[oe] [PATCH 1/5] samba: Security Advisory - CVE-2013-4496
Martin Jansa
martin.jansa at gmail.com
Mon Jun 23 11:05:00 UTC 2014
On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 01:11:28PM +0200, Martin Jansa wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 02:12:54PM +0800, Chong Lu wrote:
> > Samba 3.x before 3.6.23, 4.0.x before 4.0.16, and 4.1.x before 4.1.6
> > does not enforce the password-guessing protection mechanism for all
> > interfaces, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access
> > via brute-force ChangePasswordUser2 (1) SAMR or (2) RAP attempts.
> >
> > http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-4496
>
> As you care about samba, would you mind sending fix for autodetecting
> talloc?
>
> see
> http://lists.openembedded.org/pipermail/openembedded-core/2014-June/093414.html
I've merged this changes (as I don't want to block security fixes), but
please fix autodetecting talloc.
> > Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <Yue.Tao at windriver.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu at windriver.com>
> > ---
> > .../samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch | 966 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb | 1 +
> > 2 files changed, 967 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
> >
> > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000..c190a6c
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba/samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch
> > @@ -0,0 +1,966 @@
> > +Upstream-Status: Backport
> > +
> > +From 25066eb31d6608075b5993b0d19b3e0843cdadeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > +From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> > +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 14:55:44 +1300
> > +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3-samr: Block attempts to crack passwords
> > + via repeated password changes
> > +
> > +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
> > +
> > +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> > +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> > +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
> > +---
> > + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++
> > + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
> > + 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> > +
> > +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
> > +index 0b4b25b..59905be 100644
> > +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
> > ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
> > +@@ -1106,6 +1106,8 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
> > + struct samu *sampass = NULL;
> > + NTSTATUS nt_status;
> > + bool ret = false;
> > ++ bool updated_badpw = false;
> > ++ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
> > +
> > + if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
> > + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
> > +@@ -1121,6 +1123,13 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
> > + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
> > + }
> > +
> > ++ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> > ++ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> > ++ DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", user));
> > ++ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
> > ++ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > + nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
> > + password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
> > + old_lm_hash_encrypted,
> > +@@ -1129,6 +1138,52 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
> > + sampass,
> > + &new_passwd);
> > +
> > ++ /*
> > ++ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
> > ++ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
> > ++ */
> > ++ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(sampass,
> > ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status));
> > ++
> > ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
> > ++ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
> > ++
> > ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
> > ++ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> > ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
> > ++ {
> > ++ increment_bad_pw_count = true;
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > ++ if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
> > ++ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass);
> > ++ updated_badpw = true;
> > ++ } else {
> > ++ pdb_update_bad_password_count(sampass,
> > ++ &updated_badpw);
> > ++ }
> > ++ } else {
> > ++
> > ++ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> > ++ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){
> > ++ pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> > ++ pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> > ++ updated_badpw = true;
> > ++ }
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > ++ if (updated_badpw) {
> > ++ NTSTATUS update_status;
> > ++ become_root();
> > ++ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
> > ++ unbecome_root();
> > ++
> > ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
> > ++ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
> > ++ nt_errstr(update_status)));
> > ++ }
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
> > + TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
> > + return nt_status;
> > +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> > +index 78ef1ba..3241b97 100644
> > +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> > ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> > +@@ -1715,9 +1715,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + NTSTATUS status;
> > + bool ret = false;
> > + struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
> > +- struct samu *pwd;
> > ++ struct samu *pwd = NULL;
> > + struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
> > + struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
> > ++ bool updated_badpw = false;
> > ++ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
> > +
> > + uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
> > + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
> > +@@ -1729,6 +1731,15 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
> > + sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
> > +
> > ++ /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> > ++ if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> > ++ !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> > ++ !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> > ++ /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> > ++ present */
> > ++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > + if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
> > + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
> > + }
> > +@@ -1742,6 +1753,14 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > + }
> > +
> > ++ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> > ++ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> > ++ DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
> > ++ pdb_get_username(pwd)));
> > ++ status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> > ++ goto out;
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > + {
> > + const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
> > +
> > +@@ -1750,29 +1769,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > +
> > + if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
> > + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto out;
> > ++ goto update_login;
> > + }
> > +
> > + memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
> > + memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
> > + }
> > +
> > +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> > +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> > +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> > +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> > +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> > +- present */
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > + /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
> > + D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
> > + D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto out;
> > ++ goto update_login;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
> > +@@ -1780,7 +1789,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto out;
> > ++ goto update_login;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> > +@@ -1789,7 +1798,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto out;
> > ++ goto update_login;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > +@@ -1799,7 +1808,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto out;
> > ++ goto update_login;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > +@@ -1810,6 +1819,55 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + }
> > +
> > + status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> > ++
> > ++update_login:
> > ++
> > ++ /*
> > ++ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
> > ++ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
> > ++ */
> > ++ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd,
> > ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status));
> > ++
> > ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > ++ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
> > ++
> > ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
> > ++ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> > ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
> > ++ {
> > ++ increment_bad_pw_count = true;
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > ++ if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
> > ++ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd);
> > ++ updated_badpw = true;
> > ++ } else {
> > ++ pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd,
> > ++ &updated_badpw);
> > ++ }
> > ++ } else {
> > ++
> > ++ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> > ++ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){
> > ++ pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> > ++ pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> > ++ updated_badpw = true;
> > ++ }
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > ++ if (updated_badpw) {
> > ++ NTSTATUS update_status;
> > ++ become_root();
> > ++ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> > ++ unbecome_root();
> > ++
> > ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
> > ++ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
> > ++ nt_errstr(update_status)));
> > ++ }
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > + out:
> > + TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
> > +
> > +--
> > +1.7.9.5
> > +
> > +
> > +From 059da248cf69a3b0ef29836f49367b938fb1cbda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > +From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> > +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 14:04:20 +0100
> > +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3:auth: fix memory leak in the
> > + ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT case.
> > +
> > +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
> > +
> > +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
> > +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
> > +---
> > + source3/auth/check_samsec.c | 1 +
> > + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> > +
> > +diff --git a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
> > +index f918dc0..e2c42d6 100644
> > +--- a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
> > ++++ b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
> > +@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
> > + /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> > + if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> > + DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", username));
> > ++ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
> > + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> > + }
> > +
> > +--
> > +1.7.9.5
> > +
> > +
> > +From 27f982ef33a1238ae48d7a38d608dd23ebde61ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > +From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> > +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 16:16:46 +1300
> > +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] CVE-2013-4496:samr: Remove ChangePasswordUser
> > +
> > +This old password change mechanism does not provide the plaintext to
> > +validate against password complexity, and it is not used by modern
> > +clients.
> > +
> > +The missing features in both implementations (by design) were:
> > +
> > + - the password complexity checks (no plaintext)
> > + - the minimum password length (no plaintext)
> > +
> > +Additionally, the source3 version did not check:
> > +
> > + - the minimum password age
> > + - pdb_get_pass_can_change() which checks the security
> > + descriptor for the 'user cannot change password' setting.
> > + - the password history
> > + - the output of the 'passwd program' if 'unix passwd sync = yes'.
> > +
> > +Finally, the mechanism was almost useless, as it was incorrectly
> > +only made available to administrative users with permission
> > +to reset the password. It is removed here so that it is not
> > +mistakenly reinstated in the future.
> > +
> > +Andrew Bartlett
> > +
> > +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
> > +
> > +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
> > +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
> > +---
> > + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 169 +-------------------
> > + source3/smbd/lanman.c | 254 -------------------------------
> > + source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c | 126 +--------------
> > + source4/torture/rpc/samr.c | 12 +-
> > + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 537 deletions(-)
> > +
> > +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> > +index 3241b97..2519a3f 100644
> > +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> > ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
> > +@@ -1706,172 +1706,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupNames(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + }
> > +
> > + /****************************************************************
> > +- _samr_ChangePasswordUser
> > ++ _samr_ChangePasswordUser.
> > ++
> > ++ So old it is just not worth implementing
> > ++ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
> > ++ complexity checking and cannot update other services that use a
> > ++ plaintext password via passwd chat/pam password change/ldap password
> > ++ sync.
> > + ****************************************************************/
> > +
> > + NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
> > + struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
> > + {
> > +- NTSTATUS status;
> > +- bool ret = false;
> > +- struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
> > +- struct samu *pwd = NULL;
> > +- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
> > +- struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
> > +- bool updated_badpw = false;
> > +- NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
> > +-
> > +- uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
> > +- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
> > +- struct samr_user_info, &status);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- return status;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
> > +- sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
> > +-
> > +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> > +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> > +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> > +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> > +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> > +- present */
> > +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- become_root();
> > +- ret = pdb_getsampwsid(pwd, &uinfo->sid);
> > +- unbecome_root();
> > +-
> > +- if (!ret) {
> > +- TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
> > +- if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
> > +- DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n",
> > +- pdb_get_username(pwd)));
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- {
> > +- const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
> > +-
> > +- lm_pass = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(pwd);
> > +- nt_pass = pdb_get_nt_passwd(pwd);
> > +-
> > +- if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto update_login;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
> > +- memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
> > +- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
> > +- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto update_login;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
> > +- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
> > +- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto update_login;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> > +- check the nt cross hash */
> > +- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross) {
> > +- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto update_login;
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> > +- check the lm cross hash */
> > +- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross) {
> > +- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- goto update_login;
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd(pwd, new_ntPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED) ||
> > +- !pdb_set_lanman_passwd(pwd, new_lmPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED)) {
> > +- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> > +-
> > +-update_login:
> > +-
> > +- /*
> > +- * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
> > +- * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
> > +- */
> > +- update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd,
> > +- NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status));
> > +-
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
> > +-
> > +- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
> > +- (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> > +- NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
> > +- {
> > +- increment_bad_pw_count = true;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
> > +- pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd);
> > +- updated_badpw = true;
> > +- } else {
> > +- pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd,
> > +- &updated_badpw);
> > +- }
> > +- } else {
> > +-
> > +- if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
> > +- (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){
> > +- pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> > +- pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
> > +- updated_badpw = true;
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- if (updated_badpw) {
> > +- NTSTATUS update_status;
> > +- become_root();
> > +- update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
> > +- unbecome_root();
> > +-
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
> > +- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
> > +- nt_errstr(update_status)));
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- out:
> > +- TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
> > +-
> > +- return status;
> > ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*******************************************************************
> > +diff --git a/source3/smbd/lanman.c b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
> > +index aef12df..3b4ec65 100644
> > +--- a/source3/smbd/lanman.c
> > ++++ b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
> > +@@ -2947,259 +2947,6 @@ static bool api_NetRemoteTOD(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
> > + }
> > +
> > + /****************************************************************************
> > +- Set the user password.
> > +-*****************************************************************************/
> > +-
> > +-static bool api_SetUserPassword(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
> > +- connection_struct *conn,uint16 vuid,
> > +- char *param, int tpscnt,
> > +- char *data, int tdscnt,
> > +- int mdrcnt,int mprcnt,
> > +- char **rdata,char **rparam,
> > +- int *rdata_len,int *rparam_len)
> > +-{
> > +- char *np = get_safe_str_ptr(param,tpscnt,param,2);
> > +- char *p = NULL;
> > +- fstring user;
> > +- fstring pass1,pass2;
> > +- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_tos();
> > +- NTSTATUS status, result;
> > +- struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL;
> > +- struct policy_handle connect_handle, domain_handle, user_handle;
> > +- struct lsa_String domain_name;
> > +- struct dom_sid2 *domain_sid;
> > +- struct lsa_String names;
> > +- struct samr_Ids rids;
> > +- struct samr_Ids types;
> > +- struct samr_Password old_lm_hash;
> > +- struct samr_Password new_lm_hash;
> > +- int errcode = NERR_badpass;
> > +- uint32_t rid;
> > +- int encrypted;
> > +- int min_pwd_length;
> > +- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL;
> > +-
> > +- /* Skip 2 strings. */
> > +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,np);
> > +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
> > +-
> > +- if (!np || !p) {
> > +- return False;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* Do we have a string ? */
> > +- if (skip_string(param,tpscnt,p) == NULL) {
> > +- return False;
> > +- }
> > +- pull_ascii_fstring(user,p);
> > +-
> > +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
> > +- if (!p) {
> > +- return False;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- memset(pass1,'\0',sizeof(pass1));
> > +- memset(pass2,'\0',sizeof(pass2));
> > +- /*
> > +- * We use 31 here not 32 as we're checking
> > +- * the last byte we want to access is safe.
> > +- */
> > +- if (!is_offset_safe(param,tpscnt,p,31)) {
> > +- return False;
> > +- }
> > +- memcpy(pass1,p,16);
> > +- memcpy(pass2,p+16,16);
> > +-
> > +- encrypted = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+32,0,-1);
> > +- if (encrypted == -1) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- min_pwd_length = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+34,0,-1);
> > +- if (min_pwd_length == -1) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- *rparam_len = 4;
> > +- *rparam = smb_realloc_limit(*rparam,*rparam_len);
> > +- if (!*rparam) {
> > +- return False;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- *rdata_len = 0;
> > +-
> > +- DEBUG(3,("Set password for <%s> (encrypted: %d, min_pwd_length: %d)\n",
> > +- user, encrypted, min_pwd_length));
> > +-
> > +- ZERO_STRUCT(connect_handle);
> > +- ZERO_STRUCT(domain_handle);
> > +- ZERO_STRUCT(user_handle);
> > +-
> > +- status = rpc_pipe_open_interface(mem_ctx, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id,
> > +- conn->session_info,
> > +- &conn->sconn->client_id,
> > +- conn->sconn->msg_ctx,
> > +- &cli);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- DEBUG(0,("api_SetUserPassword: could not connect to samr: %s\n",
> > +- nt_errstr(status)));
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- b = cli->binding_handle;
> > +-
> > +- status = dcerpc_samr_Connect2(b, mem_ctx,
> > +- global_myname(),
> > +- SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER |
> > +- SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS |
> > +- SAMR_ACCESS_LOOKUP_DOMAIN,
> > +- &connect_handle,
> > +- &result);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- init_lsa_String(&domain_name, get_global_sam_name());
> > +-
> > +- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupDomain(b, mem_ctx,
> > +- &connect_handle,
> > +- &domain_name,
> > +- &domain_sid,
> > +- &result);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenDomain(b, mem_ctx,
> > +- &connect_handle,
> > +- SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT,
> > +- domain_sid,
> > +- &domain_handle,
> > +- &result);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- init_lsa_String(&names, user);
> > +-
> > +- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupNames(b, mem_ctx,
> > +- &domain_handle,
> > +- 1,
> > +- &names,
> > +- &rids,
> > +- &types,
> > +- &result);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- if (rids.count != 1) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_NO_SUCH_USER);
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (rids.count != types.count) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (types.ids[0] != SID_NAME_USER) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- rid = rids.ids[0];
> > +-
> > +- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenUser(b, mem_ctx,
> > +- &domain_handle,
> > +- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD,
> > +- rid,
> > +- &user_handle,
> > +- &result);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- if (encrypted == 0) {
> > +- E_deshash(pass1, old_lm_hash.hash);
> > +- E_deshash(pass2, new_lm_hash.hash);
> > +- } else {
> > +- ZERO_STRUCT(old_lm_hash);
> > +- ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_hash);
> > +- memcpy(old_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass1), 16));
> > +- memcpy(new_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass2), 16));
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- status = dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser(b, mem_ctx,
> > +- &user_handle,
> > +- true, /* lm_present */
> > +- &old_lm_hash,
> > +- &new_lm_hash,
> > +- false, /* nt_present */
> > +- NULL, /* old_nt_crypted */
> > +- NULL, /* new_nt_crypted */
> > +- false, /* cross1_present */
> > +- NULL, /* nt_cross */
> > +- false, /* cross2_present */
> > +- NULL, /* lm_cross */
> > +- &result);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
> > +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
> > +- goto out;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- errcode = NERR_Success;
> > +- out:
> > +-
> > +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&user_handle)) {
> > +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &user_handle, &result);
> > +- }
> > +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&domain_handle)) {
> > +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &domain_handle, &result);
> > +- }
> > +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&connect_handle)) {
> > +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &connect_handle, &result);
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- memset((char *)pass1,'\0',sizeof(fstring));
> > +- memset((char *)pass2,'\0',sizeof(fstring));
> > +-
> > +- SSVAL(*rparam,0,errcode);
> > +- SSVAL(*rparam,2,0); /* converter word */
> > +- return(True);
> > +-}
> > +-
> > +-/****************************************************************************
> > + Set the user password (SamOEM version - gets plaintext).
> > + ****************************************************************************/
> > +
> > +@@ -5790,7 +5537,6 @@ static const struct {
> > + {"NetServerEnum2", RAP_NetServerEnum2, api_RNetServerEnum2}, /* anon OK */
> > + {"NetServerEnum3", RAP_NetServerEnum3, api_RNetServerEnum3}, /* anon OK */
> > + {"WAccessGetUserPerms",RAP_WAccessGetUserPerms,api_WAccessGetUserPerms},
> > +- {"SetUserPassword", RAP_WUserPasswordSet2, api_SetUserPassword},
> > + {"WWkstaUserLogon", RAP_WWkstaUserLogon, api_WWkstaUserLogon},
> > + {"PrintJobInfo", RAP_WPrintJobSetInfo, api_PrintJobInfo},
> > + {"WPrintDriverEnum", RAP_WPrintDriverEnum, api_WPrintDriverEnum},
> > +diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
> > +index ee13a11..e618740 100644
> > +--- a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
> > ++++ b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c
> > +@@ -32,131 +32,17 @@
> > +
> > + /*
> > + samr_ChangePasswordUser
> > ++
> > ++ So old it is just not worth implementing
> > ++ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
> > ++ complexity checking and cannot update all the other password hashes.
> > ++
> > + */
> > + NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
> > + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> > + struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
> > + {
> > +- struct dcesrv_handle *h;
> > +- struct samr_account_state *a_state;
> > +- struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
> > +- struct ldb_message **res;
> > +- int ret;
> > +- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
> > +- struct samr_Password *lm_pwd, *nt_pwd;
> > +- NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
> > +- const char * const attrs[] = { "dBCSPwd", "unicodePwd" , NULL };
> > +-
> > +- DCESRV_PULL_HANDLE(h, r->in.user_handle, SAMR_HANDLE_USER);
> > +-
> > +- a_state = h->data;
> > +-
> > +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
> > +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
> > +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
> > +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
> > +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
> > +- present */
> > +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw
> > +- * hashes. */
> > +- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
> > +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
> > +- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0);
> > +- if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* fetch the old hashes */
> > +- ret = gendb_search_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
> > +- a_state->account_dn, &res, attrs);
> > +- if (ret != 1) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx,
> > +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
> > +- res[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) || !nt_pwd) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
> > +- if (lm_pwd) {
> > +- D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
> > +- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd, 16) != 0) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
> > +- D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
> > +- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd, 16) != 0) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> > +- check the nt cross hash */
> > +- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross && lm_pwd) {
> > +- D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
> > +- check the lm cross hash */
> > +- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross && lm_pwd) {
> > +- D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
> > +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
> > +- }
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* Start a SAM with user privileges for the password change */
> > +- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
> > +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
> > +- dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info, 0);
> > +- if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
> > +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* Start transaction */
> > +- ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
> > +- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
> > +- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
> > +- return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* Performs the password modification. We pass the old hashes read out
> > +- * from the database since they were already checked against the user-
> > +- * provided ones. */
> > +- status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
> > +- a_state->account_dn,
> > +- a_state->domain_state->domain_dn,
> > +- NULL, &new_lmPwdHash, &new_ntPwdHash,
> > +- lm_pwd, nt_pwd, /* this is a user password change */
> > +- NULL,
> > +- NULL);
> > +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> > +- ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
> > +- return status;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- /* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
> > +- ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
> > +- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
> > +- DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
> > +- ldb_dn_get_linearized(a_state->account_dn),
> > +- ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
> > +- return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
> > +- }
> > +-
> > +- return NT_STATUS_OK;
> > ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > +diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
> > +index 7d9a1e2..adfc5d4 100644
> > +--- a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
> > ++++ b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c
> > +@@ -1728,8 +1728,16 @@ static bool test_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b,
> > +
> > + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser_r(b, tctx, &r),
> > + "ChangePasswordUser failed");
> > +- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
> > +- "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash");
> > ++
> > ++ /* Do not proceed if this call has been removed */
> > ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) {
> > ++ return true;
> > ++ }
> > ++
> > ++ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION)) {
> > ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
> > ++ "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash");
> > ++ }
> > +
> > + /* Unbreak the LM hash */
> > + hash1.hash[0]--;
> > +--
> > +1.7.9.5
> > +
> > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
> > index 20b609d..f80e41e 100644
> > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
> > +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/samba/samba_3.6.8.bb
> > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
> > file://configure-disable-getaddrinfo-cross.patch;patchdir=.. \
> > file://configure-disable-core_pattern-cross-check.patch;patchdir=.. \
> > file://configure-libunwind.patch;patchdir=.. \
> > + file://samba-3.6.22-CVE-2013-4496.patch;patchdir=.. \
> > "
> > SRC_URI[md5sum] = "fbb245863eeef2fffe172df779a217be"
> > SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4f5a171a8d902c6b4f822ed875c51eb8339196d9ccf0ecd7f6521c966b3514de"
> > --
> > 1.7.9.5
> >
> > --
> > _______________________________________________
> > Openembedded-devel mailing list
> > Openembedded-devel at lists.openembedded.org
> > http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-devel
>
> --
> Martin 'JaMa' Jansa jabber: Martin.Jansa at gmail.com
--
Martin 'JaMa' Jansa jabber: Martin.Jansa at gmail.com
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