[oe] [PATCH] proftpd: CVE-2016-3125
akuster808
akuster808 at gmail.com
Wed Apr 27 16:01:12 UTC 2016
If I am not mistaken, this will apply to Krogoth, jethro and Fido.
- armin
On 04/27/2016 06:57 AM, Catalin Enache wrote:
> The mod_tls module in ProFTPD before 1.3.5b and 1.3.6 before
> 1.3.6rc2 does not properly handle the TLSDHParamFile directive,
> which might cause a weaker than intended Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
> to be used and consequently allow attackers to have unspecified
> impact via unknown vectors.
>
> http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-3125
>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache at windriver.com>
> ---
> .../proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++
> .../recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 248 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..69c9be0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/files/CVE-2016-3125.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
> +From 7a8f683cedf9b0d1024a80362693c9f8b93a0f2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: TJ Saunders <tj at castaglia.org>
> +Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 15:07:58 -0800
> +Subject: [PATCH] Backport of fix for Bug#4230 to 1.3.5 branch.
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +CVE: CVE-2016-3125
> +
> +Author: TJ Saunders <tj at castaglia.org>
> +Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache at windriver.com>
> +---
> + contrib/mod_tls.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> + 1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/contrib/mod_tls.c b/contrib/mod_tls.c
> +index df92658..5883cc7 100644
> +--- a/contrib/mod_tls.c
> ++++ b/contrib/mod_tls.c
> +@@ -411,6 +411,13 @@ static int tls_required_on_ctrl = 0;
> + static int tls_required_on_data = 0;
> + static unsigned char *tls_authenticated = NULL;
> +
> ++/* Define the minimum DH group length we allow (unless the AllowWeakDH
> ++ * TLSOption is used). Ideally this would be 2048, per https://weakdh.org,
> ++ * but for compatibility with older Java versions, which only support up to
> ++ * 1024, we'll use 1024. For now.
> ++ */
> ++#define TLS_DH_MIN_LEN 1024
> ++
> + /* mod_tls session flags */
> + #define TLS_SESS_ON_CTRL 0x0001
> + #define TLS_SESS_ON_DATA 0x0002
> +@@ -438,6 +445,7 @@ static unsigned char *tls_authenticated = NULL;
> + #define TLS_OPT_USE_IMPLICIT_SSL 0x0200
> + #define TLS_OPT_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATIONS 0x0400
> + #define TLS_OPT_VERIFY_CERT_CN 0x0800
> ++#define TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH 0x1000
> +
> + /* mod_tls SSCN modes */
> + #define TLS_SSCN_MODE_SERVER 0
> +@@ -2417,24 +2425,139 @@ static int tls_ctrl_renegotiate_cb(CALLBACK_FRAME) {
> +
> + static DH *tls_dh_cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) {
> + DH *dh = NULL;
> ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
> ++ int pkeylen = 0, use_pkeylen = FALSE;
> ++
> ++ /* OpenSSL will only ever call us (currently) with a keylen of 512 or 1024;
> ++ * see the SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH macro in ssl_locl.h. Sigh.
> ++ *
> ++ * Thus we adjust the DH parameter length according to the size of the
> ++ * RSA/DSA private key used for the current connection.
> ++ *
> ++ * NOTE: This MAY cause interoperability issues with some clients, notably
> ++ * Java 7 (and earlier) clients, since Java 7 and earlier supports
> ++ * Diffie-Hellman only up to 1024 bits. More sighs. To deal with these
> ++ * clients, then, you need to configure a certificate/key of 1024 bits.
> ++ */
> ++ pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
> ++ if (pkey != NULL) {
> ++ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
> ++ EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
> ++ pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
> ++
> ++ if (pkeylen < TLS_DH_MIN_LEN) {
> ++ if (!(tls_opts & TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH)) {
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
> ++ "certificate private key length %d less than %d bits, using %d "
> ++ "(see AllowWeakDH TLSOption)", pkeylen, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN,
> ++ TLS_DH_MIN_LEN);
> ++ pkeylen = TLS_DH_MIN_LEN;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (pkeylen != keylen) {
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 13,
> ++ "adjusted DH parameter length from %d to %d bits", keylen, pkeylen);
> ++ use_pkeylen = TRUE;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++ }
> +
> + if (tls_tmp_dhs != NULL &&
> + tls_tmp_dhs->nelts > 0) {
> + register unsigned int i;
> +- DH **dhs;
> ++ DH *best_dh = NULL, **dhs;
> ++ int best_dhlen = 0;
> +
> + dhs = tls_tmp_dhs->elts;
> ++
> ++ /* Search the configured list of DH parameters twice: once for any sizes
> ++ * matching the actual requested size (usually 1024), and once for any
> ++ * matching the certificate private key size (pkeylen).
> ++ *
> ++ * This behavior allows site admins to configure a TLSDHParamFile that
> ++ * contains 1024-bit parameters, for e.g. Java 7 (and earlier) clients.
> ++ */
> ++
> ++ /* Note: the keylen argument is in BITS, but DH_size() returns the number
> ++ * of BYTES.
> ++ */
> + for (i = 0; i < tls_tmp_dhs->nelts; i++) {
> +- /* Note: the keylength argument is in BITS, but DH_size() returns
> +- * the number of BYTES.
> ++ int dhlen;
> ++
> ++ dhlen = DH_size(dhs[i]) * 8;
> ++ if (dhlen == keylen) {
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
> ++ "found matching DH parameter for key length %d", keylen);
> ++ return dhs[i];
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ /* Try to find the next "best" DH to use, where "best" means
> ++ * the smallest DH that is larger than the necessary keylen.
> + */
> +- if (DH_size(dhs[i]) == (keylength / 8)) {
> ++ if (dhlen > keylen) {
> ++ if (best_dh != NULL) {
> ++ if (dhlen < best_dhlen) {
> ++ best_dh = dhs[i];
> ++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ } else {
> ++ best_dh = dhs[i];
> ++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ for (i = 0; i < tls_tmp_dhs->nelts; i++) {
> ++ int dhlen;
> ++
> ++ dhlen = DH_size(dhs[i]) * 8;
> ++ if (dhlen == pkeylen) {
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
> ++ "found matching DH parameter for certificate private key length %d",
> ++ pkeylen);
> + return dhs[i];
> + }
> ++
> ++ if (dhlen > pkeylen) {
> ++ if (best_dh != NULL) {
> ++ if (dhlen < best_dhlen) {
> ++ best_dh = dhs[i];
> ++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ } else {
> ++ best_dh = dhs[i];
> ++ best_dhlen = dhlen;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (best_dh != NULL) {
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
> ++ "using best DH parameter for key length %d (length %d)", keylen,
> ++ best_dhlen);
> ++ return best_dh;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +- switch (keylength) {
> ++ /* Still no DH parameters found? Use the built-in ones. */
> ++
> ++ if (keylen < TLS_DH_MIN_LEN) {
> ++ if (!(tls_opts & TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH)) {
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
> ++ "requested key length %d less than %d bits, using %d "
> ++ "(see AllowWeakDH TLSOption)", keylen, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN);
> ++ keylen = TLS_DH_MIN_LEN;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (use_pkeylen) {
> ++ keylen = pkeylen;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ switch (keylen) {
> + case 512:
> + dh = get_dh512();
> + break;
> +@@ -2443,32 +2566,33 @@ static DH *tls_dh_cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) {
> + dh = get_dh768();
> + break;
> +
> +- case 1024:
> +- dh = get_dh1024();
> +- break;
> ++ case 1024:
> ++ dh = get_dh1024();
> ++ break;
> +
> +- case 1536:
> +- dh = get_dh1536();
> +- break;
> ++ case 1536:
> ++ dh = get_dh1536();
> ++ break;
> +
> +- case 2048:
> +- dh = get_dh2048();
> +- break;
> ++ case 2048:
> ++ dh = get_dh2048();
> ++ break;
> +
> +- default:
> +- tls_log("unsupported DH key length %d requested, returning 1024 bits",
> +- keylength);
> +- dh = get_dh1024();
> +- break;
> ++ default:
> ++ tls_log("unsupported DH key length %d requested, returning 1024 bits",
> ++ keylen);
> ++ dh = get_dh1024();
> ++ break;
> + }
> +
> ++ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11, "using builtin DH for %d bits", keylen);
> ++
> + /* Add this DH to the list, so that it can be freed properly later. */
> + if (tls_tmp_dhs == NULL) {
> + tls_tmp_dhs = make_array(session.pool, 1, sizeof(DH *));
> + }
> +
> + *((DH **) push_array(tls_tmp_dhs)) = dh;
> +-
> + return dh;
> + }
> +
> +@@ -8445,6 +8569,9 @@ MODRET set_tlsoptions(cmd_rec *cmd) {
> + strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "AllowClientRenegotiations") == 0) {
> + opts |= TLS_OPT_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATIONS;
> +
> ++ } else if (strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "AllowWeakDH") == 0) {
> ++ opts |= TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH;
> ++
> + } else if (strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "EnableDiags") == 0) {
> + opts |= TLS_OPT_ENABLE_DIAGS;
> +
> +--
> +2.7.4
> +
> diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb
> index 8197ff8..cdf71e7 100644
> --- a/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb
> +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-daemons/proftpd/proftpd_1.3.5a.bb
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.proftpd.org/distrib/source/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
> file://contrib.patch \
> file://build_fixup.patch \
> file://proftpd.service \
> + file://CVE-2016-3125.patch \
> "
>
> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b9d3092411478415b31d435f8e26d173"
>
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