> + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>>> +- u16 keyidx;
>>> ++
>>> + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
>>> + return -1;
>>> ++
>>> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
>>> +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>>> +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
>>> +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
>>> +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
>>> +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
>>> +- igtk->igtk, len);
>>> +- if (keyidx > 4095) {
>>> +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
>>> +- return -1;
>>> +- }
>>> +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>>> +- broadcast_ether_addr,
>>> +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
>>> +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
>>> +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
>>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>>> + return -1;
>>> +- }
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> +@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>>> + */
>>> + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> + {
>>> +- int clear_ptk = 1;
>>> ++ int clear_keys = 1;
>>> +
>>> + if (sm == NULL)
>>> + return;
>>> +@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> + /* Prepare for the next transition */
>>> + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
>>> +
>>> +- clear_ptk = 0;
>>> ++ clear_keys = 0;
>>> + }
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> +
>>> +- if (clear_ptk) {
>>> ++ if (clear_keys) {
>>> + /*
>>> + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
>>> + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
>>> +@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>>> + sm->tptk_set = 0;
>>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
>>> +@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>>> + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
>>> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>>> + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
>>> + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
>>> +@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
>>> +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
>>> +- u16 keyidx;
>>> +-
>>> +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>>> +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
>>> +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
>>> +-
>>> +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
>>> +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
>>> +-
>>> +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
>>> +- igd.igtk, keylen);
>>> +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>>> +- broadcast_ether_addr,
>>> +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
>>> +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
>>> +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
>>> +- "WNM mode");
>>> +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>>> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>>> ++
>>> ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
>>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>>> + return -1;
>>> +- }
>>> +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> + } else {
>>> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>>> + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
>>> + int rx_replay_counter_set;
>>> + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
>>> ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
>>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
>>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> +
>>> + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
>>> +
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..e39bbf6
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
>>> +From a6caab8060ab60876e233306f5c586451169eba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
>>> + Mode cases
>>> +
>>> +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
>>> +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
>>> +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
>>> +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
>>> +detect a possible key reconfiguration.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
>>> + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
>>> +
>>> + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
>>> +- const u8 *key_rsc)
>>> ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
>>> + {
>>> + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
>>> + u8 gtk_buf[32];
>>> +
>>> + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>>> +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>>> +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
>>> ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
>>> ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
>>> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
>>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>>> + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
>>> +@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + }
>>> + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
>>> +
>>> +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>>> +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>>> ++ if (wnm_sleep) {
>>> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
>>> ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
>>> ++ } else {
>>> ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>>> ++ }
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
>>> + gtk_len, gtk_len,
>>> + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
>>> +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
>>> ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
>>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> + "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
>>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>>> +@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> +
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
>>> ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
>>> ++ int wnm_sleep)
>>> + {
>>> + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>>> +
>>> + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>>> +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>>> +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
>>> ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
>>> ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
>>> ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
>>> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
>>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
>>> + keyidx);
>>> +@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>>> +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>>> ++ if (wnm_sleep) {
>>> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
>>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
>>> ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
>>> ++ } else {
>>> ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>>> ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>>> ++ }
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + return -1;
>>> +
>>> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
>>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
>>> + key_rsc = null_rsc;
>>> +
>>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
>>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
>>> + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
>>> + goto failed;
>>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>>> +@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> + sm->tptk_set = 0;
>>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>>> + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>>> + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>>> + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>>> + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>>> ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>>> + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
>>> +@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>>> +
>>> + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
>>> + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
>>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
>>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
>>> + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>>> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
>>> + "WNM mode");
>>> +@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>>> + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>>> +
>>> + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
>>> +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>>> ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
>>> + return -1;
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> + } else {
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>>> + int rx_replay_counter_set;
>>> + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
>>> + struct wpa_gtk gtk;
>>> ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> + struct wpa_igtk igtk;
>>> ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> +
>>> + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..5103625
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
>>> +From abf941647f2dc33b0b59612f525e1b292331cc9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
>>> +
>>> +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
>>> +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
>>> +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
>>> +
>>> +This fixes the earlier fix in commit
>>> +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
>>> +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
>>> +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
>>> +message 3/4.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
>>> + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> +index d200285..1021ccb 100644
>>> +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> +@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
>>> + size_t kck_len;
>>> + size_t kek_len;
>>> + size_t tk_len;
>>> ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
>>> + };
>>> +
>>> + struct wpa_gtk {
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
>>> + }
>>> + sm->tptk_set = 1;
>>> +- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
>>> +
>>> + kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
>>> + kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
>>> +@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> + enum wpa_alg alg;
>>> + const u8 *key_rsc;
>>> +
>>> +- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
>>> ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
>>> + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> + "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
>>> + return 0;
>>> +@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> +
>>> + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
>>> + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
>>> +- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
>>> ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
>>> +
>>> + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
>>> + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>>> + struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
>>> + int ptk_set, tptk_set;
>>> + unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
>>> +- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
>>> + u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
>>> + u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
>>> + int renew_snonce;
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..b0e1df3
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
>>> +From 804b9d72808cddd822e7dcec4d60f40c1aceda82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
>>> +
>>> +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
>>> +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
>>> +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
>>> +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
>>> +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
>>> +
>>> +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
>>> +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
>>> + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> +index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
>>> +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> +@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +
>>> ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> ++{
>>> ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
>>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
>>> ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
>>> ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
>>> ++ return -1;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
>>> ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>>> ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++}
>>> ++
>>> ++
>>> + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
>>> + {
>>> + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
>>> +@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
>>> + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
>>> + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
>>> + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
>>> +- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
>>> +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
>>> +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
>>> ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
>>> ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
>>> ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
>>> ++ else
>>> ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
>>> ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
>>> + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
>>> + break;
>>> + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..72c7d51
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
>>> +From 7fd26db2d8147ed662db192c41d7bc15752a601d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
>>> +
>>> +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
>>> +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
>>> +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
>>> +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
>>> +that behavior does not get modified.
>>> +
>>> +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
>>> +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
>>> +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
>>> +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
>>> +and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
>>> +
>>> +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
>>> +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>> + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>>> +index e424168..9eb9738 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
>>> +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
>>> + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
>>> + } tpk;
>>> + int tpk_set;
>>> ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
>>> + int tpk_success;
>>> + int tpk_in_progress;
>>> +
>>> +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
>>> + u8 rsc[6];
>>> + enum wpa_alg alg;
>>> +
>>> ++ if (peer->tk_set) {
>>> ++ /*
>>> ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
>>> ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
>>> ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
>>> ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
>>> ++ * not allow that to happen.
>>> ++ */
>>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
>>> ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
>>> ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
>>> ++ return -1;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
>>> +
>>> + switch (peer->cipher) {
>>> +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
>>> ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
>>> + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
>>> + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
>>> + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
>>> + "driver");
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> ++ peer->tk_set = 1;
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
>>> + peer->cipher = 0;
>>> + peer->qos_info = 0;
>>> + peer->wmm_capable = 0;
>>> +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
>>> ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
>>> + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
>>> + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
>>> + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>>> +@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
>>> + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
>>> + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
>>> + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>>> + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
>>> +@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +
>>> ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
>>> ++{
>>> ++ int i;
>>> ++
>>> ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
>>> ++ if (nonce[i])
>>> ++ return 1;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++}
>>> ++
>>> ++
>>> + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
>>> + const u8 *buf, size_t len)
>>> + {
>>> +@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
>>> + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
>>> + peer->cipher = cipher;
>>> +
>>> +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
>>> ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
>>> ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
>>> + /*
>>> + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
>>> + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
>>> +@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
>>> + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
>>> + goto error;
>>> + }
>>> ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + #if 0
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 0000000..d0978c7
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
>>> +From a42eb67c42f845faf266b0633d52e17f2a82f511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> +From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
>>> +Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
>>> +
>>> +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
>>> +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
>>> +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
>>> +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
>>> +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
>>> +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
>>> +Reassociation Response frame.
>>> +
>>> +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
>>> +
>>> +Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> +Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> +---
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
>>> + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
>>> + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> +@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>>> + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
>>> + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
>>> + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
>>> ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>>> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
>>> ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> +
>>> + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
>>> + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>>> +index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
>>> +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
>>> + u16 capab;
>>> +
>>> + sm->ft_completed = 0;
>>> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
>>> +
>>> + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
>>> + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
>>> +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
>>> ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
>>> ++ return 0;
>>> ++ }
>>> ++
>>> + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
>>> + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
>>> + return -1;
>>> +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
>>> + return -1;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
>>> ++
>>> + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
>>> + return -1;
>>> +
>>> +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
>>> +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
>>> +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
>>> + size_t r0kh_id_len;
>>> + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
>>> + int ft_completed;
>>> ++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
>>> + int over_the_ds_in_progress;
>>> + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
>>> + int set_ptk_after_assoc;
>>> +--
>>> +1.8.3.1
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>>> deleted file mode 100644
>>> index 694da8f..0000000
>>> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch
>>> +++ /dev/null
>>> @@ -1,984 +0,0 @@
>>> -The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
>>> -result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
>>> -
>>> -Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
>>> -
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13077
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13078
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13079
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13080
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13081
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13082
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13086
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13087
>>> -CVE: CVE-2017-13088
>>> -
>>> -Upstream-Status: Backport
>>> -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton at intel.com>
>>> -
>>> -From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> -Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
>>> -Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
>>> -
>>> -Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
>>> -processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
>>> -issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
>>> -same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
>>> -also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
>>> -frames on RX side.
>>> -
>>> -This issue was introduced by the commit
>>> -0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
>>> -authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
>>> -times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
>>> -needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
>>> -failed.
>>> -
>>> -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> ----
>>> - src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
>>> - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
>>> - src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
>>> - src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
>>> - src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
>>> - 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>> -
>>> -diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> -index 4e04169..333035f 100644
>>> ---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> -+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
>>> -@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
>>> - {
>>> - struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
>>> - struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
>>> -+ int set = 1;
>>> -
>>> - /*
>>> - * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
>>> -@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
>>> - * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
>>> - * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
>>> - * does not support full AP client state.
>>> -+ *
>>> -+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
>>> -+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
>>> -+ * the same key.
>>> - */
>>> -- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
>>> -+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
>>> -+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
>>> -+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
>>> - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
>>> -+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
>>> -+ set = 0;
>>> -+ }
>>> -
>>> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
>>> - if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
>>> -@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
>>> - sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
>>> - sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
>>> - sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
>>> -- sta->added_unassoc)) {
>>> -+ set)) {
>>> - hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
>>> - HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
>>> - "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
>>> -- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
>>> -+ set ? "set" : "add");
>>> -
>>> - if (sta->added_unassoc) {
>>> - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
>>> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> -index 3587086..707971d 100644
>>> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
>>> -@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
>>> - #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> - break;
>>> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> -+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
>>> -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
>>> -+ return 0;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>>> -@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> -
>>> -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> -+{
>>> -+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
>>> -+ return 0;
>>> -+ return sm->tk_already_set;
>>> -+}
>>> -+
>>> -+
>>> - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>>> - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
>>> - {
>>> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> -index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
>>> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
>>> -@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
>>> - u8 *data, size_t data_len);
>>> - enum wpa_event {
>>> - WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
>>> -- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
>>> -+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
>>> - };
>>> - void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> - int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
>>> -@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> - int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> - int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> - int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
>>> - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>>> - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
>>> - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
>>> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> -index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
>>> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
>>> -@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> - return;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> -+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
>>> -+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
>>> -+ * PN in the driver */
>>> -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
>>> -+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
>>> -+ return;
>>> -+ }
>>> -+
>>> - /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
>>> - * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
>>> - * after association has been completed. This function will be called
>>> -@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
>>> -
>>> - /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
>>> - sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
>>> -+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> -
>>> -@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
>>> -
>>> - sm->pairwise = pairwise;
>>> - sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
>>> -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
>>> - wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
>>> -
>>> - buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
>>> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> -index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
>>> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
>>> -@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
>>> - struct wpa_ptk PTK;
>>> - Boolean PTK_valid;
>>> - Boolean pairwise_set;
>>> -+ Boolean tk_already_set;
>>> - int keycount;
>>> - Boolean Pair;
>>> - struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
>>> ---
>>> -2.7.4
>>> -
>>> -From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>> -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
>>> -Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
>>> -
>>> -Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
>>> -(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
>>> -not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
>>> -attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
>>> -sequence counter associated to the group key.
>>> -
>>> -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
>>> ----
>>> - src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
>>> - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>>> - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
>>> - 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>>> -
>>> -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> -index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
>>> ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
>>> -@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
>>> - size_t tk_len;
>>> - };
>>> -
>>> -+struct wpa_gtk {
>>> -+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
>>> -+ size_t gtk_len;
>>> -+};
>>> -+
>>> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> -+struct wpa_igtk {
>>> -+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
>>> -+ size_t igtk_len;
>>> -+};
>>> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> -
>>> - /* WPA IE version 1
>>> - * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
>>> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> -index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
>>> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
>>> -@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
>>> - u8 gtk_buf[32];
>>> -
>>> -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>>> -+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
>>> -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
>>> -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>>> -+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
>>> -+ return 0;
>>> -+ }
>>> -+
>>> - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
>>> - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> - "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
>>> -@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> - }
>>> - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
>>> -
>>> -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
>>> -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
>>> -+
>>> - return 0;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> -@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> -
>>> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> -+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
>>> -+{
>>> -+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> -+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>>> -+
>>> -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
>>> -+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
>>> -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
>>> -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
>>> -+ keyidx);
>>> -+ return 0;
>>> -+ }
>>> -+
>>> -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
>>> -+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
>>> -+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
>>> -+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
>>> -+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
>>> -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> -+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
>>> -+ return -1;
>>> -+ }
>>> -+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>>> -+ broadcast_ether_addr,
>>> -+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
>>> -+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
>>> -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> -+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
>>> -+ return -1;
>>> -+ }
>>> -+
>>> -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
>>> -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
>>> -+
>>> -+ return 0;
>>> -+}
>>> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> -+
>>> -+
>>> - static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> - struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
>>> - {
>>> -@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
>>> - if (ie->igtk) {
>>> - size_t len;
>>> - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
>>> -- u16 keyidx;
>>> -+
>>> - len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> - if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
>>> - return -1;
>>> -+
>>> - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
>>> -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
>>> -- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
>>> -- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
>>> -- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
>>> -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
>>> -- igtk->igtk, len);
>>> -- if (keyidx > 4095) {
>>> -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> -- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
>>> -- return -1;
>>> -- }
>>> -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>>> -- broadcast_ether_addr,
>>> -- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
>>> -- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
>>> -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
>>> -- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
>>> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
>>> - return -1;
>>> -- }
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - return 0;
>>> -@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>>> - */
>>> - void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> - {
>>> -- int clear_ptk = 1;
>>> -+ int clear_keys = 1;
>>> -
>>> - if (sm == NULL)
>>> - return;
>>> -@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> - /* Prepare for the next transition */
>>> - wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
>>> -
>>> -- clear_ptk = 0;
>>> -+ clear_keys = 0;
>>> - }
>>> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
>>> -
>>> -- if (clear_ptk) {
>>> -+ if (clear_keys) {
>>> - /*
>>> - * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
>>> - * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
>>> -@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
>>> - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>>> - sm->tptk_set = 0;
>>> - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>>> -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>>> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>>> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
>>> -@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
>>> - os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
>>> - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
>>> - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
>>> -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
>>> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
>>> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
>>> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
>>> - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
>>> - os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
>>> -@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
>>> - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
>>> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
>>> - } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
>>> -- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
>>> -- u16 keyidx;
>>> --
>>> -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
>>> -- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
>>> -- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
>>> -- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
>>> --
>>> -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
>>> -- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
>>> --
>>> -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
>>> -- igd.igtk, keylen);
>>> -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
>>> -- broadcast_ether_addr,
>>> -- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(
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