[oe] [PATCH 1/5] samba: Security Advisory - CVE-2013-4496
Martin Jansa
martin.jansa at gmail.com
Fri Jun 13 11:11:28 UTC 2014
On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 02:12:54PM +0800, Chong Lu wrote:
> Samba 3.x before 3.6.23, 4.0.x before 4.0.16, and 4.1.x before 4.1.6
> does not enforce the password-guessing protection mechanism for all
> interfaces, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access
> via brute-force ChangePasswordUser2 (1) SAMR or (2) RAP attempts.
>
> http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-4496
As you care about samba, would you mind sending fix for autodetecting
talloc?
see
http://lists.openembedded.org/pipermail/openembedded-core/2014-June/093414.html
>
> Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao at windriver.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu at windriver.com>
> ---
> .../samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch | 966 ++++++++++++++++++++
> meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 967 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..c190a6c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,966 @@
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +
> +From 25066eb31d6608075b5993b0d19b3e0843cdadeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 14:55:44 +1300
> +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3-samr: Block attempts to crack passwords
> + via repeated password changes
> +
> +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
> +---
> + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++
> + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
> + 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
> +index 0b4b25b..59905be 100644
> +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
> ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
> +@@ -1106,6 +1106,8 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
> + struct samu *sampass = NULL;
> + NTSTATUS nt_status;
> + bool ret = false;
> ++ bool updated_badpw = false;
> ++ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
> +
> + if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
> + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
> +@@ -1121,6 +1123,13 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
> + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
> + }
> +
> ++ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> ++ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> ++ DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", user));
> ++ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
> ++ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> ++ }
> ++
> + nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
> + password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
> + old_lm_hash_encrypted,
> +@@ -1129,6 +1138,52 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
> + sampass,
> + &new_passwd);
> +
> ++ /*
> ++ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
> ++ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
> ++ */
> ++ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(sampass,
> ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status));
> ++
> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
> ++ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
> ++
> ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
> ++ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
> ++ {
> ++ increment_bad_pw_count = true;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
> ++ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass);
> ++ updated_badpw = true;
> ++ } else {
> ++ pdb_update_bad_password_count(sampass,
> ++ &updated_badpw);
> ++ }
> ++ } else {
> ++
> ++ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> ++ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){
> ++ pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> ++ pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> ++ updated_badpw = true;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (updated_badpw) {
> ++ NTSTATUS update_status;
> ++ become_root();
> ++ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
> ++ unbecome_root();
> ++
> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
> ++ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
> ++ nt_errstr(update_status)));
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
> + TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
> + return nt_status;
> +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> +index 78ef1ba..3241b97 100644
> +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> +@@ -1715,9 +1715,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + NTSTATUS status;
> + bool ret = false;
> + struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
> +- struct samu *pwd;
> ++ struct samu *pwd = NULL;
> + struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
> + struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
> ++ bool updated_badpw = false;
> ++ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
> +
> + uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
> + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
> +@@ -1729,6 +1731,15 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
> + sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
> +
> ++ /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> ++ if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> ++ !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> ++ !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> ++ /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> ++ present */
> ++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> ++ }
> ++
> + if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
> + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
> + }
> +@@ -1742,6 +1753,14 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> + }
> +
> ++ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> ++ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> ++ DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
> ++ pdb_get_username(pwd)));
> ++ status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> ++ goto out;
> ++ }
> ++
> + {
> + const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
> +
> +@@ -1750,29 +1769,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> +
> + if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
> + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto out;
> ++ goto update_login;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
> + memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
> + }
> +
> +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> +- present */
> +- status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> + /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
> + D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
> + D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto out;
> ++ goto update_login;
> + }
> +
> + /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
> +@@ -1780,7 +1789,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto out;
> ++ goto update_login;
> + }
> +
> + /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> +@@ -1789,7 +1798,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto out;
> ++ goto update_login;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +@@ -1799,7 +1808,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto out;
> ++ goto update_login;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +@@ -1810,6 +1819,55 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + }
> +
> + status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> ++
> ++update_login:
> ++
> ++ /*
> ++ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
> ++ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
> ++ */
> ++ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd,
> ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status));
> ++
> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> ++ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
> ++
> ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
> ++ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
> ++ {
> ++ increment_bad_pw_count = true;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
> ++ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd);
> ++ updated_badpw = true;
> ++ } else {
> ++ pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd,
> ++ &updated_badpw);
> ++ }
> ++ } else {
> ++
> ++ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> ++ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){
> ++ pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> ++ pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> ++ updated_badpw = true;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (updated_badpw) {
> ++ NTSTATUS update_status;
> ++ become_root();
> ++ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> ++ unbecome_root();
> ++
> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
> ++ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
> ++ nt_errstr(update_status)));
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> + out:
> + TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
> +
> +--
> +1.7.9.5
> +
> +
> +From 059da248cf69a3b0ef29836f49367b938fb1cbda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 14:04:20 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3:auth: fix memory leak in the
> + ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT case.
> +
> +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
> +---
> + source3/auth/check_samsec.c | 1 +
> + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> +
> +diff --git a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
> +index f918dc0..e2c42d6 100644
> +--- a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
> ++++ b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
> +@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
> + /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> + if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> + DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", username));
> ++ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
> + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> + }
> +
> +--
> +1.7.9.5
> +
> +
> +From 27f982ef33a1238ae48d7a38d608dd23ebde61ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 16:16:46 +1300
> +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] CVE-2013-4496:samr: Remove ChangePasswordUser
> +
> +This old password change mechanism does not provide the plaintext to
> +validate against password complexity, and it is not used by modern
> +clients.
> +
> +The missing features in both implementations (by design) were:
> +
> + - the password complexity checks (no plaintext)
> + - the minimum password length (no plaintext)
> +
> +Additionally, the source3 version did not check:
> +
> + - the minimum password age
> + - pdb_get_pass_can_change() which checks the security
> + descriptor for the 'user cannot change password' setting.
> + - the password history
> + - the output of the 'passwd program' if 'unix passwd sync = yes'.
> +
> +Finally, the mechanism was almost useless, as it was incorrectly
> +only made available to administrative users with permission
> +to reset the password. It is removed here so that it is not
> +mistakenly reinstated in the future.
> +
> +Andrew Bartlett
> +
> +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> +---
> + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 169 +-------------------
> + source3/smbd/lanman.c | 254 -------------------------------
> + source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c | 126 +--------------
> + source4/torture/rpc/samr.c | 12 +-
> + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 537 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> +index 3241b97..2519a3f 100644
> +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> +@@ -1706,172 +1706,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupNames(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + }
> +
> + /****************************************************************
> +- _samr_ChangePasswordUser
> ++ _samr_ChangePasswordUser.
> ++
> ++ So old it is just not worth implementing
> ++ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
> ++ complexity checking and cannot update other services that use a
> ++ plaintext password via passwd chat/pam password change/ldap password
> ++ sync.
> + ****************************************************************/
> +
> + NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> + struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
> + {
> +- NTSTATUS status;
> +- bool ret = false;
> +- struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
> +- struct samu *pwd = NULL;
> +- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
> +- struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
> +- bool updated_badpw = false;
> +- NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
> +-
> +- uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
> +- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
> +- struct samr_user_info, &status);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- return status;
> +- }
> +-
> +- DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
> +- sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
> +-
> +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> +- present */
> +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> +- }
> +-
> +- if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
> +- }
> +-
> +- become_root();
> +- ret = pdb_getsampwsid(pwd, &uinfo->sid);
> +- unbecome_root();
> +-
> +- if (!ret) {
> +- TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> +- if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> +- DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
> +- pdb_get_username(pwd)));
> +- status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- {
> +- const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
> +-
> +- lm_pass = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(pwd);
> +- nt_pass = pdb_get_nt_passwd(pwd);
> +-
> +- if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
> +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto update_login;
> +- }
> +-
> +- memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
> +- memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
> +- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
> +- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto update_login;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
> +- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
> +- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto update_login;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> +- check the nt cross hash */
> +- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross) {
> +- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto update_login;
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> +- check the lm cross hash */
> +- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross) {
> +- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- goto update_login;
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd(pwd, new_ntPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED) ||
> +- !pdb_set_lanman_passwd(pwd, new_lmPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED)) {
> +- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> +-
> +-update_login:
> +-
> +- /*
> +- * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
> +- * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
> +- */
> +- update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd,
> +- NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status));
> +-
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
> +-
> +- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
> +- (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> +- NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
> +- {
> +- increment_bad_pw_count = true;
> +- }
> +-
> +- if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
> +- pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd);
> +- updated_badpw = true;
> +- } else {
> +- pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd,
> +- &updated_badpw);
> +- }
> +- } else {
> +-
> +- if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> +- (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){
> +- pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> +- pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> +- updated_badpw = true;
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- if (updated_badpw) {
> +- NTSTATUS update_status;
> +- become_root();
> +- update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> +- unbecome_root();
> +-
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
> +- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
> +- nt_errstr(update_status)));
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- out:
> +- TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
> +-
> +- return status;
> ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
> + }
> +
> + /*******************************************************************
> +diff --git a/source3/smbd/lanman.c b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
> +index aef12df..3b4ec65 100644
> +--- a/source3/smbd/lanman.c
> ++++ b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
> +@@ -2947,259 +2947,6 @@ static bool api_NetRemoteTOD(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
> + }
> +
> + /****************************************************************************
> +- Set the user password.
> +-*****************************************************************************/
> +-
> +-static bool api_SetUserPassword(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
> +- connection_struct *conn,uint16 vuid,
> +- char *param, int tpscnt,
> +- char *data, int tdscnt,
> +- int mdrcnt,int mprcnt,
> +- char **rdata,char **rparam,
> +- int *rdata_len,int *rparam_len)
> +-{
> +- char *np = get_safe_str_ptr(param,tpscnt,param,2);
> +- char *p = NULL;
> +- fstring user;
> +- fstring pass1,pass2;
> +- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_tos();
> +- NTSTATUS status, result;
> +- struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL;
> +- struct policy_handle connect_handle, domain_handle, user_handle;
> +- struct lsa_String domain_name;
> +- struct dom_sid2 *domain_sid;
> +- struct lsa_String names;
> +- struct samr_Ids rids;
> +- struct samr_Ids types;
> +- struct samr_Password old_lm_hash;
> +- struct samr_Password new_lm_hash;
> +- int errcode = NERR_badpass;
> +- uint32_t rid;
> +- int encrypted;
> +- int min_pwd_length;
> +- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL;
> +-
> +- /* Skip 2 strings. */
> +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,np);
> +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
> +-
> +- if (!np || !p) {
> +- return False;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* Do we have a string ? */
> +- if (skip_string(param,tpscnt,p) == NULL) {
> +- return False;
> +- }
> +- pull_ascii_fstring(user,p);
> +-
> +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
> +- if (!p) {
> +- return False;
> +- }
> +-
> +- memset(pass1,'\0',sizeof(pass1));
> +- memset(pass2,'\0',sizeof(pass2));
> +- /*
> +- * We use 31 here not 32 as we're checking
> +- * the last byte we want to access is safe.
> +- */
> +- if (!is_offset_safe(param,tpscnt,p,31)) {
> +- return False;
> +- }
> +- memcpy(pass1,p,16);
> +- memcpy(pass2,p+16,16);
> +-
> +- encrypted = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+32,0,-1);
> +- if (encrypted == -1) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- min_pwd_length = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+34,0,-1);
> +- if (min_pwd_length == -1) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- *rparam_len = 4;
> +- *rparam = smb_realloc_limit(*rparam,*rparam_len);
> +- if (!*rparam) {
> +- return False;
> +- }
> +-
> +- *rdata_len = 0;
> +-
> +- DEBUG(3,("Set password for <%s> (encrypted: %d, min_pwd_length: %d)\n",
> +- user, encrypted, min_pwd_length));
> +-
> +- ZERO_STRUCT(connect_handle);
> +- ZERO_STRUCT(domain_handle);
> +- ZERO_STRUCT(user_handle);
> +-
> +- status = rpc_pipe_open_interface(mem_ctx, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id,
> +- conn->session_info,
> +- &conn->sconn->client_id,
> +- conn->sconn->msg_ctx,
> +- &cli);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- DEBUG(0,("api_SetUserPassword: could not connect to samr: %s\n",
> +- nt_errstr(status)));
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- b = cli->binding_handle;
> +-
> +- status = dcerpc_samr_Connect2(b, mem_ctx,
> +- global_myname(),
> +- SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER |
> +- SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS |
> +- SAMR_ACCESS_LOOKUP_DOMAIN,
> +- &connect_handle,
> +- &result);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- init_lsa_String(&domain_name, get_global_sam_name());
> +-
> +- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupDomain(b, mem_ctx,
> +- &connect_handle,
> +- &domain_name,
> +- &domain_sid,
> +- &result);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenDomain(b, mem_ctx,
> +- &connect_handle,
> +- SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT,
> +- domain_sid,
> +- &domain_handle,
> +- &result);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- init_lsa_String(&names, user);
> +-
> +- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupNames(b, mem_ctx,
> +- &domain_handle,
> +- 1,
> +- &names,
> +- &rids,
> +- &types,
> +- &result);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- if (rids.count != 1) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_NO_SUCH_USER);
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (rids.count != types.count) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (types.ids[0] != SID_NAME_USER) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- rid = rids.ids[0];
> +-
> +- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenUser(b, mem_ctx,
> +- &domain_handle,
> +- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD,
> +- rid,
> +- &user_handle,
> +- &result);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- if (encrypted == 0) {
> +- E_deshash(pass1, old_lm_hash.hash);
> +- E_deshash(pass2, new_lm_hash.hash);
> +- } else {
> +- ZERO_STRUCT(old_lm_hash);
> +- ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_hash);
> +- memcpy(old_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass1), 16));
> +- memcpy(new_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass2), 16));
> +- }
> +-
> +- status = dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser(b, mem_ctx,
> +- &user_handle,
> +- true, /* lm_present */
> +- &old_lm_hash,
> +- &new_lm_hash,
> +- false, /* nt_present */
> +- NULL, /* old_nt_crypted */
> +- NULL, /* new_nt_crypted */
> +- false, /* cross1_present */
> +- NULL, /* nt_cross */
> +- false, /* cross2_present */
> +- NULL, /* lm_cross */
> +- &result);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> +- goto out;
> +- }
> +-
> +- errcode = NERR_Success;
> +- out:
> +-
> +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&user_handle)) {
> +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &user_handle, &result);
> +- }
> +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&domain_handle)) {
> +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &domain_handle, &result);
> +- }
> +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&connect_handle)) {
> +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &connect_handle, &result);
> +- }
> +-
> +- memset((char *)pass1,'\0',sizeof(fstring));
> +- memset((char *)pass2,'\0',sizeof(fstring));
> +-
> +- SSVAL(*rparam,0,errcode);
> +- SSVAL(*rparam,2,0); /* converter word */
> +- return(True);
> +-}
> +-
> +-/****************************************************************************
> + Set the user password (SamOEM version - gets plaintext).
> + ****************************************************************************/
> +
> +@@ -5790,7 +5537,6 @@ static const struct {
> + {"NetServerEnum2", RAP_NetServerEnum2, api_RNetServerEnum2}, /* anon OK */
> + {"NetServerEnum3", RAP_NetServerEnum3, api_RNetServerEnum3}, /* anon OK */
> + {"WAccessGetUserPerms",RAP_WAccessGetUserPerms,api_WAccessGetUserPerms},
> +- {"SetUserPassword", RAP_WUserPasswordSet2, api_SetUserPassword},
> + {"WWkstaUserLogon", RAP_WWkstaUserLogon, api_WWkstaUserLogon},
> + {"PrintJobInfo", RAP_WPrintJobSetInfo, api_PrintJobInfo},
> + {"WPrintDriverEnum", RAP_WPrintDriverEnum, api_WPrintDriverEnum},
> +diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
> +index ee13a11..e618740 100644
> +--- a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
> ++++ b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
> +@@ -32,131 +32,17 @@
> +
> + /*
> + samr_ChangePasswordUser
> ++
> ++ So old it is just not worth implementing
> ++ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
> ++ complexity checking and cannot update all the other password hashes.
> ++
> + */
> + NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
> + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> + struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
> + {
> +- struct dcesrv_handle *h;
> +- struct samr_account_state *a_state;
> +- struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
> +- struct ldb_message **res;
> +- int ret;
> +- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
> +- struct samr_Password *lm_pwd, *nt_pwd;
> +- NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
> +- const char * const attrs[] = { "dBCSPwd", "unicodePwd" , NULL };
> +-
> +- DCESRV_PULL_HANDLE(h, r->in.user_handle, SAMR_HANDLE_USER);
> +-
> +- a_state = h->data;
> +-
> +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> +- present */
> +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw
> +- * hashes. */
> +- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
> +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
> +- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0);
> +- if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* fetch the old hashes */
> +- ret = gendb_search_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
> +- a_state->account_dn, &res, attrs);
> +- if (ret != 1) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +-
> +- status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx,
> +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
> +- res[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) || !nt_pwd) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
> +- if (lm_pwd) {
> +- D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
> +- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd, 16) != 0) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
> +- D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
> +- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd, 16) != 0) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> +- check the nt cross hash */
> +- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross && lm_pwd) {
> +- D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> +- check the lm cross hash */
> +- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross && lm_pwd) {
> +- D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> +- }
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* Start a SAM with user privileges for the password change */
> +- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
> +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
> +- dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info, 0);
> +- if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
> +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* Start transaction */
> +- ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
> +- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
> +- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
> +- return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* Performs the password modification. We pass the old hashes read out
> +- * from the database since they were already checked against the user-
> +- * provided ones. */
> +- status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
> +- a_state->account_dn,
> +- a_state->domain_state->domain_dn,
> +- NULL, &new_lmPwdHash, &new_ntPwdHash,
> +- lm_pwd, nt_pwd, /* this is a user password change */
> +- NULL,
> +- NULL);
> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> +- ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
> +- return status;
> +- }
> +-
> +- /* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
> +- ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
> +- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
> +- DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
> +- ldb_dn_get_linearized(a_state->account_dn),
> +- ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
> +- return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
> +- }
> +-
> +- return NT_STATUS_OK;
> ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> +diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
> +index 7d9a1e2..adfc5d4 100644
> +--- a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
> ++++ b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
> +@@ -1728,8 +1728,16 @@ static bool test_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b,
> +
> + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser_r(b, tctx, &r),
> + "ChangePasswordUser failed");
> +- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
> +- "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash");
> ++
> ++ /* Do not proceed if this call has been removed */
> ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) {
> ++ return true;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION)) {
> ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
> ++ "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash");
> ++ }
> +
> + /* Unbreak the LM hash */
> + hash1.hash[0]--;
> +--
> +1.7.9.5
> +
> diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
> index 20b609d..f80e41e 100644
> --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
> +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
> file://configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch;patchdir=.. \
> file://configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch;patchdir=.. \
> file://configure-libunwind.patch;patchdir=.. \
> + file://samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch;patchdir=.. \
> "
> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "fbb245863eeef2fffe172df779a217be"
> SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4f5a171a8d902c6b4f822ed875c51eb8339196d9ccf0ecd7f6521c966b3514de"
> --
> 1.7.9.5
>
> --
> _______________________________________________
> Openembedded-devel mailing list
> Openembedded-devel at lists.openembedded.org
> http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-devel
--
Martin 'JaMa' Jansa jabber: Martin.Jansa at gmail.com
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