[oe] [meta-oe][PATCH] hostapd: Upgrade to 2.8
Philip Balister
philip at balister.org
Wed Apr 24 00:44:05 UTC 2019
Acked-by: Philip Balister <philip at balister.org>
I did the same thing and have seen it work.
Philip
On 04/23/2019 12:33 AM, mingli.yu at windriver.com wrote:
> From: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu at windriver.com>
>
> License-Update: Copyright year updated to 2019.
>
> Remove 8 backported patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu at windriver.com>
> ---
> ...d-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch | 177 ------------
> ...lation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch | 253 ------------------
> ...n-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch | 187 -------------
> ...event-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch | 82 ------
> ...TK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch | 67 -----
> ...6-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch | 135 ----------
> ...multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch | 85 ------
> .../hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 44 ---
> .../{hostapd_2.6.bb => hostapd_2.8.bb} | 14 +-
> 9 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1041 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
> delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
> rename meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/{hostapd_2.6.bb => hostapd_2.8.bb} (64%)
>
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 5535a3c5a..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
> -From 044ae35c5694c39a4aca2a33502cc3897e88f79e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
> -Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
> -
> -Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
> -processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
> -issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
> -same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
> -also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
> -frames on RX side.
> -
> -This issue was introduced by the commit
> -0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
> -authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
> -times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
> -needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
> -failed.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
> - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
> - src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
> - src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
> - src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
> - 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
> -index 4e04169..333035f 100644
> ---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
> -+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
> -@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
> - {
> - struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
> - struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
> -+ int set = 1;
> -
> - /*
> - * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
> -@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
> - * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
> - * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
> - * does not support full AP client state.
> -+ *
> -+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
> -+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
> -+ * the same key.
> - */
> -- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
> -+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
> -+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
> -+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
> - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
> -+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
> -+ set = 0;
> -+ }
> -
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
> - if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
> -@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
> - sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
> - sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
> - sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
> -- sta->added_unassoc)) {
> -+ set)) {
> - hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
> - HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
> - "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
> -- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
> -+ set ? "set" : "add");
> -
> - if (sta->added_unassoc) {
> - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> -index 3587086..707971d 100644
> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> -@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
> - #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> - break;
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> -+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
> -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
> -+ return 0;
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
> -@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> - }
> -
> -
> -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> -+{
> -+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
> -+ return 0;
> -+ return sm->tk_already_set;
> -+}
> -+
> -+
> - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
> - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
> - {
> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
> -index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
> -@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
> - u8 *data, size_t data_len);
> - enum wpa_event {
> - WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
> -- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
> -+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
> - };
> - void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> - int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
> -@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> - int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> - int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> - int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
> - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
> - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
> - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
> -index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
> -@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> - return;
> - }
> -
> -+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
> -+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
> -+ * PN in the driver */
> -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
> -+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
> -+ return;
> -+ }
> -+
> - /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
> - * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
> - * after association has been completed. This function will be called
> -@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> -
> - /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
> - sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
> -+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
> - }
> -
> -
> -@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
> -
> - sm->pairwise = pairwise;
> - sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
> -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
> - wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
> -
> - buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
> -index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
> -@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
> - struct wpa_ptk PTK;
> - Boolean PTK_valid;
> - Boolean pairwise_set;
> -+ Boolean tk_already_set;
> - int keycount;
> - Boolean Pair;
> - struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 4e57bcaa5..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
> -From c623cc973de525f7411dffe438e957ba86ef4733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
> -
> -Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
> -(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
> -not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
> -attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
> -sequence counter associated to the group key.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
> - 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> -index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
> ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
> -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> -@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
> - size_t tk_len;
> - };
> -
> -+struct wpa_gtk {
> -+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
> -+ size_t gtk_len;
> -+};
> -+
> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> -+struct wpa_igtk {
> -+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
> -+ size_t igtk_len;
> -+};
> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> -
> - /* WPA IE version 1
> - * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
> - u8 gtk_buf[32];
> -
> -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> -+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
> -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
> -+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+
> - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
> - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> - "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
> -@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - }
> - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
> -
> -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
> -+
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - }
> -
> -
> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> -+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
> -+{
> -+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
> -+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
> -+
> -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> -+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
> -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
> -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
> -+ keyidx);
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> -+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
> -+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
> -+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
> -+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
> -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> -+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
> -+ return -1;
> -+ }
> -+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
> -+ broadcast_ether_addr,
> -+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
> -+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
> -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> -+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
> -+ return -1;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
> -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
> -+
> -+ return 0;
> -+}
> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> -+
> -+
> - static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
> - {
> -@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - if (ie->igtk) {
> - size_t len;
> - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
> -- u16 keyidx;
> -+
> - len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
> - if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
> - return -1;
> -+
> - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
> -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
> -- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
> -- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
> -- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
> -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
> -- igtk->igtk, len);
> -- if (keyidx > 4095) {
> -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> -- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
> -- return -1;
> -- }
> -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
> -- broadcast_ether_addr,
> -- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
> -- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
> -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> -- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> - return -1;
> -- }
> - }
> -
> - return 0;
> -@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> - */
> - void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> - {
> -- int clear_ptk = 1;
> -+ int clear_keys = 1;
> -
> - if (sm == NULL)
> - return;
> -@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> - /* Prepare for the next transition */
> - wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
> -
> -- clear_ptk = 0;
> -+ clear_keys = 0;
> - }
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> -
> -- if (clear_ptk) {
> -+ if (clear_keys) {
> - /*
> - * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
> - * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
> -@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
> - sm->tptk_set = 0;
> - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
> -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
> -@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> - os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
> - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
> - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
> -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
> - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
> - os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
> -@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
> - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> - } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
> -- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
> -- u16 keyidx;
> --
> -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
> -- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
> -- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
> -- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
> --
> -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
> -- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
> --
> -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
> -- igd.igtk, keylen);
> -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
> -- broadcast_ether_addr,
> -- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
> -- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
> -- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
> -- "WNM mode");
> -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
> -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
> -+
> -+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> - return -1;
> -- }
> -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> - } else {
> - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> - u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
> - int rx_replay_counter_set;
> - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
> -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> -
> - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
> -
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index e39bbf63d..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
> -From a6caab8060ab60876e233306f5c586451169eba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
> -Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
> - Mode cases
> -
> -This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
> -separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
> -corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
> -GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
> -detect a possible key reconfiguration.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
> - 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
> -
> - static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
> -- const u8 *key_rsc)
> -+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
> - {
> - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
> - u8 gtk_buf[32];
> -
> - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> -- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> -- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
> -+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
> -+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
> -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
> -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
> - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
> - gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
> -@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - }
> - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
> -
> -- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> -- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
> -+ if (wnm_sleep) {
> -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
> -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
> -+ } else {
> -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
> -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
> -+ }
> -
> - return 0;
> - }
> -@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
> - gtk_len, gtk_len,
> - &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
> -- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
> -+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
> - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> - "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
> - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
> -@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> -
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> - static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> -- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
> -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
> -+ int wnm_sleep)
> - {
> - size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
> - u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
> -
> - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
> -- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
> -- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
> -+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
> -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
> -+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
> -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
> -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
> - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
> - keyidx);
> -@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> -- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
> -- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
> -+ if (wnm_sleep) {
> -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
> -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
> -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
> -+ } else {
> -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
> -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
> -+ }
> -
> - return 0;
> - }
> -@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - return -1;
> -
> - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
> -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
> - key_rsc = null_rsc;
> -
> -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
> - wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
> - goto failed;
> - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
> -@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
> - sm->tptk_set = 0;
> - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
> - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> - }
> -
> -@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
> - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
> - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
> -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
> -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
> - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
> -@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
> -
> - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
> - gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
> -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
> - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
> - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
> - "WNM mode");
> -@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
> - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
> -
> - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
> -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
> -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
> - return -1;
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> - } else {
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> - int rx_replay_counter_set;
> - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
> - struct wpa_gtk gtk;
> -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
> - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
> - struct wpa_igtk igtk;
> -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
> - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
> -
> - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 510362510..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
> -From abf941647f2dc33b0b59612f525e1b292331cc9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
> -Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
> -
> -Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
> -and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
> -trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
> -
> -This fixes the earlier fix in commit
> -ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
> -driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
> -possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
> -message 3/4.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
> - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> -index d200285..1021ccb 100644
> ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
> -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
> -@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
> - size_t kck_len;
> - size_t kek_len;
> - size_t tk_len;
> -+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
> - };
> -
> - struct wpa_gtk {
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
> - }
> - sm->tptk_set = 1;
> -- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
> -
> - kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
> - kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
> -@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> - enum wpa_alg alg;
> - const u8 *key_rsc;
> -
> -- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
> -+ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
> - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
> - "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
> - return 0;
> -@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
> -
> - /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
> - os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
> -- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
> -+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
> -
> - if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
> - eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> - struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
> - int ptk_set, tptk_set;
> - unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
> -- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
> - u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
> - u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
> - int renew_snonce;
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index b0e1df314..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
> -From 804b9d72808cddd822e7dcec4d60f40c1aceda82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
> -Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
> -
> -The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
> -the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
> -directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
> -determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
> -new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
> -
> -Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
> -for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
> - 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> -index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
> ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
> -@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
> - }
> -
> -
> -+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
> -+{
> -+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
> -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
> -+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
> -+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
> -+ return -1;
> -+ }
> -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
> -+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> -+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
> -+ return 0;
> -+}
> -+
> -+
> - SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
> - {
> - u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
> -@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
> - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
> - else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
> - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
> -- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
> -- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
> -- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
> -+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
> -+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
> -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
> -+ else
> -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
> -+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
> - case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
> - break;
> - case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 72c7d51e1..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
> -From 7fd26db2d8147ed662db192c41d7bc15752a601d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
> -Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
> -
> -Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
> -been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
> -related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
> -for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
> -that behavior does not get modified.
> -
> -For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
> -followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
> -the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
> -ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
> -and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
> -
> -As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
> -the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> - 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
> -index e424168..9eb9738 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
> -@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
> - u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
> - } tpk;
> - int tpk_set;
> -+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
> - int tpk_success;
> - int tpk_in_progress;
> -
> -@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
> - u8 rsc[6];
> - enum wpa_alg alg;
> -
> -+ if (peer->tk_set) {
> -+ /*
> -+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
> -+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
> -+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
> -+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
> -+ * not allow that to happen.
> -+ */
> -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
> -+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
> -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
> -+ return -1;
> -+ }
> -+
> - os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
> -
> - switch (peer->cipher) {
> -@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
> -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
> - if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
> - rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
> - wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
> - "driver");
> - return -1;
> - }
> -+ peer->tk_set = 1;
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
> - peer->cipher = 0;
> - peer->qos_info = 0;
> - peer->wmm_capable = 0;
> -- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
> -+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
> - peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
> - os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
> - os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> -@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
> - wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
> - return -1;
> - }
> -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
> - wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
> - peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> - os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
> -@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
> - }
> -
> -
> -+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
> -+{
> -+ int i;
> -+
> -+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
> -+ if (nonce[i])
> -+ return 1;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ return 0;
> -+}
> -+
> -+
> - static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
> - const u8 *buf, size_t len)
> - {
> -@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
> - peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
> - peer->cipher = cipher;
> -
> -- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
> -+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
> -+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
> - /*
> - * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
> - * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
> -@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
> - "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
> - goto error;
> - }
> -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
> - }
> -
> - #if 0
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index d0978c797..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
> -From a42eb67c42f845faf266b0633d52e17f2a82f511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
> -Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
> -
> -The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
> -the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
> -case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
> -pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
> -be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
> -even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
> -Reassociation Response frame.
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j at w1.fi>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <zhengrq.fnst at cn.fujitsu.com>
> ----
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
> - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
> - 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
> - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
> - wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
> - #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
> -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
> -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
> -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
> -
> - /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
> - wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
> -index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
> -@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
> - u16 capab;
> -
> - sm->ft_completed = 0;
> -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
> -
> - buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
> - 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
> -@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> -+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
> -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+
> - if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
> - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
> - return -1;
> -@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
> -+
> - if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
> - return -1;
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
> -@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
> - size_t r0kh_id_len;
> - u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
> - int ft_completed;
> -+ int ft_reassoc_completed;
> - int over_the_ds_in_progress;
> - u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
> - int set_ptk_after_assoc;
> ---
> -1.8.3.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 522fc394b..000000000
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
> -hostapd-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526
> -
> -[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
> -
> -wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
> -
> -Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
> -processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
> -flag set, but not the MIC flag.
> -
> -When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
> -not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
> -the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
> -negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
> -unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
> -could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
> -in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961]
> -CVE: CVE-2018-14526
> -Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek at siemens.com>
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644
> ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
> -@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
> -
> - if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
> - (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
> -+ /*
> -+ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
> -+ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
> -+ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
> -+ * which is the case in this code branch.
> -+ */
> -+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
> -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
> -+ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
> -+ goto out;
> -+ }
> - if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
> - &key_data_len))
> - goto out;
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.8.bb
> similarity index 64%
> rename from meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
> rename to meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.8.bb
> index 42aae4279..15884d0d0 100644
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.8.bb
> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ SUMMARY = "User space daemon for extended IEEE 802.11 management"
> HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/hostapd/"
> SECTION = "kernel/userland"
> LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
> -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://hostapd/README;md5=8aa4e8c78b59b12016c4cb2d0a8db350"
> +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://hostapd/README;md5=1ec986bec88070e2a59c68c95d763f89"
>
> DEPENDS = "libnl openssl"
>
> @@ -11,18 +11,10 @@ SRC_URI = " \
> file://defconfig \
> file://init \
> file://hostapd.service \
> - file://0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch \
> - file://0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch \
> - file://0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch \
> - file://0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch \
> - file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \
> - file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \
> - file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \
> - file://hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch \
> "
>
> -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"
> -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d"
> +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ed2c254e5f400838cb9d8e7b6e43b86c"
> +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "929f522be6eeec38c53147e7bc084df028f65f148a3f7e4fa6c4c3f955cee4b0"
>
> S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}"
> B = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}/hostapd"
>
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